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Saturday, September 10, 2011

Nine Fronts In The Next War

From Middle East and Terrorism:

Thursday, September 8, 2011


Nine Fronts in the Next War







by David Meir-Levi





The current unrest pursuant to the “Arab Spring” is a mixed blessing for Iran. On one hand, if young Bashir were to fall, Iran will lose its most important ally in the western part of the Arab world. A break with Syria would be a serious defeat for Iran, since it would no longer be able to supply Hezbollah directly, nor would it have direct contact and supervision over its proxy terror armies in Lebanon, the Sinai, and the Gaza Strip. It would also be very bad news for Hezbollah, whose terrorist leaders rely heavily on Iranian supplies, funds, and armaments, all channeled into Lebanon via Syria. Hamas too would suffer from a break in its link with its Iranian godfather.



But on the other hand, Iran is exploiting the great opportunity created by the chaos and upheaval of the “Arab Spring”. Iran does not want to see its foothold in the west undermined by this upheaval, so it has helped Bashir in his use of extreme force; and it has also begun to manipulate the “Arab Spring” violence and unrest to its advantage.



To gain maximum benefit from the situation in Egypt and to turn the world’s attention from Syria, Iran has activated two of its proxies, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, to renew attacks on Israel: blowing up the natural gas pipeline from the northern Sinai to Israel, firing scores of rockets into Israeli towns and villages near the Gaza Strip, most recently launching three brutal attacks on civilians near Eilat, and more in the offing. Igniting a new war between Israel and Egypt, or at least precipitating a crescendo in the incendiary calls for war from the Egyptian populous and neighboring Arab states, would be a marvelous win-win for Iran and for the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the best organized and most popular of the political groups contending for power in post-Mubarak Egypt.



If Israel’s response to the attacks from the Gaza Strip and Sinai were to trigger a war with Egypt, Israel is likely to win; but the turmoil and upheaval in the wake of that war would weaken the Egyptian generals currently ruling Egypt with a temporary de facto mandate. Once shamed in defeat, they would lose credibility and popularity (there already have been protests against their continued rule and postponed elections). This scenario would create the perfect storm into which the MB could sail to political control. If, despite the attacks, Israel shows restraint, the MB can still shame the generals for not confronting Israel, and then either provoke a war or use the failure of the generals to confront Israel as a way to shame and weaken them and pave the way for the MB’s own rise to power.



Better yet, if Iran, through its proxies, could spark a war with Israel, and the other forces confronting Israel were to join in, Israel would be fighting on many fronts at once. In that case, the likelihood of Israel’s victory is in question.



El Qaeda is thoroughly ensconced in the Sinai. Currently Israel and Egypt are said to be in conversation about Egypt’s re-militarizing the Sinai, so perhaps the Egyptian army could be deployed against al-Qaeda and Hamas there. But if the MB succeeds in gaining a position of political strength in Egypt, it is not likely that the Egyptian military will be deployed in the Sinai to drive al-Qaeda out. Quite the opposite, the MB wants a military confrontation with Israel. So it is likely to see al-Qaeda in Sinai as an ally in such a war. And if the MB and al-Qaeda go to war against Israel, then Hamas in the Gaza Strip is sure to follow. Hamas cannot stand idly by while its Egyptian brethren initiate the great final jihad against Israel.



With Egypt, al-Qaeda and Hamas attacking Israel on its southern and western fronts, Iran will want Hezbollah to get in on the action and make use of the thousands of rockets and missiles that it has stockpiled just for this very moment, thus opening a northern front.



Syria may have difficulty deploying a large military force on the Golan front if it must use its military against its civilian demonstrators; but Iran will be in a position to aid Syria in suppressing unrest (probably in a manner similar to what Bashir’s father Hafez el-Assad did in 1982), and young Bashir will want a distraction on the Golan front to turn his citizenry’s attention, and the opprobrium of the world, from his slaughter of unarmed demonstrators. Even if Bashir falls, undesirable for Iran but an eventuality that the Mullahs may be anticipating, a Syrian government run by the MB or other Islamo-fascists of that ilk will be delighted to join Egypt and others in a pincer-movement assault on Israel. So a Syrian Golan front is very likely to open once Israel is at war with Egypt, Hamas, el-Qaeda and Hezbollah.



In the West Bank, Hamas is strong because its extreme Islamo-fascist ideology and commitment to Israel’s annihilation hold the sympathies of many. Fatah and the PLO, the main components of the PA, are condemned in some circles for their collaboration with Israel. The PA will not be able to maintain a position of power if it chooses to sit out a war against Israel; especially since the PA is in stiff competition with Hamas for the hearts and minds of the West Bank electorate, and it looks like entering a shooting war with Israel is a good way to win those hearts and minds. So it is very likely that another intifada could erupt once the southern, western and northern fronts are aflame, probably targeting the Israeli communities scattered throughout Judea and Samaria. Such a terror offensive could cause high numbers of casualties but is not likely to create an existential military threat. However, a West Bank terror war would be a serious distraction for Israel and would reduce Israel’s ability to concentrate its military on the fronts that are existential threats.



And then there are the Arab Israelis. No one knows for sure how many Arab Israelis are active supporters of Hamas et al, but however many there are, they could be mobilized for fifth column terrorism against Israeli military bases, infrastructure, and civilians: another distraction that would sap Israel’s ability to face the greater threats on its borders.

Egypt, al-Qaeda in Sinai, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria in the Golan, Palestinian terrorist forces in the West Bank, and Arab Israelis in downtown Israel: Seven fronts.



But there’s more!



Jordan sits on a powder keg and the MB is itching to light the fuse. If the MB succeeds in supplanting the Hashemites, there can be little doubt that the newly Islamized Jordan will join the war against Israel, at very least by aiding and abetting the West Bank Arab terrorists, and perhaps by launching their own invasion from the east: front number eight.



Iran is moving ahead with alacrity to achieve WMD capabilities, despite some setbacks engineered by Israel over the past 5 years (Stuxnet being the most recent). Iran already has missiles capable of carrying nuclear payloads to Israel and beyond. West Bank or Israeli Muslims vaporized by Iran’s nuclear attack are not part of the Mullahs’ concerns. Muslim men will be martyrs, united with their celestial virgins (unclear what happens to the women and children), and besides, “Allah knows best who is wounded in His way.”[i] The Arabs of the West Bank and Israel are merely expendable pawns , collateral damage, just part of the price that the Arab world must pay for its final victory over Israel. Syria is a very important part of this equation, because Syria has substantial stockpiles of missiles and chemical warheads which can be deployed against all of Israel at very close range, to augment the internal terrorism from the West Bank and from Arab Israelis, and to mop up whatever of Israel may survive Iran’s nuclear attack.



So Iran is front number nine – and it will be a nuclear front.



In short, Israel is in greater danger now than it has ever been, even more so than during its 1948 war of survival.



Notes:



[i] A quote from Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood​, from his writings on Jihad, quoting a Hadith from Sahih Bukhari. See http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/jihad/ and http://www.sunnipath.com/library/Hadith/H0002P0061.aspx for Qur’anic and extra-Qur’anic sources.





David Meir-Levi



Source: http://frontpagemag.com/2011/09/07/nine-fronts-in-the-next-war/



Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Posted by sally at 1:56 AM

BEYOND THE TENTH YEAR IN AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

From FPRI:

BEYOND THE TENTH YEAR IN AFGHANISTAN:


SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY



by William B. Caldwell, IV. and Derek S. Reveron



Ten years ago, Afghanistan was politically fractured,

economically irrelevant, and socially repressive. The

Taliban government, recognized by only three countries at

the time, reduced the nation's GDP per capita to under $170,

almost completely destroyed public infrastructure, and

ruptured Afghanistan into a conglomeration of belligerent

localities, geographically isolated from one another.

Afghanistan hosted al-Qa'ida and we soon learned what the

latest National Military Strategy of the United States

underscored, "In this interdependent world, the enduring

interests of the United States are increasingly tied to

those of other state and non-state actors." Afghanistan is

no exception.



