Wednesday, June 1, 2011

The D-21B And Project "Senior Bowl" (As I Remember It)

From Blackbirds.net:

Updated on: 6 October 2007


Posted on: 6 October 2007







Glenn Chapman who kindly wrote the Neography, and Driftsites page about the U-2 program for the U-2 section of the this web site, has offered to do something in the other Blackbird program he worked on the Senior Bowl, D-21B drone.







The D-21B and Project “Senior Bowl”



As I Remember It







OVERVIEW OF B-52H/D-21B:



The Lockheed D-21B and modified Boeing B-52H combination was the nucleus of Project Senior Bowl from January, 1968 until July, 1971 when the project was terminated. It was formed from Lockheed Aircraft Advanced Development Project’s M-12/D-21 combination which failed after only four flights.



Lockheed ADP, or Skunk Works, gave the M-12/D-21 system the name of Tagboard. The D-21 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was the heart of this program. It was designed as an extremely high speed, very high altitude reconnaissance vehicle, in effect a much smaller, unmanned A-12 or SR-71, but with different equipment. It was considered to be a “one way aircraft,” meaning that each D-21B would fly one time only and then self-destruct. Two Lockheed A-12 aircraft were modified to carry the D-21 on the dorsal fin at the rearmost part of the aircraft between the engines and vertical stabilizers. A second cockpit was also installed for a systems operator for the D-21. These aircraft were designated by Lockheed as M-21. The only difference designation-wise between the A-12 and M-12 was the use of “M” which supposedly was to indicate “Mother” aircraft. The “D” for the D-21 supposedly was to designate the “Daughter” aircraft. The designation of “21” was intentionally reversed from the “12” for security reasons to create a little confusion. (?)



When a D-21 crashed into an M-12 as it was launched on the fourth mission, the M-12 and D-21 were both lost, as was one of the two crew members aboard the M-12 who drowned in the Pacific Ocean after ejection from the aircraft. Plans were then advanced by the head of ADP, Clarence L. “Kelly” Johnson, to modify the D-21 to be launched from B-52 bomber aircraft. This eventually became the beginning of Project “Senior Bowl,” which ultimately became designated by the Air Force at Beale AFB, California first as “A-Flight” and finally as the 4200 Support Squadron. This unit, although designated as a squadron, was really a wing-level unit and was primary responsible to Strategic Air Command. Administrative functions were through 14th Air Division at Beale; operational functions were through SAC and other still-classified hierarchy.



AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS FOR SENIOR BOWL:



Senior Bowl consisted of the D-21 modified to be carried from an underwing pylon, similar to the one used for launching of the X-15, on a B-52H aircraft. This caused the D-21 to become designated as D-21B, which is the vehicle on display at most museums except for the Museum of Flight in Seattle. This unit is the only existing M-12/D-21 display anywhere. All others, to my knowledge, are D-21B vehicles. There was no mock-up, model, or working drawings of a D-21A to my knowledge, although there may have been some sketches. Therefore, the progression went straight from D-21 to D-21B.



The major modification of two B-52H aircraft for the D-21B was the elimination of the ECM operator’s and tail gunners panels at the rear of the top deck of the bomber and the installation of identical launch control panels for D-21Bs on the right and/or left pylons. Two camera mounting stations in the left and right forward wheel wells of the B-52H were installed. These mounts held 35mm very high speed cameras that looked through an optically-ground window in the side of the forward wheel well to record the launch of the D-21B from the B-52H. The cameras were aimed at the D-21B from different angles and with different lenses which captured the D-21B as it dropped from the pylon. These cameras had film magazines which held 1,000 feet of color film and ran at a speed of about 100 inches per second. There was also a down-looking high-speed camera inside the pylon to catch the D-21B is it dropped away from the aircraft. When played back on a normal 16 inches per second projector, the film provided a very, very slow motion viewing of the D-21B launch. These films were used to document the millisecond by millisecond launch of the D-21B and, if any problems resulted during the launch, the films would help to find out what went wrong and why. Addition of the special pylons, telemetry gear, communications systems, and associated wiring and instrumentation completed the modification of the aircraft.



All D-21B vehicles launched by A-Flight and the 4200th Support Squadron were from the starboard, or right side, pylon only. The port side pylon station was never used during this time. Although some publications have shown pictures of the D-21B hanging from the port side pylon, I personally never saw this configuration. These are either from sorties flown by the Skunk Works or the picture negative has been reversed. Personally, I feel the latter is what is seen in these books.



Because the D-21B was powered by a ramjet engine, it needed to be accelerated to beyond Mach 1 to “light off.” This had originally been the purpose of the M-21 aircraft. It was decided that, in order for this to happen when launched from the pylon of the sub-sonic B-52H, the D-21B would need a rocket booster capable of propelling it to around Mach 1.5 or so for light off. After a pre-programmed amount of extremely volatile solid fuel had burned out and the D-21B had ignited, successfully, the rocket would separate from the D-21B. It would be recovered and sent back to the Skunk works and rebuilt by the vendor of the booster to fly with another D-21B. We in “A-Flight” and the 4200th jokingly referred to this booster as “the cigar” because it resembled one very closely.



This special solid fuel rocket was developed through Lockheed sources. Once the D-21B had been installed on the B-52H right inboard pylon, this rocket booster was mounted to the underside of the D-21B at the original connecting points which had once held the D-21 to the back of the M-12. It had a burn time of about ninety seconds, which got the D-21B to the calculated speed for light off.



The B-52H with it’s D-21B and booster rocket combination mounted on the right pylon would take off for the required sortie. At a precise pre-planned point in time and geographic location, the Launch Control Officer (LCO) on board the B-52H would start the sequence of operations by dropping the system from the pylon. All operations for and by the D-21B and it’s actual and peripheral equipment was by way of four large “perf tape” magnetic tape spools which was the memory for the computer system in the D-21B hatch. At the time, this was considered “state of the art” while today it is just an old antique. Each perftape was programmed by the D-21B INS technicians in accordance with orders that came down for the mission to be flown. A few seconds later the booster rocket would fire, the D-21B would light off, the booster would egress the D-21B via explosive bolts after burnout, and the D-21B would begin it’s sortie.



After deployment and completion of the mission, the D-21B would decelerate, drop to about 60,000 feet, the equipment hatch would be egressed from the D-21B through use of six explosive bolts, and was recovered by C-130H “cat’s whiskers” aircraft. Shortly after hatch egress, the D-21B would self-destruct.



Initial program cost of the D-21B delivered from the Skunk Works to the 4200th and through the mission to destruction was estimated a 5.5 million dollars each, including the rocket, mission evaluation, operation of the B-52H, and all other program-incurred “per mission” expenses.

Project Senior Bowl’s operational life lasted from summer, 1967 until it’s abrupt termination in July, 1971. During that time, “A-Flight” and the 4200th Support Squadron launched about sixteen D-21B vehicles from the B-52H both as training and as operational sorties.



At the time of the operation, Senior Bowl was one of the best kept secrets in the military. Only a very few select people were cleared for the project. Everyone in the project was cleared to top secret and had, in addition, a special project clearance which enhanced the top secret level. The level of this clearance was, and still is, in itself extremely highly classified. All Senior Bowl personnel that I knew were cleared to the same level, regardless of rank or grade



A-FLIGHT AND THE 4200 SUPPORT SQUADRON:



In the summer and early autumn of 1967, Strategic Air Command (SAC) began putting together the nucleus of the Air Force unit which would maintain, prepare, launch, fly, and recover the D-21B from these modified B-52H aircraft. Assignments were levied throughout Strategic Air Command for approximately 180 officers and airman of varying skills. The skills required for Senior Bowl were:



1. Those personnel who would fly or work on the B-52H only;



2. Those personnel who would work on the D-21B only;



3. Those few personnel who would be involved with both the B-52H and D-21B;



4. A small specially trained component of Security Police who would be responsible only to A-Flight and, later, the 4200th Support Squadron;



5. Supply, administrative, and other support personnel who would not directly be involved with the B-52H or D-21B, but were an important part of the project.



In addition to the Air Force personnel who would make up the project, many Lockheed and vendor support and advisory personnel were part of the team.



The requirements for all personnel were extremely stringent. Air Force was in effect hand-picking these individuals so they could get the best they could find for Senior Bowl. In November, 1967, I received my assignment while I was a staff sergeant avionics specialist stationed at K.I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan.



When I asked where I would be going and what I was to do, I was told the assignment was for “A-Flight at Beale AFB, California.” I asked what the numerical designation of the outfit was and was told it only said “A-Flight, 14th Strategic Aerospace Division (SAC), Beale AFB, California” and nothing else.



When I arrived at Beale on January 3, 1968 and began my in-processing, I was amazed to find out that the words “A-Flight” were a magic phrase. Personnel, Finance, and other permanent party support personnel at Beale who had heard this term had absolutely no idea as to what it was, but the general consensus among all of them was that it was a new addition to the very prestigious 9th Strategic Wing who flew the SR-71 aircraft. In reality, although we later ended up working in the immediate vicinity of the SR-71s, we never were even an indirect part of the 9th or the SR-71 program. I was indeed being assigned to a squadron simply known as “A-Flight.” I was given priority over everyone else processing with me, including at one time, a Lt Colonel who was quite upset that I took precedence over him. Actually, it was not me who had the precedence, it was the needs of “A-Flight” that had the precedence. Evidently, all base services had been informed that anyone processing into “A-Flight” would be given immediate precedence.



A few days later, I found that “A-Flight” was nothing more than a wooden single story building directly across the street from the 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing Headquarters Building on the main base. Incidentally, this building is still standing as this is written. When I entered this building for the first time, I could hear many voices inside and found it was literally armpit to armpit with about a hundred other men like me wondering what exactly was going on. No one seemed to know anything. One staff sergeant, who we found out was the acting First Sergeant and Chief Clerk, was the only one who knew anything and he wasn’t talking. It ended up that we would report to this building at 0800 each morning, drink some coffee and tell some lies to each other, and be told about a half hour later to go home and call in once in a while. For about six weeks this is exactly what I did. Never in my Air Force career had I had more legal time off without official leave that I had during these times. In one respect it was wonderful; in another it was extremely agonizing, which gave all of us with the project a feeling of being abandoned, useless, or worse. However, and without our knowledge, this was the time which was being used for the project to achieve the final project clearances we all needed before we could be told anything or used as we felt we should be utilized.



Around the middle of February, 1968, I was called in and brought into a room for my first meeting with our squadro9n commander, Colonel Arden B. Curfman who, behind his back later on, became known to us as “ABC.” Also with him at that time was a Full Colonel Baldwin who I would find out later was our “chief spook.” Actually, he was the Air Force liaison person at the Skunk Works for Senior Bowl. This day was the one and only time I would see him in uniform; I was told that I would refer to him as “Mr. Baldwin” from this point onward. During my time with the unit, this was the only time I have ever seen him in his USAF uniform.