While Taliban totalitarianism attempted to destroy Afghans'

future, the international community has attempted to reverse

societal regression. To be sure, Afghanistan still has many

challenges, but it is also not the fragmented society it

once was either. Insurgent groups still conduct attacks,

primarily in the south and east, but much has changed in ten

years-Afghanistan is now sovereign, the international

community is heavily invested in the future of Afghanistan,

and their society is slowly recovering. With international

assistance, GDP has increased to $1,000 per capita, almost

all Afghans have access to basic health services, and school

enrollment increased from 900,000 (mainly boys) to almost

seven million (37 percent girls). Women now serve in

Parliament and even train to be pilots in the Afghan Air

Force. Most of the country is now connected via mobile

phones, highways, and common purpose-assuming responsibility

for its own security, which remains threatened by various

insurgent groups.



Internationally, Afghanistan is not the pariah it once was

and it is on the verge of helping to link Central and South

Asia along a new Silk Road. India is providing $2 billion

worth of assistance; Uzbekistan is building rail links in

the north; and China is investing in the east. In short,

Afghanistan is attempting to normalize its international

relations and is on a path that President Obama outlined at

West Point on December 1, 2009 to "deny al Qaeda a safe

haven...reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the

ability to overthrow the government_ and strengthen the

capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so

that they can take the lead responsibility for Afghanistan's

future." In contrast to other ethnically-diverse countries

wracked by years of war, Afghans overwhelmingly favor a

unified, multi-ethnic country where ISAF members are

welcomed as guests.



To be sure, progress is dependent on international support

for Afghanistan, but as agreed at the NATO summit in Lisbon

last fall, Kabul will increasingly assume lead

responsibility for its development and security. This

process started in July of this year when the first seven

areas began to transition lead security responsibility from

NATO to Afghanistan. Far from an anomaly, this international

approach to enabling other governments to provide security

for their people is a contemporary feature of U.S. national

security. As former secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote,

"building partner capacity: helping others defend themselves

or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing

them with equipment, training, or other forms of security

assistance_[because] building the security capacity of other

countries must be a critical element of U.S. national

security strategy." These ideas are being practiced in

Afghanistan every day and have enabled the Afghan Surge.



THE AFGHAN SURGE

When the United States surged an additional 30,000 troops to

Afghanistan, they supported the training of Afghan soldiers

and police that now number 305,000. The growth is not only a

testament to the strength of partnership between the

international community and the government of Afghanistan,

but also Afghans' willingness to heed the call to defend

their country and determine their future. Taken together,

the combined NATO-Afghan force provides security "shoulder-

to-shoulder," in Dari shohna ba shohna, and in Pashtu ooga-

pa-ooga. NATO forces are partnered with Afghan units at many

levels and make the ultimate sacrifice too (last year Afghan

security personnel were killed at a rate one and half times

greater than coalition forces). This unfortunate fact is

both a reminder of the dangers insurgents pose and the

Afghans' heavy engagement in the fight for control of their

country. But the costs are beginning to show progress. In

July, NATO transitioned lead security responsibility to

Afghan forces in seven areas. The transition process will

continue through 2014 when NATO will shift to a supporting

role and underscores the importance of training, equipping,

and fielding a self-sustaining and enduring Afghan Army, Air

Force, and Police.



Former Minister of Interior Ali Jalali wrote in Prism in

September 2010, "the key to future success is a shared

vision for the end-state in Afghanistan, and the building of

indigenous capacity to achieve this goal." Afghan

presidential advsior Dr. Ashraf Ghani wrote in the same

issue, "the success of the counteroffensive will be judged

by its role in the larger project of

counterinsurgency-creating the enabling environment for a

stable political and economic system that can turn both

Afghan citizens and regional players into stakeholders in

its success." An underappreciated fact is that this is the

Afghans' war. Minister of Defense Wardak, Minister of

Interior Mohammadi, Chief of General Staff Karimi, Ground

Force Commander Murad Ali, and Sergeant Major Roshan are its

leaders. Every day, Afghan soldiers and police are

conducting patrols in Helmand, interdicting insurgents in

Paktika, and recovering weapons caches in Khost. ISAF forces

are certainly essential to these efforts today, but it is

with Afghans that combined operations protect the

population, build institutions, and deprive insurgents the

support they need. And over the next three years, ISAF

operations will yield to Afghan-led operations. This process

coupled with increased growth and professionalization is

enabling the Afghan military and police to assume greater

responsibility for security and self-reliance.



BEYOND GROWTH

Over the next year, the Afghan Army, Air Force, and Afghan

National Police will continue to grow from 305,000 and reach

their combined authorized end strength of 352,000. At the

same time Afghan infantry kandaks (battalions) replace ISAF

combat forces, the Afghan Army will also develop the

critical enabling and supporting capabilities. With its own

logistic capability, the army will be able to deliver

supplies to forward deployed units. With its own explosive

ordinance disposal units, the army will be able to defuse

improvised explosive devices left by insurgents; and with

its own air force, Afghanistan will have the capability to

support its forces in the field or assist with regional

disaster relief operations.



Afghan police are making progress too. Initially saddled by

disparate training programs and lacking civilian police

trainers, the Afghan National Police did not grow as easily

as the Army did. With the importance of civil policing to

assist social recovery, the Ministry of Interior revised its

training program to develop an Afghan curriculum based on

best practices from the European Union Police, German Police

Project Team, NATO countries, and non-NATO countries. The

curriculum advances Afghan civil policing through various

topics such as: criminal investigation fundamentals, human

rights, and gender issues. Given the security environment

and its starting point, it will take several years to impart

civil policing norms, but Afghan police are benefiting from

partnerships with organizations such as Royal Canadian

Mounted Police, Italian Caribinieri, French Gendarmerie, and

other members of the European Gendarmerie Force.



The progress of these efforts is evident in our daily

activities with Afghan policymakers, military, and police

leaders. Minister of Interior Mohammadi told the Afghan

National Police Symposium in January, "To win the support

and confidence of the people and provide for the personal

security of the citizens, we are determined to concentrate

more on developing civilian policing capacities of the ANP."

And President Karzai told an audience at the March National

Military Academy of Afghanistan graduation, "We understand

that the people of Afghanistan no longer want to see others

defend for them_The transition is the answer to the long

held aspirations of the people of Afghanistan." For this to

occur, recruited forces need to be trained, equipped,

fielded, and sustained.



Recruit and Train



Every day, more than 32,000 Afghan personnel are in training

at 70 sites across 21 provinces in Afghanistan, and in

selected courses in the United Arab Emirates and Turkey. The

results are evident. In just two short years, the Afghan

National Army went from using Soviet-era equipment to more

modern NATO weapons. Weapons qualifications rates increased

dramatically and Afghans learned to conduct convoy

operations. Soldiers once unable to count or read are now

enrolled in mandatory literacy training.



An unfortunate reality is that those eligible for military

and police service had their educations stolen by decades of

war. While Afghans have a proud warrior ethos and tactical

intelligence, they lacked the ability to write their names

or count to ten. To make up for the shortfall, all

illiterate Afghan soldiers and police recruits are enrolled

in mandatory literacy programs to ensure they reach the

international standard for literacy. Currently, about 3,000

Afghan teachers are following Afghan Ministry of Education

guidelines to help recruits overcome the illiteracy barrier.

We see the effect in the force and see literacy as the

essential enabler. Literate soldiers and police can now

account for the gear they are issued and know that they are

receiving their full pay. And soldiers subjected to graft

now receive a living wage through electronic banking.

Finally, literate soldiers can read the service manuals for

the equipment they are issued and perform the necessary

services and repair equipment to ensure the significant

investment in vehicles and equipment is maintained and

accounted for properly. The international investment in the

literacy program is showing progress; the literacy rate in

the army and police will be twice that of the population in

2012.



Professionalize and Sustain



Since 2009, international focus has been on fielding trained

infantry to meet the needs of counterinsurgency with

additional combat fighting formations. Attrition in the Army

remains stubborn, but the force will continue to grow

another 47,000 over the next year with increased emphasis on

specialty or vocational training. Today, Afghans are

studying to be mechanics, engineers, and personnel

specialists. There are now 12 vocational schools that

provide Afghans the skill sets they need to sustain the

force the international community invested so heavily in.

Shifting from an ISAF-enabled infantry to a professional and

self-sustaining Afghan force will occur over the next

several years, but with an indigenous training base, a

process that is on-going.



Since the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan was created in

November 2009, investing in Afghan human capital has been a

priority. Through the "Afghan First" program, NATO is

supporting indigenous industries to supply uniforms,

equipment, and services to the Afghan military and police.

Under the Afghan First program, about 17,000 Afghan jobs

were created; this facilitates the development of legitimate

commerce, reduces cross-border transactions, and

institutionalizes transparent procurement mechanisms.

Further, supporting local industry reduces international

dependency and lays a foundation for sustainability.



Building enduring systems and institutions is a central

feature of the NATO strategy in Afghanistan. Lessons from

other conflict-prone societies suggest that sustainment is

essential to secure short-term gains and give a war-stricken

society a chance to recover. Given the investment made over

the last ten years and the priority of supporting

Afghanistan's stability, the international community and the

Afghan government reaffirmed a long-term commitment to a

better future for the Afghan people at last fall's summit in

Lisbon. Specifically, NATO and Afghan leaders agreed to

"sustaining and improving their capacity and capability to

counter threats to the security, stability and integrity of

Afghanistan effectively, and contributing to regional

security; and doing so with full respect for Afghan

sovereignty and leadership, in a manner consistent with and

supportive of the Afghan constitution and international law

and recognizing the sacrifices and the ongoing endeavors of

the Afghan people for achieving peace." To realize these

goals, army and police professionalization continues apace.



The effects are evident. Dr. Ashraf Ghani, who now oversees

the security transition process for President Karzai, noted,

"The Afghan National Army has had an enormous change both in

quality and in numbers." He told us that perceptions of the

Afghan Army and Police are at least two years old. More

importantly, the Afghan people agree. In a November 2010

Asia Foundation poll, 92 percent of Afghans viewed the

Afghan National Army favorably, while 84 percent viewed the

police favorably. In a May International Council on Security

and Development poll, 82 percent of northern Afghans saw the

army as effective compared to 67 percent of southern

Afghans. There are regional differences, but with

international support and training, Afghan soldiers and

police are beginning to show progress. And the Afghan people

increasingly trust and value their soldiers and police. This

is evident in the thousands of Afghans who report to

military and police recruiting stations every month, which

is the surest sign that Afghans want to take charge of their

future and relieve NATO forces of lead security

responsibility. The challenge remains to make the gains

enduring and the Afghan forces self-sustaining.



ESSENTIAL PARTNERSHIP

The progress made over the past two years would not have

been possible without the generous support of the

international community through partnership. Before the

creation of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan there were

disparate efforts with insufficient resources to properly

train and equip the Afghan Army and Police. Today, there are

35 countries (Ukraine and El Salvador are the newest)

providing trainers who are training both new recruits and

Afghan trainers to take their places. This is a clear sign

that the international community is committed to giving

Afghanistan the tools to control its borders, provide

security for its people, and contribute to regional

security.



Countries increasingly recognize that training Afghanistan's

police and military is essential to long-term stability in

Afghanistan and Central Asia. Further, developing,

employing, and sustaining the Afghan National Army, Air

Force, and Police ensures Afghanistan can be a net

contributor to international security rather than a

consumer. With a growing indigenous training base, over the

next several years, the government of Afghanistan will not

be dependent on foreign trainers and endeavors to become a

regional hub for peacekeeping training, pilot training, and

vehicle maintenance.



Reflecting on ten years of United States involvement in

Afghanistan, we recognize the greatest long-term effect we

can have is through partnership. Through partnership, the

training base has expanded and the benefits of partnership

are evident in the fielded force. Our Afghan counterparts

know the languages and terrain of Afghanistan and share

unique cultural insights with NATO forces. Most importantly,

we see hope here that was not here two years ago; with the

proper resources, Afghans can do this mission, which is

supported through security force assistance.



INSIGHTS FROM COMMAND

Our experience in Afghanistan resonates across conflict from

the last 20 years and informs our thinking about future

military operations. While NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan

personnel are working hard with Afghans to develop Afghan

security forces, we are reflecting on the challenges,

successes, and opportunities the mission created. Among

these is the importance of international cooperation, which

undergirds efforts in Afghanistan. This is apparent in

listening to the different languages spoken from Kandahar to

Kabul. Far from an anomaly, partnership remains a key

feature of efforts in Afghanistan and more broadly for

international security.



The collective international experience in Afghanistan must

inform future thinking about the roles and missions of the

U.S. military. U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Martin

Dempsey pointed out in the Army Operating Concept that,

"future Army forces require the capability to conduct

security force assistance and civil military operations

(such as military support to governance, rule of law, and

institutional capacity building) in a multinational

environment with partners and among diverse populations to

support allies and partners, protect and reassure

populations, and isolate and defeat enemies." While we

practice this daily, we continue to redefine the

configuration and employment of conventional assets to build

the capacity of Afghanistan's security sector. We must

capture the lessons and deliberately incorporate them into

U.S. thinking and doctrine.



The U.S. military appears to be at a new, albeit familiar

crossroads. In the 1980s, the United States recognized the

importance of joint operations and worked to improve

cooperation among the military services. In the 1990s,

coalition warfare became the norm and interoperability took

on an international character. In the 2000s, military

operations incorporated interagency capabilities, which

leveraged a whole of government approach to

counterinsurgency and stability operations. In the 2010s, it

is imperative we recognize security force assistance is a

core function of military operations. It is time to evaluate

the shift from combat operations to security force

assistance and work together to consider the implications

for the size, shape, scope, and doctrine of future forces.

Ten years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we must be ready

to enable partners through security assistance to eliminate

security deficits that threaten international peace and

security.



----------------------------------------------------------

Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute

(http://www.fpri.org/).

Pakistan May Have Over-Stated Importance Of Arrested Al Quesa Operative

From Jihad Watch:


Pakistan may have overstated importance of arrested al-Qaeda operative







A possible complication in this story. "Pakistan may have overplayed al-Qaida arrest, terrorism expert says," by Padraic Murphy for the Herald Sun, September 6:



An al-Qaida man captured last week and accused of plotting attacks against Australia may have had his role overstated by Pakistani authorities desperate to win the approval of the US, a local terrorism expert said.



The Pakistani army arrested Younis al-Mauritani in Quetta with two other high-ranking operatives and accused them of plotting attacks against Australia, Europe and the US.



"In an intelligence-driven operation by Inter-Services Intelligence in co-ordination with Frontier Corps Baluchistan, a senior al-Qaida leader, Younis al-Mauritani, mainly responsible for planning and conduct of international operations, was nabbed," a Pakistani army statement said.



It named the others as Abdul Ghaffar al-Shami and Messara al-Shami.



But none of them are featured on the FBI's website of wanted terrorists or the US Treasury Department's list of global terrorists.



According to Pakistan's army, Mauritani was instructed by Osama bin Laden to focus on economic targets in Australia, the US and Europe.



But Australian National University terrorism expert Prof Clive Williams said there had been no threats against Australia by foreign terrorists since 2004.



"I've never heard of this man. It might be he has been picked up by Pakistani[s] keen to show they are co-operating after bin Laden's death," Prof Williams said.



A grainy black and white photograph released by the army shows the al-Qaida operative with short dark hair, a slim face and neatly trimmed moustache and beard.



The Pakistani army said: "He was planning to target US economic interests including gas/oil pipelines, power generating dams and strike ships/oil tankers through explosive-laden speed boats in international waters."



A White House spokesman praised the operation.



"We applaud the actions of Pakistan's intelligence and security services that led to the capture of a senior al-Qaida operative who was involved in planning attacks against the interests of the US and many other countries," White House spokesman Josh Earnest said in Washington.



Contradictory:



Western intelligence officials from two countries confirmed Mauritani was part of al-Qaida's top team and linked to threats against Europe.