I was informed I had been cleared for the project clearance for Senior Bowl and both of these gentlemen proceeded to give me the most intense security briefing I have ever received. This encounter lasted about three hours with no one except Curfman, Baldwin, me, and occasionally the Chief Clerk. When something highly classified was to be mentioned, it was not done orally; Baldwin or Curfman wrote it on a piece of paper and handed it to me to read and, after reading it, I was asked if I understood it. When I answered that I did, they immediately destroyed it by putting the scrap of paper in an ash tray and setting fire to it. Immediately prior to my briefing conclusion, the Chief Clerk came in and gathered these ashes from the ash tray and put them in a little bag for further disposition. I think I read more that day than I heard, because virtually everything they told me was very highly top secret. Most of all was information they told me concerning where we would be going to test the D-21B, how I was to conduct myself whenever I had to go to the Skunk Works or “vendor,” and where it was planned that we would use it operationally.



Later that week, along with three other men in my career field who had been cleared the same week I had been, I attended “school” at night in the same room where I had been briefed. The training was conducted by a technical representative from our vendor and lasted about a week. It consisted of very intense training on our specific system, called “the payload,” and the D-21B. The first night, before we had gotten too far into the session, I jokingly asked this man if we were going to be working on something like the X-15. He looked at me very stoically and told me that “---I was not too far off track on that.” I would find later that this individual never joked around and was very hard to get along with, but he was very good, smart, and knowledgeable on what he was telling us. After that week of school, I never saw him again.



I was in the first fifty of the new group to receive the full clearance. A few individuals failed to receive the clearance. They were immediately given an assignment to another base or unit. They had received no information other than the project name of “Senior Bowl” and that they were assigned to “A-Flight.”



To indicate how difficult it was to get this clearance, the following is indicated. I had in my skill a technical sergeant who was one of the original Air Force people in the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing with the U-2 aircraft. He had been to the special area where the D-21B was now at when he was introduced to the U-2 in 1957. Although that security was akin to what we were going through for Senior Bowl, he had received that clearance relatively easily compared to what it took for him to become cleared for our new project. As a teenager in the early 1950s, he and some other kids had gotten drunk one night and had to “sleep it off” in jail in his home town in Eldorado, Arkansas. Although this did not hold him back from the top secret and project clearance for the U-2, it held him back for nearly six months for Senior Bowl until it was finally all cleared up.



Nearly the entire year of 1968 most of us who were project cleared went to a classified location each week where we learned the ins and outs of the D-21B, the modified B-52H, our specialized equipment, and how we all fit in. We would meet at Beale AFB Base Operations each Monday morning at about 0600 and climb on board a civilian Fairchild F-27 turboprop aircraft for the flight to “the area.” While at the area, we were assigned rooms in mobile homes. We could not leave the area but were free to travel anywhere in it’s environs that we desired. About 1730 each Friday evening, we would again board the F-27 for the flight back to Beale. Our weekends were free to do whatever we wanted to do. Then, it would start all over again on the following Monday. Because of our relative isolation from anyone back at Beale while we were at the area, we spent our time rather easily learning all we had to know about what we would be doing and how to do it.



In December, 1968, we lost the designation of “A-Flight’ and became the 4200th Support Squadron. Many publications have called us the “4200 Test Squadron.” We were never in our tenure known as a test squadron. When we became the 4200th, we lost some of our priority we had been enjoying but still retained enough “precedence,” far more than the SR-71 boys, to know we were in a pretty elite outfit. In December of that year, we moved permanently to Beale and were housed in a nose dock near the current locations of Fuel Cell and Phase Hangars. While we were spending our time at the area, civilian contractors had been remodeling our nose dock for our operation. Also, our two B-52H aircraft, called “BUFF,” were provided parking at the farthest point at the northern end of the ramp near the alert facility.



The 4200th had it’s own security forces of Security Police who, like us, had been fully cleared for Senior Bowl. Although we were squadron level, we were in effect a wing-level operation. We were exempt from the usual inspections, Maintenance Standardization and Evaluation Program (MSEP) inspections, base details, and other irritants that everybody else on Beale had to be concerned with. We became a very close knit group, the 180 or so people who comprised the 4200th.



OPERATIONS:



We never had any idea when a sortie would be levied for us. It seemed to be quite spontaneous to say the least. We would go weeks, and sometimes even months, with nothing to prepare for except lots and lots of training among ourselves. Besides us Air Force people, about 10% to 20% of the complement of the 4200th was comprised of Skunk Works personnel and vendor’s technicians, otherwise known as “technical representatives.” They assisted us in our training and helped us prepare for each levied sortie. They also provided all parts and hardware for the D-21B and vendor’s equipment.



The D-21B was constructed primarily of titanium, stainless steel fasteners, and composite structures that were in their infancy at the time. All wiring in the vehicle, especially in the equipment hatch, was teflon-coated, gold-alloyed wiring. It required whole new skills learning to work with this wiring and, because of it’s makeup, was pretty brittle and broke easily at the wrong time if we were not careful while working with it. Special solder was used with this wiring as were very unique soldering techniques. All of us who had to work with it were required to be trained by a very knowledgeable Skunk Works technician. Quite often we used a Lockheed-developed item called a “solder sleeve” that was basically an in-line “stakon-type” wire splice with a shrinkable sheathed plastic sleeve which had the special solder encircled around the inside of the sleeve. We would strip the wire insulation using high-temperature heat strippers and then put the stripped wire ends inside the solder sleeve. We would subject the sleeve to a high-temperature heat gun, something like a hair dryer except much hotter, until the solder would melt and the plastic sheathing would shrink making a perfectly spliced connection.



The stainless steel screws which were used with the titanium parts were very unique. They were mostly flat head and resembled a Phillips head. However, the slots in the head were offset and very vaguely resembled the old Nazi symbol Therefore, they became known as “swastika heads.” The idea behind this configuration was to provide higher torque when tightening or loosening them. Special swastika-type “apex” drivers were developed and we made our own screwdrivers using these apexes in an apex holder welded to a piece of 3/8” square stock about 24” long. We made our own wooden handles which we attached to the square stock and, voila, we had swastika screwdrivers.



When tightening these screws down, the apex would tend to dig into the screw rather than slip out of the head as Phillips head type would do. It was the same when taking them out. With the extremely high stresses during flight, the screws in the hatch covers would become even tighter. The swastika drivers made it a little easier to get them out because they would again tend to dig into the head rather than slip out. It took a lot of strength in the arms and shoulders, however, to do this and, at the time, I was in very good shape and quite strong and was one of two or three others in the shop who could break these screws loose easily. Incidentally, a screw was only used once and, if it had to be removed, was thrown away and a new one used in it’s place. This happened to literally thousands of screws over time.



If a screw was lost or damaged, we went over to the Lockheed parts person to get more screws. The first time I did this, I was asked how many I needed. I asked for a handful and was told to go count exactly how many I needed. I came up with about thirty or so and the parts man counted out exactly that many and made me sign for them. I found out later that each one of these swastika-head screws, which were about 1⁄2” long by 10-32, cost more than $5.00 apiece. A good profit for Lockheed for sure.



Once a mission was levied, the first thing that happened was to figure out who would be going TDY to the ADVON (Advance Party) locations. This usually meant that at least 30% of the D-21B and some of the B-52H people would be away from Beale while preparation for the mission was taking place at Beale. We usually had three locations:



1. The first location was to receive and deploy the B-52H/D-21B aircraft as scheduled and from there the B-52H/D-21B would depart for the mission. A few times, however, the mission was commenced directly from Beale and this location was used for return of the B-52 after launch of the D-21B;



2. The second location was the site where, once the D-21B had completed it’s mission, the hatch would be brought so that recovery operations of the equipment could occur, and;



3. The third location was a “floating TDY,” usually a Liberty Ship or Navy destroyer, which could perform secondary recovery operations of the hatch in case the “cat’s-whiskers” C-130H was not able to snag the hatch in flight.



No site-permanent personnel or personnel aboard the ships were project cleared for Senior Bowl. The captain of the vessel would be briefed by our ranking individual, usually an officer or high-ranking NCO, to only what was needed to be known by him to get us where we needed to be. Likewise, the ranking individual at the ground-based sites were briefed in the same way.



MISSION PREPARATION:



The hatch was removed from the D-21B and we took it into the Payload Shop. Other technicians started BIT (built-in testing) and IFCO (in-flight checkout) procedures on the D-21B with special test equipment in the hangar. What they would actually be doing was to simulate an actual mission using the test set to determine whether the D-21B was operating as it should. It may be hard to believe, but the same thing had happened at the Skunk Works before the D-21B had left and the vehicle was perfect, ready to go. However, while in transit between the Skunk Works and Beale, the gremlins always seemed to set in and cause the D-21B to go out of whack. Sometimes it was not too bad; other times it was horrible. Regardless, not once did we get a D-21B that worked as it should have. Nothing against the Skunk Works, because they had made it perfect. It also wasn’t our fault because, like the Skunk works people, we would again make it perfect. At least until it started it’s takeoff roll with the B-52H for it’s upcoming sortie. Again, gremlins seemed to live within the D-21B because sometimes, after launch, the whole thing would go haywire again. It just seemed that the D-21B was a very fragile and temperamental aircraft.



While these technicians were working their magic, we would begin our own checks and would prepare the payload for installation into the hatch. Once installed, we began our own BIT and IFCO checks with our test equipment. The final thing we would do was to put RTV sealant (the old red, flaky-when-dry stuff) around and on all areas of the hatch that wasn’t secured prior to putting the waterproof cover on top of the hatch. This also meant RTV under the cover and on each screw that was holding this cover down. There were about two hundred screws that had to be installed and, for one reason or another, some of the holes which had been drilled and tapped at Lockheed seemed to have moved which made it even more difficult for us to tighten down the cover properly. Somehow we always seemed to persevere. However, we with the swastika screwdrivers usually ended up “red-handed.” This RTV was miserable stuff and was hard to get off our hands and fingers. A spray can of WD-40 helped to get it off.



When we were finished with our BITs and IFCOs in the shop, we took the hatch back to the D-21B where the BITs and IFCOs were still in progress. The hatch would be installed in the equipment bar at the forward underside of the vehicle after all proper connections were made. One of these connectors was a square Cannon plug with 100 pins which had to mate perfectly with it’s connector inside the equipment bay. This was extremely difficult because we had little room to work around and the pins on the connector could be easily damaged. There were times when we all would take turns trying to get it right until all of a sudden it went together seemingly by itself. One time the connector was found to be damaged when the BIT was performed and more than a week went by until we got a new harness from Lockheed, took the hatch apart again, replaced the harness, performed more BITs and IFCOs, re-sealed the hatch, and re-installed it back on the D-21B. The BITs and IFCOs on the D-21B had to be started again from where it had left off, therefore becoming quite time consuming.



When the D-21B and the hatch had passed all BITs and IFCOs, it was taken out to the B-52H, again very early in the morning, under a canvas shroud, and uploaded onto the right inboard pylon. Once it was hung on the pylon, the booster rocket, or as we called it, the cigar, was brought out to be installed to the underside of the D-21B. It was at this point when things really got hairy.



Because the cigar was a solid fuel unit, it was very volatile and sensitive to static electricity which could very easily ignite it. Although this never occurred, it would have wreaked havoc with the flight line, buildings, people, or anything else. To prevent any static electricity from forming, anyone in the vicinity of 25 feet of the cigar had to wear “leg stats.” These looked like garters which had a hard rubber loop that our feet went into and a wire that was connected to a strap that was connected around the upper part of our lower leg. This strap was highly conductive and was connected via the high-conductance wire to a highly conductive pad on the loop below our shoes. Therefore, our entire body would be kept fully grounded at all times so that no difference in potential could occur that could cause static electricity to form. We had to remember to keep one of our feet fully flat on the ground any time that we had to kneel around the cigar so that conductivity to ground could be maintained. Had any static occurred any time we came in close contact with the D-21B and/or the cigar, it could have caused a low-amperage, high-voltage arc of direct current, something like lightning, which could ignite the cigar and send it on it’s way. Obviously, this would have resulted in the loss of the D-21B, probably the B-52H, maybe some lives, and a few aircraft, buildings, people, or whatever in the line of fire of the cigar. If we didn’t do anything else right, each and every member of the 4200th/A-Flight made sure leg stats were used religiously. Most of us even wore them when the D-21B was installed and the cigar wasn’t even at the site yet.



When it came time for launching the B-52H/D-21B/Booster Rocket Combo, nearly all personnel were at the squadron or at specific duty stations to take care of last minute hang-ups or problems so that the scheduled takeoff time could be achieved. Because timing was everything, if only an hour, or many times less time, went by and the bomber was not in the air, the mission would be aborted and rescheduled. Although this happened a couple of times, we were generally able to make our takeoff times as scheduled.



After launch, the B-52H/D-21B/Booster assembly would usually head out for Location Number One where it was recovered. Final launching for mission was usually done from that location. Once or twice, however, the mission requirements required mission launch directly from Beale.



Once the bomber was up for mission, it was totally out of our hands. The only people who had any control of any kind now were the bomber crew, whose job it was to get the D-21B to it’s drop point exactly on time accurately and the Launch Control Officers who were able to perform IFCO checks and had some manual control of the D-21B as needed. Once the D-21B was dropped from the pylon, very little control, other than some telemetry signals from the LCO and his panelboard on the B-52H, was possible.



Final IFCO checks were performed by the LCO and, if everything was in order, and the operation had not been recalled, (which happened occasionally) the LCO would initiate the launch sequence and drop the D-21B/Booster. Immediately prior to the drop, high speed 35 mm cameras mounted in the forward starboard wheel well and the wing pylon of the B-52H were started so that the drop could be recorded on film. One camera in the wheel well and the camera in the pylon had a wide-angle lens, and the other camera in the wheel well had a “fisheye” lens. They all looked directly toward the D-21B through a small window installed on the side of the wheel well and vertically downward from the pylon. These cameras would only run for about ten seconds, but would record the drop and firing of the D-21B and cigar in case something went haywire. After each flight, we were allowed to view these films of the drops. The action was so slow that, after awhile, it became quite boring to watch, although I, for one, watched them all. It was fascinating to see that thing drop away and light off, although it appeared to be so agonizingly slow. In reality, however, it was virtually instantaneous with only a few seconds going by until it was out of sight of the camera’s eye.



As soon as the D-21B and cigar were dropped, automatic sequencing within the D-21B started from the perftape computer. About two seconds after the drop, the cigar would ignite, the automatic flight Control system (AFCS), Inertial Navigation System, (INS) and other systems inside the D-21B and the hatch began their work to get the ramjet on the D-21B started, put the vehicle into proper trajectory, egress the cigar after about a ninety second burn, and commence programmed operations from the on-board computer. Now all that could be done, other than a few actions that could be taken by the LCO, was to wait. One of the most important of the LCO commands that could be given to the D-21B was the “destroy” signal if anything went wrong that required instant destruction of the bird for safety and/or security.



At the proper time in the mission, payload equipment would begin operation until the computer determined it was time to shut it down. The D-21B was now sent into it’s final leg. At a pre-determined point, explosive bolts would fire and the hatch would be egressed from the D-21B. The hatchless vehicle would continue on it’s way until, at another pre-determined point, an explosive charge would ignite, destroying the entire D-21B into a meaningless pack of trash, ashes, and whatever other residue resulted from the destruction.



After egress, the hatch would drop until about 15,000 feet or so, a drogue and main chute attached inside the hatch would engage, trailing the hatch a few hundred feet from a cable. On this cable were calculated markings that the C-130H would (hopefully) engage the marked spots on the cable and the hatch would be retrieved into the aircraft and delivered to Location Number Two for recovery operations by the 4200th/A-Flight personnel.



If the C-130s missed their target, the ship (Location Number Three) would attempt recovery operations. If this happened, all recovery operations were to be performed by the 4200th/A-Flight people on board the ship and, after docking, would be sent forward to a facility for analysis. I was on these ships four different times and not once did we have to recover the hatch. It was either recovered by the C-130 or was lost completely.



CONCLUSION:



Senior Bowl and the 4200th/A-Flight lasted only three years. It was a very difficult operation to perform, even with the state-of-the-art technology of the day that was available to us. Only one thing had to go wrong to cause the mission to be in jeopardy and usually one problem would lead to more problems which, ultimately, cascaded to cause less than desired results. The operation was extremely expensive and proved not to be feasible at the time. Our successes were overwhelmed by our less than successful or totally unsuccessful outcomes. Kelly Johnson and his Skunk Works geniuses did far more than was required to achieve success as did we in the 4200th/A-Flight. We were very highly trained, and each member of the squadron, regardless of our skills, were extremely well qualified and capable of performing our duties successfully. Although there were a few individuals who either could not cope with the high security, family separations, or other stresses put upon us, there were definitely very few of them. There was one individual who I felt should never have been accepted into the project and that was because he was not nearly as security conscious as the rest of us and he ended up very drastically being terminated from the project. Another individual, a member of my shop, was also terminated from the project for his less-than-ethical financial etiquette which ultimately led to a courts-martial. Although he was acquitted, he too, although less drastically, was terminated from the project. It undoubtedly affected the rest of his Air Force career, provided he was allowed to have a career. As for the rest of us, we were an extremely close-knit group who just failed to get it right with the short time we had to do it in.



Three months prior to the termination of the project, many of us, especially those of us with overseas-imbalance skills or critical skills, received orders for Vietnam. This would be my second full tour and, including a ninety-five day TDY there with the U-2 in 1964, would be my third trip to this “Paid Vacation In A Tropical Paradise” called Vietnam. I was at Tan Son Nhut AB near Saigon when, in August of 1971, one of the members of my shop showed up and told me that the 4200th had been abruptly shut down and operations terminated one day a few weeks earlier. Operation Senior Bowl and the D-21B had come to an unceremonious end.



As of this writing, I believe much is still highly classified about Senior Bowl and the D-21B. We all had to sign all kinds of security paperwork that we jokingly referred to as “burn before reading” that in effect said we would never mention the term D-21B nor discuss what we did while part of Senior Bowl. I have never been briefed as to downgrading of security of this project, and have to assume that much of what cannot be told will forever, or at least for a very long time, remain secret. I agree with this fully. However, I also feel the D-21B itself, like the U-2 I had worked on earlier, has become unclassified, with most of it’s equipment still covered under the national Securities Act.



Someday, like the U-2, SR-71, the F-117, and other once “black” operations, all may become known about Senior Bowl. Until that time, this is all I feel I can report on this unique operation I like to refer to as an “unsuccessful success.”





© Glenn R. Chapman

A-12, YF-12 And SR-71 Specifications

From Blackbirds.net:

Last updated on: 19 November 2006




A-12, YF-12, and SR-71 Specifications







A-12 Specifications

Construction: Titanium (Beta-120/Ti-13V-11Cr-3A1) Monococque with some super-high-temperature plastics.

Length: 102 feet, 3 inches

Wingspan: 55 feet, 7 inches

Wing Area: 1,795 square feet

Height: 18 feet, 6 inches

Landing Weight: 52,000 pounds

Maximum Gross Take-off Weight: 117,000 pounds

Maximum Speed: 3.2 Mach above 75,000 feet

Operational Ceiling: above 80,000 feet

Maximum Unrefueled Range: Classified

Armament: none

Powerplant Data: 2 Pratt & Whitney J75 with 17,000 pounds thrust on first 5 aircraft during flight testing

updated to: In production, 2 P & W J58 (JT11D-20A) high-bypass ratio turbojets with 20,500 pounds thrust (dry), with afterburner: 31,500 pounds thrust, some later engines generated 34,500 pounds thrust in afterburner.

A-12 production: 15 aircraft; Only 9 A-12s are still in existance today.



Serial Numbers assigned to A-12 production was 60-6924 through 60-6948

Serial numbers 60-6942 through 60-6948 were not used







D-21A/B

Construction: Titanium (Beta-120/Ti-13V-11Cr-3A1) Monococque with some super-high- temperature palstics

Length: 42 feet, 10 inches

Wingspan: 19 feet, 1/4 inch

Wing Area: ?

Height: 7 feet, 1/4 inch

Empty Weight: ?

Maximum Gross Take-off Weight: 11,000 pounds

Maximum Speed: 3.35 Mach/ Maximum 3.25 at 80,000 to 95,000 feet

Operational Ceiling: 95,000 feet

Maximum Unrefueled Range: 3,000 nautical miles

Armament: None

Powerplant Data: Marquardt RJ43-MA-11 Ramjet with 1,500 pounds thrust

D-21 production: 38 drones

D-21A: M-21 launched, 4 launches

D-21B: B-52H launched, 17 Launches, with 4 operational missions







YF-12A

Construction: Titanium (Beta-120/Ti-13V-11Cr-3A1) monococque w/some super-high- temperature plastics.

Length: 101 feet, 8 inches

Wingspan: 55 feet, 7 inches

Wing Area: 1,795 square feet

Height: 18 feet, 6 inches

Landing Weight: 68,000 pounds

Maximum Gross Take-off Weight: 124,000 pounds

Maximum Speed: 3.2 Mach above 75,000 feet

Operational Ceiling: Classified, but probably over 80,000 feet

Maximum Unrefueled Range: Classified

Armament: 3 Hughes GAR-9/ AIM-47A air to air radar guided missiles (maximum speed 4 Mach)

Powerplant Data: 2 Pratt & Whitney J58 (JT11D-20A) High-bypass-ratio turbojets

YF-12A production: 3 aircraft

Out of the 3 YF-12As built only one is in existance today. Though the rear half of #934 was mated with the front half of the SR static test model to build the SR-71C trainer.