Good, but not great?



"If it's confirmed, it's a good catch," said one Western intelligence source.



Posted by Marisol on September 7, 2011 12:09 AM

Libyan Missiles Looted; "They Could Turn All Of North Africa Into A No-Fly Zone"

From Jihad Watch:


Libyan missiles looted; "they could turn all of North Africa into a no-fly-zone"







"Grinch SA-24s are designed to target front-line aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles and drones. They can shoot down a plane flying as high as 11,000 feet and can travel 19,000 feet straight out."



We'll see them again, only next time, they'll be airborne. Great Libyan Jihadist Garage Sale Update. "Exclusive: Libyan missiles looted," by Ben Wedeman and Ingrid Formanek for CNN, September 7:



A potent stash of Russian-made surface-to-air missiles is missing from a huge Tripoli weapons warehouse amid reports of weapons looting across war-torn Libya.



They are Grinch SA-24 shoulder-launched missiles, also known as Igla-S missiles, the equivalent of U.S.-made Stinger missiles.



A CNN team and Human Rights Watch found dozens of empty crates marked with packing lists and inventory numbers that identified the items as Igla-S surface-to-air missiles.



The list for one box, for example, written in English and Russian, said it had contained two missiles, with inventory number "Missile 9M342," and a power source, inventory number "Article 9B238."



Grinch SA-24s are designed to target front-line aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles and drones. They can shoot down a plane flying as high as 11,000 feet and can travel 19,000 feet straight out.



Reinforcing Peter Hitchens' admonitions about the order, discipline, and intentions of NTC fighters: "It looks to me pretty much like a football crowd armed with AK-47s and bazookas, with the added ingredient of Islamic militancy. Why am I expected to like it?"



Fighters aligned with the National Transitional Council and others swiped armaments from the storage facility, witnesses told Human Rights Watch. The warehouse is located near a base of the Khamis Brigade, a special forces unit in Gadhafi's military, in the southeastern part of the capital.



The warehouse contains mortars and artillery rounds, but there are empty crates for those items as well. There are also empty boxes for another surface-to-air missile, the SA-7.



Peter Bouckaert, Human Rights Watch emergencies director, told CNN he has seen the same pattern in armories looted elsewhere in Libya, noting that "in every city we arrive, the first thing to disappear are the surface-to-air missiles."



He said such missiles can fetch many thousands of dollars on the black market.



"We are talking about some 20,000 surface-to-air missiles in all of Libya, and I've seen cars packed with them." he said. "They could turn all of North Africa into a no-fly zone." [...]



Western officials worry that weapons from the storage sites will end up in the hands of militants or adversaries like Iran.



The governments of neighboring Niger and Chad have both said that weapons from Libya are already being smuggled into their countries, and they are destined for al Qaeda. They include detonators and a plastic explosive called Semtex. Chad's president said they include SA-7 missiles.



An ethnic Tuareg leader in the northern Niger city of Agadez also said many weapons have come across the border. He said he and other Tuareg leaders are anxious about Gadhafi's Tuareg fighters returning home - with their weapons - and making common cause with al Qaeda cells in the region. Gadhafi's fighting forces have included mercenaries from other African nations.



The missing weapons also conjure fears of what happened in Iraq, where people grabbed scores of weapons when Saddam Hussein's regime was overthrown.



Bouckaert said one or two of the missing artillery rounds are "enough to make a car bomb."



"We should remember what happened in Iraq," he said, when the "country was turned upside down" by insurgents using such weaponry.



There have been similar concerns in Afghanistan, where the United States provided thousands of Stinger missiles to the Afghan mujahedeen when they were fighting the Soviets in the 1980s. The United States has spent hundreds of millions of dollars trying to buy them back, fearful that they would fall into the hands of terrorists....



Posted by Marisol on September 7, 2011 9:21 AM

New Delhi Bomb Blast Kills Eleven People And Injures 59 Outside The High Court

From Europe News:

New Delhi bomb blast kills 11 people and injures 59 outside the High Court














Metro 8 September 2011

By Manmohan Singh



The bomb, the deadliest attack in India’s capital in three years, left a deep crater on the road and shook the building, sending lawyers and judges fleeing outside. A Muslim militant group claimed responsibility in an email, but investigators said it was too early to name any group as suspects.



The blast, which also injured 59 people at the courthouse gates, was the second to target the building in five months.



‘There was smoke everywhere. People were running and shouting. There was blood everywhere,’ said lawyer Sangeeta Sondhi who was parking her car near the gate.



The attack renewed criticism of India’s ability to protect its main institutions despite a security overhaul that followed the 2008 Mumbai siege. Prime minister Manmohan Singh, who was visiting neighbouring Bangladesh, said: ‘We will never succumb to the pressure of terrorists (...)









Posted September 8th, 2011 by hd

Libya Burning

From Middle East Forum:

Libya Burning


by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

The American Spectator

September 8, 2011



http://www.meforum.org/3033/libya-burning



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As troops aligned with the Libyan interim government continue to advance on the few remaining strongholds of Gaddafi loyalists -- such as Bani Walid (where the tribal elders are refusing to surrender) -- much debate is still raging over Libya's future. Will the country emerge as a stable liberal democracy, will it be torn by ethnic and tribal divisions, or will it transform into an Islamist state?



Of course, there is always a degree of uncertainty in prediction here, but some signs appear to have emerged that strongly discount the first, desirable outcome. To begin with, despite the assurances of the National Transitional Council (NTC) that there will be a focus on reconciliation to avoid punishing all those associated with the Gaddafi regime and thus not repeat the "mistakes of Iraq," it is not at all clear that these soothing words are being put into practice.



Indeed, recently concerns have been raised over the treatment of blacks residing in Libya at the hands of forces loyal to the interim government, and even outlets like the New York Times are starting to pay attention. It is true that a few of these blacks have been employed as mercenaries by Gaddafi, but the overwhelming majority are simply innocent migrant workers imported during Libya's oil boom for construction and menial work. Yet blacks are being targeted by anti-Gaddafi insurgents as though they are all mercenaries guilty of the crimes of the Gaddafi regime.



In fact, as the Wall Street Journal noted, in one town called Tawergha, a brigade of anti-Gaddafi troops that describes itself as dedicated to "purging slaves" and "black skin" has engaged in ethnic cleansing of blacks in the town, and has vowed that in the "new Libya" all remaining blacks in Tawergha would be denied access to health care and schooling in nearby Misrata, from which all blacks have already been expelled.



Similarly, the BBC recently showed a video of hundreds of bodies found in the Abu Salim hospital in Tripoli, but failed to mention, either through genuine neglect or a deliberate intention to mislead, that most of the corpses were those of black people, who had obviously been killed by anti-Gaddafi forces when the city was taken.



The "blacks are mercenaries" myth has been useful to those wishing to downplay the idea that Gaddafi could be receiving support from any native Libyans, and portray the entire conflict as "Gaddafi vs. the people." However, if collective punishment is the way the rebel forces are going to treat those suspected -- rightly or wrongly -- of links to Gaddafi's regime, on what grounds should we presume that there will be no punitive measures implemented against native Libyan groups who have backed Gaddafi during the conflict, including many of the rural Arabized tribes of southwest Fezzan? As I predicted, the rebel forces have recently been giving the Berber Touareg in the far south this kind of harsh treatment.



Clearly, the horrific treatment of blacks is not only a result of racism but also part of an attempt to dismantle anything associated with Gaddafi's legacy (the importation of Africans was one aspect of Gaddafi's eccentric turn towards notions of pan-Africanism and a vision of a "United States of Africa" after 1998).



In any event, it is worth recalling that the Iraqi Shi'a politicians and public figures who pushed for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 (e.g. Ahmad Chalabi​, who is the first cousin of my aunt's husband in Baghdad) repeatedly affirmed that their sole interest was in creating a genuinely free and democratic Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime. Yet once in power through the interim Iraqi Governing Council, whether for reasons of ideological conviction or political expediency, they effectively turned the de-Baa'thification process into "de-Sunnification" in the hope of creating a majoritarian Shi'a democracy. This only aggravated sectarian tensions and culminated in the civil war around Baghdad in 2006.



Even so, it is also evident that there are deep tensions within the anti-Gaddafi forces. In particular, there is good reason to expect a forthcoming conflict between the Amazigh Berbers and the Islamists. The Amazigh Berbers, denied civil rights for decades by Gaddafi and forbidden to speak Tamazight, played a key role in the fighting in the western Nafusa Mountains that eventually led to the successful push towards Tripoli. Quite rightly, they are keen to assert their rights to celebrate their Berber culture and language, and will undoubtedly take further inspiration from the success of Berber activists in Morocco, which has now given Tamazight the status of an official language alongside Arabic.



Meanwhile, the Islamist presence among the anti-Gaddafi forces is now something that cannot be ignored. As Barry Rubin points out, Abdul al-Hakim al-Hasadi has just been named commander of the Tripoli Military Council. This man was formerly head of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization affiliated with al-Qa'ida, and although he claims to have disavowed his record of extremism, many rebel fighters around Misrata are highly suspicious of him. It does not follow from this that Libya will necessarily become an Islamist state, but as the experiences in Algeria, Sudan and Iraq show, Islamists in the Middle East and North Africa despise any assertion of a non-Arab identity and aim to suppress it by instilling terror through indiscriminate attacks.



I sincerely hope that I am proven wrong and that the post-Gaddafi government will promote liberal democracy (nor do I believe that it was wrong to stop Gaddafi's forces from taking Benghazi back in March). Nevertheless, idealistic wishes cannot obscure hard evidence on the ground. At best, NATO can now only make it clear to the NTC that any Islamist aggression originating from Libya will be met with severe retaliation.



Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and an intern at the Middle East Forum.



New York: "Albanian Man" Who Came To The U.S. In 2008 Arrested Boarding Flight To Wage Jihad In Pakistan And "Marry With The Girls In Paradise"

From Jihad Watch:


New York: "Albanian man" who came to the U.S. in 2008 arrested boarding flight to wage jihad in Pakistan and "marry with the girls in paradise"







Qur'an 9:111 promises paradise to those who "slay and are slain" fighting in Allah's cause. The promises of a frat party on steroids for the slain jihadists are rooted in part in Qur'an 52:20 and 78:31-34, and 56:35-37.



"Albanian who allegedly hoped to join terrorists is held in N.Y.," from the Los Angeles Times, September 9:



An Albanian man living in New York has been arrested as he prepared to travel to Pakistan to join a radical group plotting violence against American targets, prosecutors said Friday. The announcement in New York came hours after officials warned of a credible new threat against the country in conjunction with the anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.



The suspect, Agron Hasbajrami, was charged with providing material support to terrorists. He was expected to be arraigned Friday in federal court in Brooklyn, New York, following the unsealing of an indictment that described him as "a danger to the community."



The 27-year-old was arrested Sept. 6 as he prepared to board a flight to Turkey at New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport. In Turkey, he planned to meet up with others who he thought would help him travel to Pakistan to join militants battling U.S. forces in Afghanistan, according to the 11-page indictment.



Hasbajrami had allegedly been arranging his plans with the help of a supposed militant -- one of several contacts -- from a Pakistani-based militant group with which he kept in touch. But the "militant" was working as a confidential source for the FBI.



Agents tipped off to Hasbajrami's plans intercepted him when he arrived at the airport with a one-way ticket in hand. At the time of his arrest, he was also carrying his Albanian passport, a tent, boots and cold-weather gear, authorities said, presumably in preparation for training and waging war in the mountainous areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan.



According to the indictment, agents who searched Hasbajrami's home in Brooklyn found a handwritten note that read: "Do not wait for the invasion, the time is martyrdom time." Among email messages exchanged with contacts in Pakistan was allegedly one in which Hasbajrami expressed his desire to "marry with the girls in paradise," or sacrifice his life in the name of jihad, which promises martyrs they will be rewarded with virgins in paradise.



According to the court documents, Hasbajrami's interest in waging jihad reached back to at least June 2010 and involved the transfer of at least $1,000 to a contact in Pakistan -- apparently not the FBI informant -- involved in militant activities there. In one email exchange last April, Hasbajrami reportedly told the contact that it was not easy to raise money from fellow Muslims in the United States because "when they hear it is for jihad" they became apprehensive.



Apprehension is not enough. Reporting it should be the next step.



Hasbajrami originally planned to travel to Pakistan via Iran and obtained an Iranian visa, but he re-routed himself at the last minute after deciding that this route was problematic. His Iranian visa subsequently expired, and in early September, he was approached by the FBI informant, who offered to help get Hasbajrami to Pakistan via Turkey, the indictment said.



According to the documents, Hasbajrami came to the United States in February 2008. He faces 15 years in prison if convicted.



Posted by Marisol on September 9, 2011 12:10 PM

9/11 Anniversary Threat Intercepted From Al Queda Operative

From Jihad Watch:


9/11 anniversary threat intercepted from al-Qaeda operative







One thing this won't help is the intention in many corners to downplay al-Qaeda in the discourse surrounding the anniversary -- to just "move on." "9/11 threat from al Qaeda operative intercepted, official says," by Barbara Starr, Mike M. Ahlers and Lesa Jansen for CNN, September 9:



Washington (CNN) -- American spy networks have intercepted communications from an al Qaeda operative in Pakistan indicating plans for a terrorist strike in New York or Washington, according to a senior U.S. official.



The communications come from a source who has provided accurate information in the past, the official said, prompting intelligence officials to sift through communications from other al Qaeda cells.



No other corroborating evidence of an attack has been uncovered, the official added.



But the information indicates the plan -- thought to involve a vehicle-borne explosive device -- is meant to coincide with the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attacks.



U.S. officials rarely speak on the record about intelligence intercepts. And in the days following the raid on Osama bin Laden's compound, U.S. officials indicated al Qaeda had gone to great lengths to avoid having its communications intercepted by the United States.



While the precise nature of communication intercepts is rarely discussed, U.S. officials repeatedly have indicated their comfort with sharing the results of those intercepts.



Intelligence officials also say they have picked up "chatter," or widely divergent communications, from extremists that suggest the newly tapped al Qaeda head, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is in some way involved in the current plot.



Meanwhile, heightened security was visible Friday in New York and Washington as intelligence officials worked to pin down information about the potential threat and federal and local law enforcement fanned out across both cities.



A senior U.S. official said the plot was believed to involve three individuals. It is believed to entail a vehicle bomb, but "we cannot rule out other means," the official said.



At least two of the individuals are believed to be American citizens, a U.S. government source said.



U.S. Vice President Joe Biden also weighed in Friday, saying the information was at least in part gleaned from the May raid against bin Laden in Abottabad, Pakistan.



"This is the first ... credible piece of information we've gotten," Biden told NBC's "Today" show. "All hands are on deck."...



Posted by Marisol on September 10, 2011 12:13 AM

Dyess AFB, Texas: First Full House Of B-1Bs

From USAF:
Via Terry

First full house of B-1s




Posted 9/9/2011 Updated 9/9/2011 Email story Print story







by Senior Airman Robert Hicks

7th Bomb Wing Public Affairs



9/9/2011 - DYESS AIR FORCE BASE, Texas -- For the first time, B-1 Bombers from Dyess, Ellsworth and Edwards Air Force Bases are parked on the same ramp at the same time.



The first B-1 Bomber was delivered to Dyess in June 1985. Initial operational capability was achieved Oct. 1, 1986; the final B-1 was delivered May 2, 1988.



"It was exciting to see all the different units' B-1 tails on the runway together after the B-1s were transferred from Mountain Home, Robbins and McConnell Air Force Base to Dyess and Ellsworth," said Richard Warner, 7th Bomb Wing museum curator and historian.



Dyess is the hub of the B-1 community, operating and maintaining more than half the fleet.



"Dyess is an important hub of the B-1 community," said Col. David Béen, 7th Bomb Wing commander. "We have our own combat deployment squadron, weapons school, and test and evaluation squadron. We train every B-1 crew member who enters the Air Force."