Summary of YF-12A Missile Firings Date YF-12 Alt. YF-12 Mach Target Alt. Results

Mar 1965 65,000ft 2.19 40,000ft Target destroyed

May 1965 64,800ft 2.18 20,000ft Missile Gyro failure

Sep 1965 75,200ft 3.22 20,000ft. Target destroyed

Mar 1966 74,000ft 3.16 1,700ft Target destroyed

Apr 1966 75,200ft 3.20 1,100ft Target destroyed

May 1966 76,000ft 3.20 20,000ft Target destroyed

Sep 1966 74,400ft 3.20 500ft Target destroyed









SR-71A/B/C

Construction: Titanium (Beta-120/Ti-13V-11Cr-3A1) Monococque with some super-high- temperature palstics.

Length: 107 feet, 5 inches

Wingspan: 55 feet, 7 inches

Wing Area: 1,795 square feet

Height: 16 feet, 6 inches

Landing Weight: 68,000 pounds

Maximum Gross Take-off Weight: 140,000 pounds

Maximum Speed: 3.2 Mach above 75,000 feet

Operational Ceiling: over 85,000 feet

Maximum Unrefueled Range: 3,200 nautical miles

Armament: None

Powerplant Data: 2 Pratt & Whitney J58 (JT11D-20A) High-bypass-turbojets with 34,000 pounds thrust

SR-71 production:



A...29

B... 2

C... 1

Out of the total of 32 SR-71's built, 21 are still in existance.

Total SR-71s lost in accidents: 12 (no USAF Pilot or RSO lost their lives in any SR accident, nor were any shot down by hostile fire)

AF Serial Numbers assigned for the SR-71: 61-17950 through 61-17985



Serial numbers 61-17982 through 61-17985 were not used

Program Info:(as of Jan 1990)



Total Flight Hours:...........53,490

Total Mach 3+ Time:........11,675

Total Sorties:.....................17,300

Total Operational Sorties:....3,551

Total Operational Hours:...11,008

Total Air Refeulings..........25,862

Total Crew Members:............284 (includes NASA and USAF Crews checked out in AC)

Cumulative Hours by Crews:

300 Hours.....163

600 Hours.......69

900 Hours.......18

1000 Hours.......8

1392.7 Hours.....1





Sources:



Buddy Brown

"Lockheed Skunk Works, The First 50 Years" by Jay Miller

The Oxcart Story


From NASA:  Design and Development of the Blackbird:  Challenges and Lessons Learned 

http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20090007797_2009006909.pdf


From Blackbirds.net:

The Oxcart Story








Unclassified security ratings are for historical interest only. This page and the document it comes from, entitled OXCART History (DON: SC-86-010115), has been UNCLASSIFIED according to Senior Crown Security Class Guide dated 11/01/89, approved and dated 25 Feb. 91.

S= Secret

C= Classified

U= Unclassifed





(S) THE OXCART STORY



Thomas P. McIninch

(S) One spring day in 1962 a test pilot named Louis Schalk, employed by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, took off from the Nevada desert in an aircraft the like of which had never been seen before. A casual observer would have been startled by the appearance of this vehicle; he would perhaps have noticed especially its extremely long, slim, shape, its two enormous jet engines, its long sharp, projecting nose, and its swept-back wings which appeared far too short to support the fuselage in flight. He might well have realized that this was a revolutionary airplane; he could not have known that it would be able to fly at three times the speed of sound for more than 3,000 miles without refueling, or that toward the end of its flight, when fuel began to run low, it could cruise at over 90,000 feet. Still less would he have known of the equipment it was to carry, or of the formidable problems attending its design and construction.



(U) There was, of course, no casual observer present. The aircraft had been designed and built for reconnaissance; it was projected as a successor to the U-2. Its development had been carried out in profound secrecy. Despite the numerous designers, engineers, skilled and unskilled workers, administrators and others who had been involved in the affair, no authentic accounts, and indeed scarcely any accounts at all, had leaked. Many aspects have not been revealed to this day, and many are likely to remain classified for some time to come.



(S) The official designation of the aircraft was A-12. By a sort of inspired perversity, however, it came to be called OXCART, a code word also applied to the program under which it was developed. The secrecy in which it was so long shrouded has lifted a bit, and the purpose of this article is to give some account of the inception, development, operation, and untimely demise of this remarkable airplane. The OXCART no longer flies, but it left a legacy of technological achievement which points the way to new projects. And it became the progenitor of a similar but somewhat less sophisticated reconnaissance vehicle called the SR-71, whose existence is well known to press and public.



(S) Sequel to the U-2



(S) The U-2 dated from 1954, when its development began under the direction of a group headed by Richard M. Bissell of CIA. In June 1956, the aircraft became operational, but officials predicted that its useful lifetime over the USSR could hardly be much more than 18 months or two years. Its first flight over Soviet territory revealed that the defense warning system not only detected but tracked it quite accurately. Yet, it remained a unique and



(S)invaluable source of intelligence information for almost four years, until on 1 May 1960, Francis Gary Powers was shot down near Sverdlovsk.



(U) Meanwhile, even as the U-2 commenced its active carreer, efforts were under way to make it less vulnerable. The hope was to reduce the vehicle's radar cross-section, so that it would become less susceptible to detection. New developments in radar-absorbing materials were tried out and achieved considerable success, though not enough to solve the problem. Various far-out designs were explored, most of them seeking to create an aircraft capable of flying at extremely high altitudes, though still at relatively slow speed. None of them proved practicable.



(S) Eventually, in the fall of 1957, Bissell arranged with a contractor for a job of operations analysis to determine how far the probability of shooting down an airplane varied respectively with the plane's speed, altitude, and radar cross-section. This analysis demonstrated that supersonic speed greatly reduced the chances of detection by radar. The probability of being shot down was not of course reduced to zero, but it was evident that the supersonic line of approach was worth serious consideration. Therefore, from this time on, attention focused increasingly on the possibility of building a vehicle which could fly at extremely high speeds as well as great altitudes, and which would also incorporate the best that could be attained in radar-absorbing capabilities. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and Convair Division of General Dynamics were informed of the general requirements, and their designers set to work on the problem without as yet receiving any contract or funds from the government. From the fall of 1957 to late 1958 these designers constantly refined and adapted their respective schemes.



(S) Bissell realized that development and production of such an aircraft would be exceedingly expensive, and that in the early stages at least it would be doubtful whether the project could succeed. To secure the necessary funds for such a program, high officials would have to receive the best and most authoritative presentation of whatever prospects might unfold. Accordingly, he got together a panel consisting of two distinguished authorities on aero- dynamics and one physicist, with E. M. Land of the Polaroid Corporation as chairman. Between 1957 and 1959 this panel met about six times, usually in Land's office in Cambridge. Lockheed and Convair designers attended during parts of the sessions. So also did the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy concerned with research and development, together with one or two of their technical advisors. One useful consequence of the participation of service representatives was that bureaucratic and jurisdictional feuds were reduced virtually to nil. Throughout the program both Air Force and Navy gave valuable assistance and cooperation.



(S) As the months went by, the general outlines of what might be done took shape in the minds of those concerned. Late in November 1958, the members of the panel held a crucial meeting. They agreed that it now appeared feasible to build an aircraft of such speed and altitude as to be very difficult to track by radar. They recommended that the president be asked to approve in principle a further prosecution of the project, and to make funds available for further studies and tests. The president and his Scientific Advisor, Dr. James Killian were already aware of what was going on, and when CIA officials went to them with the recommendations of the panel they received a favorable hearing. The President gave his approval. Lockheed and Convair were then asked to submit definite proposals, funds were made available to them, and the project took on the code name GUSTO.



(C) Less than a year later the two proposals were essentially complete, and on 20 July 1959, the President was again briefed. This time he gave final approval, which signified that the program could get fully under way.



(C) The next major step was to choose between the Lockheed and Convair designs. On 20 August 1959 specifications of the two proposals were submitted to a joint DOD/USAF/CIA selection panel:





Lockheed Convair

Speed Mach 3.2 Mach 3.2

Range (Total) 4,120 nm 4,000nm

Start Alt. 84,000 ft 85,000 ft

Mid-Range Alt. 91,000 ft 88,000 ft

End Alt. 97,600 ft 94,000 ft

Length 102 ft 79.5 ft

Span 57 ft 56.0 ft

Gross Weight 110,000 lbs 101,700 lbs

Fuel Weight

Time to First Flight 22 months 22 months



(S) The Lockheed design was selected, Project GUSTO terminated, and the program to develop a new U-2 follow-on aircraft was names OXCART. On 3 September 1959, CIA authorized Lockheed to proceed with antiradar studies, aerodynamic structural tests, and engineering designs, and on 30 January 1960 gave the green light to produce 12 aircraft.



(S) Pratt and Whitney Division of United Aircraft Corporation had been involved in discussions of the project, and undertook to develop the propulsion system. Their J-58 engine, which was to be used in the A-12, had been sponsored originally by the US Navy for its own purposes, and was to be capable of a speed of Mach 3.0. Navy interest in the development was diminishing, however, and the Secretary of Defense had decided to withdraw from the program at the end of 1959. CIA's requirement was that the engine and aircraft be further developed and optimized for a speed of Mach 3.2. The new contract called for initial assembly of three advanced experimental engines for durability and reliability testing, and provision of three engines for experimental flight testing in early 1961.



(S) The primary camera manufacturer was Perkin-Elmer. Because of the extreme complexity of the design, however, a decision was soon made that a back-up system might be necessary in the event the Perkin-Elmer design ran into production problems, and Eastman Kodak was also asked to build a camera. Minneapolis-Honeywell Corporation was selected to provide both the inertial navigation and automatic flight control system. The Firewell Corpora-tion and the David Clark Corporation became the prime sources of pilot equipment and associated life support hardware.



(U) Lockheed's designer was Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson, creator of the U-2, and he called his new vehicle not A-12 but A-11. Its design exhibited many innovations. Supersonic airplanes, however, involve a multitude of extremely difficult design problems. Their payload-range performance is highly sensitive to engine weight, structural weight, fuel consumption, and aerodynamic efficiency. Small mistakes in predicting these values can lead to large errors in performance. Models of the A-11 were tested and retested, adjusted and readjusted, during thousands of hours in the wind tunnel. Johnson was confident of his design, but no one could say positively whether the bird would fly, still less whether it would fulfill the extremely demanding requirements laid down for it.



(U) To make the drawings and test the model was one thing; to build the air- craft was another. The most numerous problems arose from the simple fact that in flying through the atmosphere at its designed speed the skin of the air- craft would be subjected to a temperature of more than 550 degrees Fahrenheit. For one thing, no metal hitherto commonly used in aircraft production would stand this temperature, and those which would do so were for the most part too heavy to be suitable for the purpose in hand.



(S) During the design phase Lockheed evaluated many materials and finally chose an alloy of titanium, characterized by great strength, relatively light weight, and good resistance to high temperatures. Titanium was also scarce and very costly. Methods for milling it and controlling the quality of the product were not fully developed. Of the early deliveries from Titanium Metals Corporation some 80 percent had to be rejected, and it was not until 1961, when a delegation from headquarters visited the officials of that company, informed them of the objectives and high priority of the OXCART program, and gained their full cooperation, that the supply became consist- ently satisfactory.



(S) But this only solved an initial problem. One of the virtues of titanium was its exceeding hardness, but this very virtue gave rise to immense difficulties in machining and shaping the material. Drills which worked well on aluminum soon broke to pieces; new ones had to be devised. Assembly-line production was impossible; each of the small OXCART fleet was, so to speak, turned out by hand. The cost of the program mounted well above original estimates, and it soon began to run behind schedule. One after another, however, the problems were solved, and their solution constituted the greatest single technological achievement of the entire enterprise. Henceforth it became practicable, if expensive, to build aircraft out of titanium.



(S) Since every additional pound of weight was critical, adequate insulation was out of the question. The inside of the aircraft would be like a moderately hot oven. The pilot would have to wear a kind of space suit, with its own cool- ing apparatus, pressure control, oxygen supply, and other necessities for survival. The fuel tanks, which constituted by far the greater part of the aircraft, would heat up to about 350 degrees, so that special fuel had to be supplied and the tanks themselves rendered inert with nitrogen. Lubricating oil was formulated for operation at 600 degrees F., and contained a diluent in order to remain fluid at operation below 40 degrees. Insulation on the plane's intricate wiring soon became brittle and useless. During the lifetime of the OXCART no better insulation was found; the wiring and related connectors had to be given special attention and handling at great cost in labor and time.



(S) Then there was the unique problem of the camera window. The OXCART was to carry a delicate and highly sophisticated camera, which would look out through a quartz glass window. The effectiveness of the whole system depended upon achieving complete freedom from optical distortion despite the great heat to which the window would be subjected. Thus the question was not simply one of providing equipment with resistance to high temperature, but of assuring that there should be no unevenness of tempera- ture throughout the area of the window. It took three years of time and two million dollars of money to arrive at a satisfactory solution. The program scored one of its most remarkable successes when the quartz glass was successfully fused to its metal frame by an unprecedented process involving the use of high frequency sound waves.



(S) Another major problem of different nature was to achieve the low radar cross-section desired. The airframe areas giving the greatest radar return were the vertical stabilizers, the engine inlet, and the forward side of the engine nacelles. Research in ferrites, high temperature absorbing materials and high- temperature plastic structures was undertaken to find methods to reduce the return. Eventually the vertical tail section fins were constructed from a kind of laminated "plastic" material-the first time that such a material had been used for an important part of an aircraft's structure. With such changes in structural materials, the A-11 was redesignated A-12, and as such has never been publically disclosed.



(C) To test the effectiveness of antiradar devices a small-scale model is inadequate; only a full-size mock-up will do. Lockheed accordingly built one of these, and as early as November 1959, transported it in a specially designed trailer truck over hundreds of miles of highway from the Burbank plant to the test area. Here it was hoisted to the top of a pylon and looked at from various angles by radar. Tests and adjustments went on for a year and a half before the results were deemed satisfactory. In the course of the process it was found desirable to attach some sizable metallic constructions on each side of the fuselage, and Kelly Johnson worried a good deal about the effect of these protuberances on his design. In flight tests, however, it later developed that they imparted a useful aerodynamic lift to the vehicle, and years afterward Lockheed's design for a supersonic transport embodied similar structures.



(S) Pilots for the OXCART would obviously have to be of quite extraordinary competence, not only because of the unprecedented performance of the aircraft itself, but also because of the particluar qualities needed in men who were to fly intelligence missions. Brigadier General Don Flickinger, of the Air Force, was designated to draw up the criteria for selection, with advice from Kelly Johnson and from CIA Headquarters. Pilots had to be qualified in the latest high performance fighters, emotionally stable, and well motivated. They were to be between 25 and 40 years of age, and the size of the A-12 cockpit prescribed that they be under six feet tall and under 175 pounds in weight.



(S) Air Force files were screened for possible candidates and a list of pilots obtained. Psychological assessments, physical examinations and refinement of criteria eliminated a good many. Pre-evaluation processing resulted in sixteen potential nominees. This group underwent a further intensive security and medical scrutiny by the Agency. Those who remained were then approached to take employment with the Agency on a highly classified project involving a very advanced aircraft. In November 1961, commitments were obtained from five of the group. The small number recruited at this stage required that a second search be undertaken.



(S) When the final screening was complete the pilots selected from the program were William L. Skliar, Kenneth S. Collins, Walter Ray, Lon Walter, Mele Vojvodich, Jr., Jack W. Weeks, Ronald "Jack" Layton, Dennis B. Sullivan, David P. Young, Francis J. Murray, and Russell Scott. After the selection, arrangements were made with the Air Force to effect appropriate transfers and assignments to cover their training and to lay the basis for their transition from military to civilian status. Compensation and insurance arrangements were similar to those for the U-2 pilots.



(U) One thing to be decided in the earliest stages of the program was where to base and test the aircraft. Lockheed clearly could not do the business at Burbank, where the aircraft were being built, if for no other reason that its runway was too short. The ideal location ought to be remote from metropoli- tan areas; well away from civil and military airways to preclude observation; easily accessible by air; blessed with good weather the year round; capable of accommodating large numbers of personnel; equipped with fuel storage facilities; fairly close to an Air Force installation; and possessing at least an 8,000 foot runway. There was no such place to be found.



(S) Ten Air Force bases programmed for closure were considered, but none provided the necessary security, and annual operating costs at most of them would be unacceptable. Edwards Air Force Base in California seemed a more likely candidate, but in the end it also was passed over. Instead a secluded site in Nevada was finally picked. It was deficient in personnel accomodations and POL storage, and its long-unused runway was inadequate, but security was good, or could be made so, and a moderate construction program could provide sufficient facilities. Lockheed estimated what would be needed in such respects as monthly fuel consumption, hangars and shop space, housing for personnel, and runway specifications. Armed with the list of major requirements, Headquarters came up with a construction and engineering plan. And in case anyone became curious about what was going on at this re- mote spot, a cover story stated that the facilities were being prepared for certain radar studies, to be conducted by an engineering firm with support from the Air Force. The remote location was explained as necessary to reduce the effect of electronic interference from outside sources.



(S) Excellent as it may have been from the point of view of security, the site at first afforded few of the necessities and none of the amenities of life. It was far from any metropolitan center. Lockheed provided a C-47 shuttle service to its plant at Burbank, and a chartered D-18 (Lodestar) furnished transportation to Las Vegas. Daily commuting was out of the question, however, and the con- struction workers arriving during 1960 were billeted in surplus trailers. A new water well was dug, and a few recreational facilities provided, but it was some time before accomodations became agreeable. **



(** This footnote did NOT appear in the original document. It is the method I will use to indicate marginal notes that were hand written, at the location of '**' in the original document. The marginal note states: (1955))



(S) Among the lesser snags, one existed because the laws of Nevada required the names of all contractor personnel staying in the state for more than 48 hours to be reported to state authorities. It was generally felt that to list all these names and identify the companies involved would be likely to give the whole show away. The Agency's General Counsel, however, discovered that Government employees were exempted from these requirements. Thenceforth all contractor personnel going to the site received appointments as Govern- ment consultants, and if questions were asked the reply could be that no one but government employees were at this site.



(C) Construction began in earnest in September 1960, and continued on a double-shift schedule until mid-1964. One of the most urgent tasks was to build the runway, which according to initial estimates of A-12 requirements must be 8,500 feet long. The existing asphalt runway was 5,000 feet long and incapable of supporting the weight of the A-12. The new one was built between 7 September and 15 November and involved pouring over 25,000 yards of concrete. Another major problem was to provide some 500,000 gallons of PF-1 aircraft fuel per month. Neither storage facilities nor means of transporting fuel existed. After considering airlift, pipeline, and truck trans- port, it was decided that the last-named was the most economical, and could be made feasible by resurfacing no more than eighteen miles of highway leading into the base.



(C) Three surplus Navy hangars were obtained, dismantled, and erected on the north side of the base. Over 100 surplus Navy housing buildings were transported to the base and made ready for occupancy. By early 1962 a fuel tank farm was ready, with a capacity of 1,320,000 gallons. Warehousing and shop space was begun and repairs made to older buildings. All this, together with the many other facilities that had to be provided, took a long time to complete. Meanwhile, however, the really essential facilities were ready in time for the forecast delivery date of Aircraft No. 1 in August 1961.



(S) The facilities were ready, but the aircraft were not. Originally promised for delivery at the end of May 1961, the date first slipped to August, largely because of Lockheed's difficulties in procuring and fabricating titanium. Moreover, Pratt & Whitney found unexpectedly great trouble in bringing the J-58 engine up to OXCART requirements. In March 1961, Kelly Johnson notified Headquarters:



(U) "Schedules are in jeopardy on two fronts. One is the assembly of the wing and the other is in satisfactory development of the engine. Our evaluation shows that each of these programs is from three to four months behind the current schedule."



(S)To this Bissell replied: (U) "I have learned of your expected additional delay in first flight from 30 August to 1 December 1961. This news is extremely shocking on top of our previous slippage from May to August and my understanding as of our meeting 19 December that the titanium extrusion problems were essentially overcome. I trust this is the last of such disappointments short of a severe earthquake in Burbank."



(U) Realizing that delays were causing the cost of the program to soar, Headquarters decided to place a top-level aeronautical engineer in residence at Lockheed to monitor the program and submit progress reports.



(C) Delays nevertheless persisted. On 11 September, Pratt and Whitney informed Lockheed of their continuing difficulties with the J-58 engine in terms of weight, delivery, and performance. Completion date for Aircraft No. 1 by now had slipped to 22 December 1961, and the first flight to 27 Feb- ruary 1962. Even on this last date the J-58 would not be ready, and it was therefore decided that a Pratt and Whitney J-75 engine, designed for the F-105 and flown in the U-2, should be used for early flights. The engine, along with other components, could be fitted to the A-12 airframe, and it could power the aircraft safely to altitudes up to 50,000 feet and at speeds up to Mach 1.6.



(S) When this decision had been made, final preparations were begun for the testing phase. In late 1961 Colonel Robert J. Holbury, USAF, was named Commander of the base, with the Agency employee as his Deputy. Support aircraft began arriving in the spring of 1962. These included eight F-101's for training, two T-33's for proficiency flying, a C-130 for cargo transport, a U-3A for administration purposes, a helicopter for search and rescue, and a Cessna- 180 for liaison use. In addition, Lockheed provided an F-104 to act as chase aircraft during the A-12 flight test period.



(S) Meanwhile in January 1962, an agreement was reached with the Federal Aviation Agency that expanded the restricted airspace in the vicinity of the test area. Certain FAA air traffic controllers were cleared for the OXCART Project; their function was to insure that aircraft did not violate the order. The North American Air Defense Command established procedures to prevent their radar stations from reporting the appearance of high performance aircraft on their radar scopes.



(S) Refueling concepts required prepositioning of vast quantities of fuel at certain points outside the United States. Special tank farms were programmed in California, Eielson AFB Alaska, Thule AB Greenland, Kadena AB Okinawa, and Adana, Turkey. Since the A-12 use specially refined fuel, these tank farms were reserved exclusively for use by the OXCART Program. Very small detachments of technicians at these locations maintained the fuel storage facility and arranged for periodic quality control fuel tests.