The Dyess flightline has plenty of space to hold the fleet of B-1 Bombers stationed here.



"We have more than enough room to hold an entire airlift group of C-130 Hercules, C-130 J models and two-thirds of the B-1 fleet parked on our ramp at one time," Béen said. "We have plenty of space for new missions if the Air Force decides to bring them to Dyess."



The B-1 combat debut consisted of a mixed fleet of Dyess and Ellsworth jets.



The B-1B was first used in combat in support of operations against Iraq during Operation Desert Fox in December 1998. In 1999, six B-1s were used in Operation Allied Force, delivering more than 20 percent of the total ordnance while flying less than 2 percent of the combat sorties.



The B-1A was initially developed in the 1970s as a replacement for the B-52. Four prototypes of this long-range, high speed (Mach 2.2) strategic bomber were developed and tested in the mid-1970s, but the program was canceled in 1977 before going into production. Flight testing continued through 1981.



Source and pics at:

http://www.acc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123270805

Ten Years--We Are Still Missing The Lessons Of 9/11

From AIFD:

Ten Years -- We Are Still Missing the Lessons of 9/11




By Dr. M. Zuhdi Jasser



Published September 10, 2011
FoxNews.com



In recent years and even weeks, the lessons of September 11, 2001 have been lost to constant distraction, the most recent being Mayor Bloomberg's unfathomable decision to forbid people of faith a role at the tenth anniversary commemoration.



Faith was the impetus for the attack, faith was the instrument for healing, and faith is the only hope we have to defeat the ideology that attacked us ten years ago.



Bloomberg's stance encapsulates our greatest liabilities as a nation ten years after 9/11. We, now, more than ever, lack the political will, the national skill sets, and the prominent American Muslim leadership willing to identify, engage, and defeat Islamism.



While many Muslims take the bait of victimology preached by supposed Muslim civil rights groups in America, as American Muslims the rest of us cannot continue to deny the connection no matter how unfair between certain interpretations of our faith and Al Qaeda's brutal attack.



Usama bin Laden did not just represent a handful of militant extremists. He was a standard bearer for an end stage of a global ideology - political Islam (Islamism) - that has buried its roots deep within interpretations of our faith. Islamism is a theo-political construct that believes in the supremacy of the Islamic state and that is the antithesis of what makes America unique and exceptional. It can only be defeated by Muslims who step beyond the distractions and denials and champion an ideological path that binds our identity and faith to liberty and individual freedom.



If American Muslim leaders want to do anything to combat fear of Islamism and any unfair association of all Muslims that may exist, the most effective move would be to form an offensive strategy against Islamists and their ideas from within.



My family came to the U.S. in the 1960's escaping Syria's Baathist oppression in order to be free, more free than they ever dreamed of being in Muslim majority nations.



Yet, it is unconscionable that 10 years after 9/11, the United States is still dithering over the root cause of Islamist terror.



Islamists detest the very fabric of American society. September 11 was not the first attack and it was not the last. If we do not engage in a full throated ideological fight we will continue to witness an ever increasing threat to our homeland.



Sadly, the America I know that I chose to serve as a naval officer has spent an uncharacteristically sheepish decade asleep against the greatest existential threat to our survival. We must now develop and implement a coherent tactical plan to defeat the ideological root of militant Islamism- political Islam and the dreams for some Muslims of the Islamic state.



The threat to the United States has grown exponentially in ten years. A report from the Department of Justice in March of 2010 showed that of 228 terror-related arrests 186 of them were Muslim. That is over 80 percent from a Muslim community that represents less than 2 percent of the U.S. population.



What this report does not tell us is that of the 186 Muslim arrests almost certainly all of them were Muslims that believed in and adhered to an Islamist ideology. Since this report we have seen upwards of another 28 terror-related arrests of Muslims including the likes of Faisal Shahzad -- the Times Square bomber -- and Pvt. Naser Abdo who was preparing a second attack on Fort Hood who both claimed to be "Muslim soldiers" fighting for the ummah (Muslim nation).



The threat is increasing because the ideological message has largely gone unchecked. To change that we need to empower reform-minded liberal Muslim leaders. We need the political will from the Administration and Congress to identify political Islam as the problem and devout reformist Muslims and enlightened Islam as the solution. We need our government, media, and academe to have the skill set to not cower when terms like "Islamophobia" are leveled against those who are smart enough and brave enough to call out political Islam as the problem and we need for Muslims to separate religion and state to defeat Islamism. Unless we do that, our "whack-a-mole" approach to security will eventually miss one.



Western pluralistic societies that embrace individual liberty are not in conflict with the faith of Islam as practiced by most Muslims. This is not a war against a religion. We cannot allow our ideological enemy to use faith to tie our hands in this fight. Hear that Mayor Bloomberg? Mr. President? PC police? We must break the shackles of political correctness and step beyond the fear that paralyzes us against matters that happen to touch on faith.



The founding fathers never intended for faith to be sacrosanct and beyond public discourse. Perhaps the greatest outcome of the American experiment is that the U.S. Constitution reclaimed faith from the hands of the monarch and the clergy and vested it in the hands of the people as it was always intended. Now faced with an existential theo-political threat, we are failing that vision and need to rededicate ourselves to our founding principles.



The only way to win is to stop playing defense and create an offensive strategy which empowers liberty-minded Muslims whose identity is tied to Americanism and our Establishment Clause, rather than Islamism, shar'iah, and victimhood. We must tackle the fallacy of the Islamic state and demonstrate to Muslims the religious strength that comes from individual liberty.



We have yet to operationalize these lessons of 9/11. We will not win this struggle and therefore never have true national security without confronting the hard issues of Islamist ideology. Our enemy does not suffer the same malady and in fact utilizes ideology as their primary weapon in this battle.



We must do the same. Our dedication to the concepts of liberty and unyielding belief in the inalienable rights of man as endowed by our creator are the key to our victory.



Dr. Jasser is president of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy, a former U.S. Navy Lt. Commander and a physician in private practice based in Phoenix, Ariz. He can be reached at info@aifdemocracy.org.







Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/09/10/ten-years-are-still-missing-lessons-11/#ixzz1XXx7jsPO



Friday, September 9, 2011

The CIA's Islamist Cover-Up

From The New York Review of Books and The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report:

The CIA’s Islamist Cover Up




Ian Johnson







AP Photo/Ben Curtis



Members of the Muslim Brotherhood outside a Cairo court, February 2007. Internal CIA documents describe the movement as a potential ally against Islamist terrorism.



The tenth anniversary of the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington will be accompanied by the usual solemn political pronouncements and predictable media retrospectives. Pundits will point out that the West’s own economic mismanagement of the past decade has done more to weaken Europe and North America than the Islamists’ attacks. Some others will note how radical Islamists are still strong in Afghanistan and point to the recent downing of a military helicopter with dozens of US troops dead. Still others will use the anniversary to pontificate on how our concerns about Islamism have given racists an excuse to tarnish an entire religion. We will also hear about how the democratic uprisings in the Arab world—Libya being the latest—have undermined Islamists (by providing the region’s disgruntled masses with examples of positive, instead of destructive change).



All of these points are well and good and worth hearing again. But they shouldn’t distract us from a very precise and practical problem that hasn’t been addressed: the refusal of the CIA to disclose the details of its involvement with Islamist groups. In recent weeks, the agency has tried to block sections of a new book that deals with its handling of al-Qaeda before and after September 11. But this is only one part of a large-scale cover-up that Western governments have been perpetrating about decades of ties to Islamist organizations. Until we clarify our murky history with radical Islam, we won’t be able to understand the background of the September 11 attacks and whether our strategies today to engage the Muslim world are likely to succeed.



Of course some of this history is well known. The blowback story—how the US armed the mujahedeen, some of whom morphed into al-Qaeda—has been told in book and film. We are also getting a sense now of how parts of the US-backed Pakistani military-intelligence complex have actively supported radical Islamists. Collusion between Britain and Islamist movements over the past century has also been explored. And of course, Israel’s support for Hamas as a counterweight to the Palestinian Liberation Organization has gone down as one of the great diplomatic miscalculations of recent history.