(S) At the Lockheed Burbank plant, Aircraft No. 1 (serially numbered 121) received its final tests and checkout during January and February 1962, and was partially disassembled for shipment to the site. It became clear very early in OXCART planning that because of security problems and the inadequate runway, the A-12 could not fly from Burbank. Movement of the full-scale



(S)radar test model had been successfully accomplished in November 1959, as described above. A thorough survey of the route in June 1961, ascertained the hazards and problems of moving the actual aircraft, and showed that a package measuring 35 feet wide and 105 feet long could be transported without major difficulty. Obstructing road signs had to be removed, trees trimmed, and some roadsides levelled. Appropriate arrangements were made with police authorities and local officials to accomplish the safe transport of the aircraft. The entire fuselage, minus wings, was crated, covered, and loaded on the special-design trailer, which cost about $100,000. On 26 February 1962, it departed Burbank, and arrived at the base according to plan.



(S) First Flights



(U) Upon arrival reassembly of the aircraft and installation of the J-75 engines began. Soon it was found that aircraft tank sealing compounds had failed to adhere to the metals, and when fuel was put into the tanks numerous leaks oc- curred. It was necessary to strip the tanks of the faulty sealing compounds and reline them with new materials. Thus occurred one more unexpected and exasperating delay in the program.



(U) Finally, on 26 April 1962, Aircraft 121 was ready. On that day in accordance with Kelly Johnson's custom, Louis Schalk took it for an unofficial, unannounced, maiden flight lasting some 40 minutes. As in all maiden flights minor problems were detected, but it took only four more days to ready the aircraft for its first official flight.



(U) On 30 April 1962, just under one year later than originally planned, the A-12 officially lifted her wheels from the runway. Piloted again by Louis Schalk, it took off at 170 knots, with a gross weight of 72,000 pounds, and climbed to 30,000 feet. Top speed was 340 knots and the flight lasted 59 minutes. The pilot reported that the aircraft responded well and was extremely stable. Kelly Johnson declared it to be the smoothest official first flight of any aircraft he had designed or tested. The aircraft broke the sound barrier on its second official flight, 4 May 1962, reaching Mach 1.1. Again only minor problems were reported.



(S) With these flights accomplished, jubilation was the order of the day. The new Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. John McCone, sent a telegram of congratulation to Kelly Johnson. A critical phase had been triumphantly passed, but there remained the long, difficult, and sometimes discouraging process of working the aircraft up to full operational performance.



(C) Aircraft No. 122 arrived at base on 26 June, and spent three months in radar testing before engine installations and final assembly. Aircraft No. 123 arrived in August and flew in October. Aircraft No. 124, a two-seated version intended for use in training project pilots, was delivered in November. It was to be powered by the J-58 engines, but delivery delays and a desire to begin pilot training prompted a decision to install the smaller J-75's. The trainer flew initially in January 1963. The fifth aircraft, No. 125, arrived at the area on 17 December.



(S) Meanwhile the OXCART program received a shot in the arm from the Cuban missile crisis. U-2's had been maintaining a regular reconnaissance vigil over the island, and it was on one of these missions in October that the presence of offensive missiles was discovered. Overflights thereafter became more frequent, but on 27 October an Agency U-2, flown by a Strategic Air Force pilot on a SAC-directed mission, was shot down by a surface-to-air missile. This raised the dismaying possibility that continued manned, high- altitude surveillance of Cuba might become out of the question. The OXCART program suddenly assumed greater significance than ever, and its achievement of operational status became one of the highest national priorities.



(S) At the end of 1962 there were two A-12 aircraft engaged in flight tests. A speed of Mach 2.16 and altitude of 60,000 feet had been achieved. Progress was still slow, however, because of delays in the delivery of engines and shortcomings in the performance of those delivered. One of the two test aircraft was still flying with two J-75 engines, and the other with one J-75 and one J-58. It had long since become clear that Pratt & Whitney had been too optimistic in their forecast; the problem of developing the J-58 up to OXCART specifications had proved a good deal more recalcitrant than expected. Mr. McCone judged the situation to be truly serious, and on 3 December he wrote to the President of United Aircraft Corporation.



(U) "I have been advised that J-58 engine deliveries have been delayed again due to engine control production problems....By the end of the year it appears we will have barely enough J-58 engines to support the flight test program adequately....Furthernore, due to various engine difficulties we have not yet reached design speed and altitude. Engine thrust and fuel consumption deficiencies at pres- ent prevent sustained flight at design conditions which is so necessary to complete developments."



(U) By the end of January 1963, ten engines were available, and the first flight with two of them installed occurred on 15 January. Thenceforth all A-12 aircraft were fitted with their intended propulsion system. Flight testing accelerated and contractor personnel went to a three-shift work day.



(U) With each succeeding step into a high Mach regime new problems presented themselves. The worst of all these difficulties-indeed one of the most formidable in the entire history of the program-was revealed when flight testing moved into speeds between Mach 2.4 and 2.8, and the aircraft experienced such severe roughness as to make its operation virtually out of the question. The trouble was diagnosed as being in the air inlet system, which with its controls admitted air to the engine. At the higher speeds the flow of air was uneven, and the engine therefore could not function properly. Only after a long period of experimentation, often highly frustrating and irritating, was a solution reached. This further postponed the day when the A-12 could be declared operationally ready.



(U) Among more mundane troubles was the discovery that various nuts, bolts, clamps, and other debris of the manufacturing process had not been cleared ** away, and upon engine runup or take-off were sucked into the engine. The engine parts were machined to such close tolerances that they could be ruined in this fashion. Obviously the fault was due to sheer carelessness. Inspection procedures were revised, and it was also found prudent at Burbank to hoist the engine nacelles into the air, rock them back and forth, listen for loose objects, and then remove them by hand.



(** This footnote did NOT appear in the original document. It is the method I will use to indicate marginal notes that were hand written, at the location of '**' in the original document. The marginal note states: hasn't changed)



(S) While on a routine flight, 24 May 1963, one of the detachment pilots rec- ognized an erroneous and confusing air speed indication and decided to eject from the aircraft, which crashed 14 miles south of Wendover, Utah. The pilot Kenneth Collins, was unhurt. The wreckage was recovered in two days, and persons at the scene were indentified and requested to sign secrecy agreements. A cover story for the press described the accident as occurring to a F-105, and is still listed in this way on official records.



(U) All A-12 aircraft were grounded for a week during investigation of the accident. A plugged pitot static tube in icing conditions turned out to be responsible for the faulty cockpit instrument indications-it was not some- thing which would hold things up for long.



(S) Loss of this aircraft nevertheless precipitated a policy problem which had been troubling the Agency for some time. With the growing number of A-12's, how much longer could the project remain secret? The program had gone through development, construction, and a year of flight testing without attracting public attention. But the Department of Defense was having difficulty in concealing its participation because of the increasing rate of expenditures, otherwise unexplained. There was also a realization that the technological data would be extremely valuable in connection with feasibility studies for the SST. Finally, there was a growing awareness in the higher reaches of the aircraft industry that something new and remarkable was going on. Rumors spread, and gossip flew about. Commercial airline crews sighted the OXCART in flight. The editor of Aviation Week (as might be expected) indicated his knowledge of developments at Burbank. The secrecy was thinning out.



(S) The President's Announcement



(U) In spite of all this, 1963 went by without any public revelation. President Johnson was brought up to date on the project a week after taking office, and directed that a paper be prepared for an announcement in the spring of 1964. Then at his press conference on 24 February, he read a statement of which the first paragraph was as follows:



(U) "The United States has successfully developed an advanced experi- mental jet aircraft, the A-11, which has been tested in sustained flight at more than 2,000 miles per hour and at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet. The performance of the A-11 far exceeds that of any other aircraft in the world today. The development of this aircraft has been made possible by major advances in aircraft technology of great significance for both military and commercial applications. Several A-11 aircraft are now being flight tested at Edwards Air Force Base in California. The existence of this program is being disclosed today to permit the orderly exploitation of this advanced technology in our military and commercial program."



(U)The president went on to mention the "mastery of the metallurgy and fabrication of titanium metal" which has been achieved, gave credit to Lockheed and to Pratt & Whitney, remarked that appropriate members of the Senate and House had been kept fully informed, and prescribed that the detailed performance of the A-11 would be kept strictly classified.



(S) The President's reference to the "A-11" was of course deliberate. "A-11" had been the original design designation for the all-metal aircraft first proposed by Lockheed; subsequently it became the design designation for the Air Force YF-12A interceptor which differed from its parent mainly in that it carried a second man for launching air-to-air missiles. To preserve the distinction between the A-11 and the A-12 Security had briefed practically all witting personnel in government and industry on the impending announce- ment. OXCART secrecy continued in effect. There was considerable specula- tion about an Agency role in the A-11 development, but it was never acknowledged by the government. News headlines ranged from "US has dozen A-11 jets already flying" to "Secret of sizzling new plane probably history's best kept."



(U) The President also said that "the A-11 aircraft now at Edwards Air Force Base are undergoing extensive tests to determine their capabilities as long- range interceptors." It was true that the Air Force in October 1960, had contracted for three interceptor versions of the A-12, and they were by this time available. But at the moment when the President spoke, there were no A-11's at Edwards and there never had been. Project officials had known that the public announcement was about to be made, but they had not been told exactly when. Caught by surprise, they hastily flew two Air Force YF-12A's to Edwards to support the President's statement. So rushed was this operation, so speedily were the aircraft put into hangars upon arrival, that heat from them activated the hangar sprinkler system, dousing the reception team which awaited them.



(S) Thenceforth, while the OXCART continued its secret career at its own site, the A-11 performed at Edwards Air Force Base in a considerable glare of publicity. Pictures of the aircraft appeared in the press, correspondents could look at it and marvel, stories could be written. Virtually no details were made available, but the technical journals nevertheless had a field day. The unclassified Air Force and Space Digest, for example, published a long article in its issue of April 1964, commencing: "The official pictures and statements tell very little about the A-11. But the technical literature from open sources, when carefully interpreted, tells a good deal about what it could and, more importantly, what it could not be. Here's the story ..."



(S) Going Operational



(U) Three years and seven months after first flight in April 1962 the OXCART was declared ready for operational use at design specifications. The period thus devoted to flight tests was remarkably short, considering the new fields of aircraft performance which were being explored. As each higher Mach number was reached exhaustive tests were carried out in accordance with standard procedures to ensure that the aircraft functioned properly and safely. Defects were corrected and improvements made. All concerned gained experience with the particular characteristics and idiosyncrasies of the vehicle.



(S) The air inlet and related control continued for a long time to present the most troublesome and refractory problem. Numerous attempts failed to find a remedy, even though a special task force concentrated on the task. For a time there was something approaching despair, and the solution when finally achieved was greeted with enormous relief. After all, not every experimental aircraft of advanced performance has survived its flight testing period. The possibility existed that OXCART also would fail, despite the great cost and effort expended upon it.



(S) A few dates and figures will serve to mark the progress of events. By the end of 1963 there had been 573 flights totalling 765 hours. Nine aircraft were in the inventory. On 20 July 1963 test aircraft flew for the first time at Mach 3; in November Mach 3.2 (the design speed) was reached at 78,000 feet altitude. The longest sustained flight at design conditions occurred on 3 February 1964; it lasted to ten minutes at Mach 3.2 and 83,000 feet. By the end of 1964 there had been 1,160 flights, totalling 1,616 hours. Eleven aircraft were then available, four of them reserved for testing and seven assigned to the detachment.



(C) The record may be put in another way. Mach 2 was reached after six months of flying; Mach 3 after 15 months. Two years after the first flight the aircraft had flown a total of 38 hours at Mach 2, three hours at Mach 2.6, and less than one hour at Mach 3. After three years, Mach 2 time had increased to 60 hours, Mach 2.6 time time to 33 hours, and Mach 3 time to nine hours; all Mach 3 time, however, was by test aircraft, and detachment aircraft were still restricted to mach 2.9.



(S) As may be seen from the figures, most flights were of short duration, averaging little more than an hour each. Primarily this was because longer flights were unnecessary at this stage of testing. It was also true, however, that the less seen of OXCART the better, and short flights helped to preserve the secrecy of the proceedings. Yet it was virtually impossible for an aircraft of such dimensions and capabilities to remain inconspicuous. At its full speed OXCART had a turning radius of no less than 86 miles. There was no question of staying close to the airfield; its shortest possible flights took it over a very large expanse of territory.



(S) The first long-range, high-speed flight occurred on 27 January 1965, when one of the test aircraft flew for an hour and forty minutes, with an hour and fifteen minutes above Mach 3.1. Its total range was 2,580 nautical miles, with altitudes between 75,600 and 80,000 feet.



(U) Two more aircraft were lost during this phase of the program. On 9 July 1964 Aircraft No. 133 was making its final approach to the runway when at altitude of 500 feet and airspeed of 200 knots it began a smooth steady roll to the left. Lockheed test pilot Bill Park could not overcome the roll. At about a 45 degree bank angle and 200 foot altitude he ejected. As he swung down to the vertical in the parachute his feet touched the ground, for what must have been one of the narrower escapes in the perilous history of test piloting. The primary cause of the accident was that the servo for the right ourboard roll and pitch control froze. No news of the accident filtered out.



(S) On 28 December 1965 Aircraft No. 126 crashed immediately after take- off and was totally destroyed. Detachment pilot Mele Vojvodich ejected safely at an altitude of 150 feet. The accident investigation board determined that a flight line electrician had improperly connected the yaw and pitch gyros-had in effect reversed the controls. This time Mr. McCone directed the Office of Security to conduct an investigation into the possibility of sabotage. While nothing of the sort was discovered, there were indications of negligence, as the manufacturer of the gyro had earlier warned of the possibility that the mechanism could be connected in reverse. No action had been taken, however, even by such an elementary precaution as painting the contacts different colors. Again there was no publicity connected with the accident.



(S) The year 1965 saw the test site reach the high point of activity. Completion of construction brought it to full physical size. All detachment pilots were Mach 3.0 qualified. Site population reached 1,835. Contractors were working three shifts a day. Lockheed Constellations made daily flights between the factory at Burbank and the site. Two C-47 flights a day were made between the site and Las Vegas. And officials were considering how and when and where to use OXCART in its appointed role.



(S) Targeting the OX



(S) After the unhappy end of U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, US political authorities were understandably cautious about committing themselves to further manned reconnaissance over unfriendly territory. There was no serious intention to use the OXCART over Russia; save in some unforseeable emergency it was indeed no longer necessary to do so. What then, should be done with this vehicle?



(S) The first interest was in Cuba. By early 1964 Project Headquarters began planning for the contingency of flights over that island under a program designated SKYLARK. Bill Park's accident in early July held this program up for a time, but on 5 August Acting DCI Marshall S. Carter directed that SKYLARK achieve emergency operational readiness by 5 November. This involved preparing a small detachment which should be able to do the job over Cuba, though at something less than the full design capability of the OXCART. The goal was to operate at Mach 2.8 and 80,000 feet altitude.



(C) In order to meet the deadline set by General Carter, camera performance would have to be validated, pilots qualified for Mach 2.8 flight, and coordination with supporting elements arranged. Only one of several equip- ments for electronic countermeasures (ECM) would be ready by November, and a senior intra-governmental group, including representation from the President's Scientific Advisory Committee, examined the problem of operat- ing over Cuba without the full complement of defensive systems. This panel decided that the first few overflights could safely be conducted without them, but the ECM would be necessary thereafter. The delivery schedule of ECM equipment was compatible with this course of action.



(S) After considerable modifications to aircraft, the detachment simulated Cuban missions on training flights, and a limited emergency SKYLARK capability was announced on the date General Carter had set. With two weeks notice the OXCART detachment could accomplish a Cuban overflight, though with fewer ready aircraft and pilots than had been planned.



(S) During the following weeks the detachment concentrated on developing SKYLARK into a sustained capability, with five ready pilots and five operational aircraft. The main tasks were to determine aircraft range and fuel consumption, attain repeatable reliable operation, finish pilot training, prepare a family of SKYLARK missions, and coordinate routes with North American Air Defense, Continental Air Defense, and the Federal Aviation Authority. All this was accomplished without substantially hindering the main task of working up OXCART to full design capability. We may anticipate the story, however, by remarking that despite all this preparation the OXCART was never used over Cuba. U-2's proved adequate, and the A-12 was reserved for more critical situations.



(S) In 1965 a more critical situation did indeed emerge in Asia, and interest in using the aircraft there began to be manifest. On 18 March 1965 Mr. McCone discussed with Secretaries McNamara and Vance the increasing hazards to U-2 and drone reconnaissance of Communist China. A memorandum of this conversation stated:



(S) "It was further agreed that we should proceed immediately with all preparatory steps necessary to operate the OXCART over Commu- nist China, flying out of Okinawa. It was agreed that we should proceed with all construction and related arrangements. However, this decision did not authorize the deployment of the OXCART to Okinawa nor the decision to fly the OXCART over Communist China. The decision would authorize all preparatory steps and the expenditure of such funds as might be involved. No decision has been taken to fly the OXCART operationally over Communist China. This decision can only be made by the President."



(S) Four days later Brigadier General Jack C. Ledford, Director of the Office of Special Activities, DD/S&T, briefed Mr. Vance on the scheme which had been drawn up for operations in the Far East. The project was called BLACK SHIELD, and it called for the OXCART to operate out of the Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa. In the first phase, three aircraft would stage to Okinawa for 60-day periods, twice a year, with about 225 personnel involved.



(S)After this was in good order, BLACK SHIELD would advance to the point of maintaining a permanent detachment at Kadena. Secretary Vance made $3.7 million available to be spent in providing support facilities on the island, which were to be available by early fall of 1965.



(S) Meanwhile the Communists began to deploy surface-to-air missiles around Hanoi, thereby threatening our current military reconnaissance capa- bilities. Secretary McNamara called this to the attention of the Under Secretary of the Air Force on 3 June 1965, and inquired about the practicabil- ity of substituting OXCART aircraft for U-2's. He was told that BLACK SHIELD could operate over Vietnam as soon as adequate aircraft perform- ance was achieved.



(S) With deployment overseas thus apparently impending in the fall, the detachment went into the final stages of its program for validating the reliability of aircraft and aircraft systems. It set out to demonstrate complete systems reliability at Mach 3.05 and at 2,300 nautical miles range, with penetration altitude of 76,000 feet. A demonstrated capability for three aerial refuelings was also part of the validation process.



(S) By this time the OXCART was well along in performance. The inlet, camera, hydraulic, navigation, and flight control systems all demonstrated acceptable reliability. Nevertheless, as longer flights were conducted at high speeds and high temperatures, new problems came to the surface, the most serious being with the electrical wiring system. Wiring connectors and components had to withstand temperatures of more than 800 degrees Fahrenheit, together with structural flexing, vibration, and shock. Continuing malfunctions in the inlet controls, communications equipment, ECM systems, and cockpit instruments were in many cases attributable to wiring failures. There was also disturbing evidence that careless handling was contributing to electrical connector failures. Difficulties persisted in the sealing of fuel tanks. What with one thing and another, officials soon began to fear that the scheduled date for BLACK SHIELD readiness would not be met. Prompt corrective action on the part of Lockheed was in order. The quality of maintenance needed drastic improvement. The responsibility for delivering an aircraft system with acceptable reliability to meet an operational commitment lay in Lockheed's hands.



(S) In this uncomfortable situation, John Paragosky, Deputy for Technology, OSA, went to the Lockheed plant to see Kelly Johnson on 3 August 1965. A frank discussion ensued on the measures necessary to insure that BLACK SHIELD commitments would be met, and Johnson concluded that he should himself spend full time at the site in order to get the job done expeditiously. Lockheed President Daniel Haughton offered the full support of the corpora- tion, and Johnson began duty at the site next day. His firm and effective man- agement got Project BLACK SHIELD back on schedule.



(S) Four primary BLACK SHIELD aircraft were selected and final validation flights conducted. During these tests the OXCART achieved a maximum speed of Mach 3.29, altitude of 90,000 feet, and sustained flight time above Mach 3.2 of one hour and fourteen minutes. The maximum endurance flight lasted six hours and twenty minutes. The last stage was reached on 20 November 1965, and two days later Kelly Johnson wrote General Ledford:



(S) " ... Over-all, my considered opinion is that the aircraft can be suc- cessfully deployed for the BLACK SHIELD mission with what I would consider to be at least as low a degree of risk as in the early U-2 deployment days. Actually, considering our performance level of more than four times the U-2 speed and three miles more operating altitude, it is probably much less risky than our first U-2 deployment. I think the time has come when the bird should leave its nest."



(S) Ten days later the 303 Committee received a formal proposal that OXCART be deployed to the Far East. The Committee, after examining the matter, did not approve. It did agree, however, that short of actually moving aircraft to Kadena all steps should be taken to develop and maintain a quick reaction capability, ready to deploy within a 21-day period at any time after 1 January 1966.



(S) There the matter remained, for more than a year. During 1966 there were frequent renewals of the request to the 303 Committee for authorization to deploy OXCART to Okinawa and conduct reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam, Communist China, or both. All were turned down. Among high officials there was difference of opinion; CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board favored the move, while Alexis Johnson representing State, and Defense in the persons of Messrs. McNamara and Vance, opposed it. The proponents urged the necessity of better intelligence, especially on a possible Chinese Communist build-up preparatory to intervention in Vietnam. The opponents felt that better intelligence was not so urgently needed as to justify the political risks of basing the aircraft in Okinawa and thus almost certainly disclosing to Japanese and other propagandists. They also believed it undesirable to use OXCART and reveal something of its capability until a more pressing requirement appeared. At least once, on 12 August 1966, the divergent views were brought up to the President, who confirmed the 303 Committee's majority opinion against deployment.