But compared to the full scope of the issue, these insights are meager. To date, the Central Intelligence Agency continues to block access to its archives relating to radical Islam or cooperation with Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. In the course of researching my book on the Brotherhood’s expansion into the West, I applied numerous times under the Freedom of Information Act to see documents concerning events in the 1950s, some of which had been confirmed by already declassified State Department cables. Inevitably the CIA responded with the blanket exception of “national security” to justify denying access to any files.











Said Ramadan



Despite the CIA’s information blockade, it is clear from interviews with CIA operatives and other countries’ intelligence archives that the CIA was courting groups like the Brotherhood as allies in the US’s global battle against communism. In Egypt, the charge was often made by the government of Gamel Abdel Nasser that the Muslim Brotherhood was in the CIA’s pay. This was also a view of some Western intelligence agencies, which flatly declared that Said Ramadan, the Swiss-based son-in-law of the group’s founder, was a US agent. The agency may have—but for this we need access to its archives—colluded with Ramadan in attempting a coup against Nasser.



The CIA certainly did help the Brotherhood establish itself in Europe, helping to create the milieu that led to the September 11 attacks. The mosque in Munich that Ramadan helped found, for example, became a hotbed of anti-US activity. The man convicted as a key perpetrator of the 1993 attack against the World Trade Center had sought spiritual counseling at the mosque before leaving to carry out his attacks. And in 1998, the man believed to be al-Qaeda’s chief financial officer was arrested near the mosque and also sought spiritual counseling from the mosque’s imam. An investigation based on this arrest traced radical Islamists right to a second mosque—the al-Quds mosque in Hamburg—where three of the four 9/11 pilots worshipped, it but failed to make the final link. This isn’t to say that the CIA was behind the September 11 attacks but that US collusion with Islamists in the Cold War bore bitter fruit in later years—making it imperative that we understand exactly what happened in those seemingly distant years of the 50s, 60s and 70s of the last century.



More recently, despite Washington’s sometimes hostile public rhetoric toward to the Brotherhood, it is clear that the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama have tried to court the movement. Internal CIA analyses from 2006 and 2008, which I obtained, show that the Brotherhood was viewed as a positive force and potential ally—this time not against communism but Islamist terrorism: the Brotherhood was considered a moderate Islamist group and thus able to channel grievances away from violence toward the United States (even if Brotherhood theoreticians did not renounce violence against Israel or US soldiers). The State Department also used US Muslims close to the Brotherhood to reach out to Islamists in Europe. Such support has given these groups legitimacy in the United States and Europe.



The CIA is blocking the release of information because the subject remains sensitive—both for the West and the Muslim world. In Washington, the CIA could come under fire if its own archives would confirm and fill out the current sketch view of history. For the Brotherhood, amid its current re-emergence as a major political force in Egypt and other countries, it would be extremely damaging to know that illustrious figures in its history were working for the country that most exemplifies the decadent, imperialist forces it has struggled against for decades.



Revealing this history could be painful but necessary to strip away the doublespeak that both sides have used to describe their dealings with each other. This isn’t to say that releasing information should be used to bash cooperation with Islamists. Clearly the United States and other Western countries need to deal with groups like the Brotherhood, and perhaps in some situations even to support them: for example if the Brotherhood really were to come to power democratically in Egypt, the United States would be obliged to deal with such a government. For the Brotherhood a case could be made that in past decades, when its members were so badly repressed by authorities in the Middle East, that some sort of help from the West was necessary to avoid destruction by the authoritarian governments that persecute it.



These are legitimate arguments. But they can only be made if the full history of these relationships is made known rather than kept hidden. To do this will require action from Congress. The CIA did not release documents concerning US intelligence dealings with Nazi officials, for example, until it was forced to by the passage of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998. This piece of legislation compelled US government agencies to release all files on their dealings with the Nazis during and after the war. It lead to an incredible flood of information on the topic, helping us understand, for example, US collaboration with ex-Nazis after the war.



We need a similar law today. This is not to draw a parallel between Islamism and Nazism—an argument that is tendentious and counter-productive. The only parallel is that the US government has dealt with these questionable organizations and is so unwilling to admit this that it will take specific instructions from Congress to make these dealings public. Whatever the merits of these policies they are based on a long-standing, but still mostly secret, strategy. As Western governments seek to distinguish between “good” and “bad” Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or between the Muslim Brotherhood and more radical groups in the Middle East, understanding this strategy—and its efficacy—has never been more urgent.



August 30, 2011 2:15 p.m.

The CIA's Islamist Cover-Up

From The New York Review of Books and The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report:

The CIA’s Islamist Cover Up




Ian Johnson







AP Photo/Ben Curtis



Members of the Muslim Brotherhood outside a Cairo court, February 2007. Internal CIA documents describe the movement as a potential ally against Islamist terrorism.



The tenth anniversary of the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington will be accompanied by the usual solemn political pronouncements and predictable media retrospectives. Pundits will point out that the West’s own economic mismanagement of the past decade has done more to weaken Europe and North America than the Islamists’ attacks. Some others will note how radical Islamists are still strong in Afghanistan and point to the recent downing of a military helicopter with dozens of US troops dead. Still others will use the anniversary to pontificate on how our concerns about Islamism have given racists an excuse to tarnish an entire religion. We will also hear about how the democratic uprisings in the Arab world—Libya being the latest—have undermined Islamists (by providing the region’s disgruntled masses with examples of positive, instead of destructive change).



All of these points are well and good and worth hearing again. But they shouldn’t distract us from a very precise and practical problem that hasn’t been addressed: the refusal of the CIA to disclose the details of its involvement with Islamist groups. In recent weeks, the agency has tried to block sections of a new book that deals with its handling of al-Qaeda before and after September 11. But this is only one part of a large-scale cover-up that Western governments have been perpetrating about decades of ties to Islamist organizations. Until we clarify our murky history with radical Islam, we won’t be able to understand the background of the September 11 attacks and whether our strategies today to engage the Muslim world are likely to succeed.



Of course some of this history is well known. The blowback story—how the US armed the mujahedeen, some of whom morphed into al-Qaeda—has been told in book and film. We are also getting a sense now of how parts of the US-backed Pakistani military-intelligence complex have actively supported radical Islamists. Collusion between Britain and Islamist movements over the past century has also been explored. And of course, Israel’s support for Hamas as a counterweight to the Palestinian Liberation Organization has gone down as one of the great diplomatic miscalculations of recent history.



But compared to the full scope of the issue, these insights are meager. To date, the Central Intelligence Agency continues to block access to its archives relating to radical Islam or cooperation with Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. In the course of researching my book on the Brotherhood’s expansion into the West, I applied numerous times under the Freedom of Information Act to see documents concerning events in the 1950s, some of which had been confirmed by already declassified State Department cables. Inevitably the CIA responded with the blanket exception of “national security” to justify denying access to any files.











Said Ramadan



Despite the CIA’s information blockade, it is clear from interviews with CIA operatives and other countries’ intelligence archives that the CIA was courting groups like the Brotherhood as allies in the US’s global battle against communism. In Egypt, the charge was often made by the government of Gamel Abdel Nasser that the Muslim Brotherhood was in the CIA’s pay. This was also a view of some Western intelligence agencies, which flatly declared that Said Ramadan, the Swiss-based son-in-law of the group’s founder, was a US agent. The agency may have—but for this we need access to its archives—colluded with Ramadan in attempting a coup against Nasser.



The CIA certainly did help the Brotherhood establish itself in Europe, helping to create the milieu that led to the September 11 attacks. The mosque in Munich that Ramadan helped found, for example, became a hotbed of anti-US activity. The man convicted as a key perpetrator of the 1993 attack against the World Trade Center had sought spiritual counseling at the mosque before leaving to carry out his attacks. And in 1998, the man believed to be al-Qaeda’s chief financial officer was arrested near the mosque and also sought spiritual counseling from the mosque’s imam. An investigation based on this arrest traced radical Islamists right to a second mosque—the al-Quds mosque in Hamburg—where three of the four 9/11 pilots worshipped, it but failed to make the final link. This isn’t to say that the CIA was behind the September 11 attacks but that US collusion with Islamists in the Cold War bore bitter fruit in later years—making it imperative that we understand exactly what happened in those seemingly distant years of the 50s, 60s and 70s of the last century.



More recently, despite Washington’s sometimes hostile public rhetoric toward to the Brotherhood, it is clear that the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama have tried to court the movement. Internal CIA analyses from 2006 and 2008, which I obtained, show that the Brotherhood was viewed as a positive force and potential ally—this time not against communism but Islamist terrorism: the Brotherhood was considered a moderate Islamist group and thus able to channel grievances away from violence toward the United States (even if Brotherhood theoreticians did not renounce violence against Israel or US soldiers). The State Department also used US Muslims close to the Brotherhood to reach out to Islamists in Europe. Such support has given these groups legitimacy in the United States and Europe.



The CIA is blocking the release of information because the subject remains sensitive—both for the West and the Muslim world. In Washington, the CIA could come under fire if its own archives would confirm and fill out the current sketch view of history. For the Brotherhood, amid its current re-emergence as a major political force in Egypt and other countries, it would be extremely damaging to know that illustrious figures in its history were working for the country that most exemplifies the decadent, imperialist forces it has struggled against for decades.



Revealing this history could be painful but necessary to strip away the doublespeak that both sides have used to describe their dealings with each other. This isn’t to say that releasing information should be used to bash cooperation with Islamists. Clearly the United States and other Western countries need to deal with groups like the Brotherhood, and perhaps in some situations even to support them: for example if the Brotherhood really were to come to power democratically in Egypt, the United States would be obliged to deal with such a government. For the Brotherhood a case could be made that in past decades, when its members were so badly repressed by authorities in the Middle East, that some sort of help from the West was necessary to avoid destruction by the authoritarian governments that persecute it.



These are legitimate arguments. But they can only be made if the full history of these relationships is made known rather than kept hidden. To do this will require action from Congress. The CIA did not release documents concerning US intelligence dealings with Nazi officials, for example, until it was forced to by the passage of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998. This piece of legislation compelled US government agencies to release all files on their dealings with the Nazis during and after the war. It lead to an incredible flood of information on the topic, helping us understand, for example, US collaboration with ex-Nazis after the war.



We need a similar law today. This is not to draw a parallel between Islamism and Nazism—an argument that is tendentious and counter-productive. The only parallel is that the US government has dealt with these questionable organizations and is so unwilling to admit this that it will take specific instructions from Congress to make these dealings public. Whatever the merits of these policies they are based on a long-standing, but still mostly secret, strategy. As Western governments seek to distinguish between “good” and “bad” Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or between the Muslim Brotherhood and more radical groups in the Middle East, understanding this strategy—and its efficacy—has never been more urgent.



August 30, 2011 2:15 p.m.

Jawad In American Spectator: "Libya Burning"

From Middle East and Terrorism Blog:

Friday, September 9, 2011


Jawad in American Spectator: "Libya Burning"







by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi





As troops aligned with the Libyan interim government continue to advance on the few remaining strongholds of Gaddafi loyalists -- such as Bani Walid (where the tribal elders are refusing to surrender) -- much debate is still raging over Libya's future. Will the country emerge as a stable liberal democracy, will it be torn by ethnic and tribal divisions, or will it transform into an Islamist state?



Of course, there is always a degree of uncertainty in prediction here, but some signs appear to have emerged that strongly discount the first, desirable outcome. To begin with, despite the assurances of the National Transitional Council (NTC) that there will be a focus on reconciliation to avoid punishing all those associated with the Gaddafi regime and thus not repeat the "mistakes of Iraq," it is not at all clear that these soothing words are being put into practice.



Indeed, recently concerns have been raised over the treatment of blacks residing in Libya at the hands of forces loyal to the interim government, and even outlets like the New York Times are starting to pay attention. It is true that a few of these blacks have been employed as mercenaries by Gaddafi, but the overwhelming majority are simply innocent migrant workers imported during Libya's oil boom for construction and menial work. Yet blacks are being targeted by anti-Gaddafi insurgents as though they are all mercenaries guilty of the crimes of the Gaddafi regime.



In fact, as the Wall Street Journal noted, in one town called Tawergha, a brigade of anti-Gaddafi troops that describes itself as dedicated to "purging slaves" and "black skin" has engaged in ethnic cleansing of blacks in the town, and has vowed that in the "new Libya" all remaining blacks in Tawergha would be denied access to health care and schooling in nearby Misrata, from which all blacks have already been expelled.



Similarly, the BBC recently showed a video of hundreds of bodies found in the Abu Salim hospital in Tripoli, but failed to mention, either through genuine neglect or a deliberate intention to mislead, that most of the corpses were those of black people, who had obviously been killed by anti-Gaddafi forces when the city was taken.



The "blacks are mercenaries" myth has been useful to those wishing to downplay the idea that Gaddafi could be receiving support from any native Libyans, and portray the entire conflict as "Gaddafi vs. the people." However, if collective punishment is the way the rebel forces are going to treat those suspected -- rightly or wrongly -- of links to Gaddafi's regime, on what grounds should we presume that there will be no punitive measures implemented against native Libyan groups who have backed Gaddafi during the conflict, including many of the rural Arabized tribes of southwest Fezzan? As I predicted, the rebel forces have recently been giving the Berber Touareg in the far south this kind of harsh treatment.



Clearly, the horrific treatment of blacks is not only a result of racism but also part of an attempt to dismantle anything associated with Gaddafi's legacy (the importation of Africans was one aspect of Gaddafi's eccentric turn towards notions of pan-Africanism and a vision of a "United States of Africa" after 1998).



In any event, it is worth recalling that the Iraqi Shi'a politicians and public figures who pushed for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 (e.g. Ahmad Chalabi​, who is the first cousin of my aunt's husband in Baghdad) repeatedly affirmed that their sole interest was in creating a genuinely free and democratic Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime. Yet once in power through the interim Iraqi Governing Council, whether for reasons of ideological conviction or political expediency, they effectively turned the de-Baa'thification process into "de-Sunnification" in the hope of creating a majoritarian Shi'a democracy. This only aggravated sectarian tensions and culminated in the civil war around Baghdad in 2006.



Even so, it is also evident that there are deep tensions within the anti-Gaddafi forces. In particular, there is good reason to expect a forthcoming conflict between the Amazigh Berbers and the Islamists. The Amazigh Berbers, denied civil rights for decades by Gaddafi and forbidden to speak Tamazight, played a key role in the fighting in the western Nafusa Mountains that eventually led to the successful push towards Tripoli. Quite rightly, they are keen to assert their rights to celebrate their Berber culture and language, and will undoubtedly take further inspiration from the success of Berber activists in Morocco, which has now given Tamazight the status of an official language alongside Arabic.



Meanwhile, the Islamist presence among the anti-Gaddafi forces is now something that cannot be ignored. As Barry Rubin points out, Abdul al-Hakim al-Hasadi has just been named commander of the Tripoli Military Council. This man was formerly head of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization affiliated with al-Qa'ida, and although he claims to have disavowed his record of extremism, many rebel fighters around Misrata are highly suspicious of him. It does not follow from this that Libya will necessarily become an Islamist state, but as the experiences in Algeria, Sudan and Iraq show, Islamists in the Middle East and North Africa despise any assertion of a non-Arab identity and aim to suppress it by instilling terror through indiscriminate attacks.



I sincerely hope that I am proven wrong and that the post-Gaddafi government will promote liberal democracy (nor do I believe that it was wrong to stop Gaddafi's forces from taking Benghazi back in March). Nevertheless, idealistic wishes cannot obscure hard evidence on the ground. At best, NATO can now only make it clear to the NTC that any Islamist aggression originating from Libya will be met with severe retaliation.





Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and an intern at the Middle East Forum.



Source: http://www.meforum.org/3033/libya-burning



Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

Posted by sally at 5:14 AM