(S) Meanwhile, of course, flight testing and crew proficiency training contin- ued. There was plenty of time to improve mission plans and flight tactics, as well as to prepare the forward area at Kadena. New plans shortened deployment time from the 21 days first specified. Personnel and cargo were to be airlifted to Kadena the day deployment was approved. On the fifth day the first OXCART would depart and travel the 6,673 miles in five hours and 34 minutes. The second would go on the seventh and the third on the ninth day. The first two would be ready for an emergency mission on the eleventh day, and for a normal mission on the fifteenth day.



(S) An impressive demonstration of the OXCART's capability occurred on 21 December 1966 when Lockheed test pilot Bill Park flew 10,198 statute miles in six hours. The aircraft left the test area in Nevada and flew northward over Yellowstone National Park, thence eastward to Bismark, North Dakota, and on to Duluth, Minnesota. It then turned south and passed Atlanta en route to Tampa, Florida, then northwest to Portland, Oregon, then southwest to Nevada. Again the flight turned eastward, passing Denver and St. Louis. Turning around at Knoxville, Tennessee, it passed Memphis in the home stretch back to Nevada. This flight established a record unapproachable by any other aircraft; it began at about the same time a typical government employee starts his work day and ended two hours before his quitting time. *



(S) Shortly after this exploit, tragedy befell the program. During a routine training flight on 5 January 1967, the fourth aircraft was lost, together with its pilot. The accident occurred during descent about 70 miles from the base. A fuel guage failed to function properly, and the aircraft ran out of fuel only minutes before landing. The pilot, Walter Ray, ejected but was killed when he failed to separate from the ejection seat before impact. The aircraft was totally destroyed. Its wreckage was found on 6 January and Ray's body recovered a day later. Through Air Force channels a story was released to the effect that an Air Force SR-71, on a routine test flight out of Edwards Air Force Base, was missing and presumed down in Nevada. The pilot was identified as a civilian test pilot, and the newspapers connected him with Lockheed. Flight activity at the base was again suspended during investigation of the causes both for the crash and for the failure of the seat separation device.



(S) It is worth observing that none of the four accidents occurred in the high- Mach-number, high-temperature regime of flight. All involved traditional problems inherent in any aircraft. In fact, the OXCART was by this time performing at high speeds, with excellent reliability.



(S) BLACK SHIELD



(S) About May of 1967 prospects for deployment took a new turn. A good deal of apprehension was evident in Washington about the possibility that the Communists might introduce surface-to-surface missiles into North Vietnam, and concern was aggravated by doubts as to whether we could detect such a development if it occurred. The President asked for a proposal on the matter; CIA briefed the 303 Committee and once again suggested that the OXCART be used. Its camera was far superior to those on drones or on the U-2, its vul- nerability was far less. The State and Defense members of the Committee decided to re-examine the requirements and the political risks involved. While they were engaged in their deliberations, Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, submitted to the 303 Committee another formal proposal to deploy the OXCART. In addition, he raised the matter at President Johnson's "Tuesday lunch" on 16 May, and received the Presidents approval to "go." Walt Rostow later in the day formally conveyed the President's decision, and the BLACK SHIELD deployment plan was forthwith put into effect.



(S) On 17 May airlift to Kadena began. On 22 May the first A-12 (Serial No. 131) flew nonstop to Kadena in six hours and six minutes. Aircraft No. 127



(S) * Neither on this nor on other flights was there much trouble from sonic boom. To be sure, the inhabitants of a small village some 30 miles from the site were troubled as the aircraft broke through the sound barrier while gaining altitude. A change of course remedied this. At altitude OXCART produced no more than an ominous rumble on the ground and since the plane was in- visible to the naked eye no one associated this sound with its actual source.



(C)departed on 24 May and arrived at Kadena five hours and 55 minutes later. The third, No. 129, left according to plan on 26 May 1967 and proceeded nor- mally until in the vicinity of Wake Island where the pilot experienced difficulties with the inertial navigation and communications systems. In the circumstances, he decided to make a precautionary landing at Wake Island. The prepositioned emergency recovery team secured the aircraft without incident and the flight to Kadena resumed next day.



(C) Arrangements were made to brief the Ambassadors and Chiefs of Station in the Philippines, Formosa, Thailand, South Vietnam, and Japan, and the High Commissioner and Chief of Station, Okinawa. The Prime Ministers of Japan and Thailand were advised, as were the President and Defense Minister of the Republic of China. The Chiefs of the Air Force of Thailand and the Republic of China were also briefed. Reactions were favorable.



(S) On 29 May 1967, the unit at Kadena was ready to fly an operational mis- sion. Under the command of Colonel Hugh C. Slater two hundred and sixty personnel had deployed to the BLACK SHIELD facility. Except for hangars, which were a month short of completion, everything was in shape for sustained operations. Next day the detachment was alerted for a mission on 31 May, and the moment arrived which would see the culmination of ten years of effort, worry, and cost. As fate would have it, on the morning of the 31st heavy rain fell at Kadena. Since weather over the target area was clear, preparations continued in hopes that the local weather would clear. When the time for take-off approached, the OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway, and took off while the rain continued.



(S) The first BLACK SHIELD mission followed one flight line over North Vietnam and one over the Demilitarized Zone. It lasted three hours and 39 minutes, and the cruise legs were flown at Mach 3.1 and 80,000 feet. Results were satisfactory. Seventy of the 190 known SAM sites in North Vietnam were photographed, as were nine other priority targets. There were no radar signals detected, indicating that the first mission had gone completely unnoticed by both Chinese and North Vietnamese.



(S) Fifteen BLACK SHIELD missions were alerted during the period from 31 May to 15 August 1967. Seven of the fifteen were flown and of these four detected radar tracking signals, but no hostile action was taken against any of them. By mid-July they had determined with a high degree of confidence that there were no surface-to-surface missiles in North Vietnam.



(C) All operational missions were planned, directed, and controlled by Project Headquarters in Washington. A constant watch was maintained on the weather in the target areas. Each day at a specified hour (1600 hours local) a mission alert briefing occurred. If the forecast weather appeared favorable, the Kadena base was alerted and provided a route to be flown. The alert pre- ceded actual take-off by 28 to 30 hours. Twelve hours prior to take-off (H minus 12) a second review of target weather was made. If it continued favorable, the mission generation sequence continued. At H minus 2 hours, a "go-no-go" decision was made and communicated to the field. The final decision, it should be noted, depended not solely on weather in the target area; conditions had to be propitious also in the refueling areas and at the launch and recovery base.



(S) Operations and maintenance at Kadena began with the receipt of alert notification. Both a primary aircraft and pilot and a back-up aircraft and pilot were selected. The aircraft were given thorough inspection and servicing, all systems were checked, and the cameras loaded into the aircraft. Pilots received a detailed route briefing in the early evening prior to the day of flight. On the morning of the flight a final briefing occurred, at which time the condition of the aircraft and its systems was reported, last-minute weather forecasts reviewed, and other relevant intelligence communicated together with any amendments or changes in the flight plan. Two hours prior to take- off the primary pilot had a medical examination, got into his suit, and was taken to the aircraft. If any malfunctions developed on the primary aircraft, the back-up could execute the mission one hour later.



(S) A typical route profile for a BLACK SHIELD mission over North Vietnam included a refueling shortly after take-off, south of Okinawa, the planned photographic pass or passes, withdrawl to a second aerial refueling in the Thailand area, and return to Kadena. So great was the OXCART's speed that it spent only 12 1/2 minutes over North Vietnam in a typical "single pass" mission, or a total of 21 1/2 minutes on two passes. Its turning radius of 86 miles was such, however, that on some mission profiles it might be forced during its turn to intrude into Chinese airspace.



(S) Once landed back at Kadena, the camera film was removed from the aircraft, boxed, and sent by special plane to the processing facilities. Film from earlier missions was developed at the Eastman Kodak plant in Rochester, New York. By late summer an Air Force Center in Japan carried out the processing in order to place the photointelligence in the hands of American commanders in Vietnam within 24 hours of completion of a BLACK SHIELD mission.



(S) Between 16 August and 31 December 1967, twenty-six missions were alerted. Fifteen were flown. On 17 December one SAM site tracked the vehicle with its acquisition radar but was unsuccessful with its Fan Song guidance radar. On 28 October a North Vietnamese SAM site for the first time launched a single, albiet unsuccessful, missile at the OXCART. Photography from this mission documented the event with photographs of missile smoke above the SAM firing site, and with pictures of the missile and of its contrail. Electronic countermeasures equipment appeared to perform well against the missile firing.



(S) During the flight of 30 October 1967, pilot Dennis Sullivan detected radar tracking on his first pass over North Vietnam. Two sites prepared to launch missiles but neither did. During the second pass at least six missiles were fired at the OXCART, each confirmed by missile vapor trails on mission photog- raphy. Sullivan saw these vapor trails and witnessed three missile detonations. Post-flight inspection of the aircraft revealed that a piece of metal had penetrated the lower right wing fillet area and lodged against the support structure of the wing tank. The fragment was not a warhead pellet but may have been a part of the debris from one of the missile detonations observed by the pilot.



(S) Between 1 January and 31 March 1968 six missions were flown out of fifteen alerted. Four of these were over North Vietnam and two over North Korea. The first mission over North Korea on 26 January occurred during a very tense period following seizure of the Pueblo on the 23rd. The aim was to discover whether the North Koreans were preparing any large scale hostile move on the heels of this incident. Chinese tracking of the flight was apparent, but no missiles were fired at the plane.



(C) The Department of State was reluctant to endorse a second mission over North Korea for fear of the diplomatic repercussions which could be expected if the aircraft came down in hostile territory. Brigadier General Paul Bacalis then briefed Secretary Rusk on the details and objectives of the mission, and assured him that the aircraft would transit North Korea in no more than seven minutes. He explained that even if some failure occurred during flight the aircraft would be highly unlikely to land either in North Korea or in China. Secretary Rusk made suggestions to alter the flight plan, thus becoming the projects highest ranking flight planner.



(S) Between 1 April and 9 June 1968 two missions were alerted for North Korea. Only the mission which flew on 8 May was granted approval.



(S) The SR-71



(S) All through the OXCART program the Air Force had been exceedingly helpful. it gave financial support, conducted the refueling program, provided operational facilities at Kadena, and air-lifted OXCART personnel and supplies to Okinawa for the operations over Vietnam and North Korea. It also ordered from Lockheed a small fleet of A-11's, which upon being finished as two seated reconnaissance aircraft would be named SR-71. These would become operational about 1967.



(S) The stated mission of the SR-71 was to conduct "post-strike reconnais- sance," that is, to look the enemy situation over after a nuclear exchange. The likelihood of using the aircraft in the capacity hardly appeared great, but SR-71 was of course also capable of ordinary intelligence missions. For these purposes, however, the OXCART possessed certain clear advantages. It carried only one man, and largely for this reason it had room for a much bigger and better camera, as well as for various other collection devices which at the time could not be carried by the SR-71. It was certainly the most effective reconnaissance aircraft in existence, or likely to be in existence for years to come. Also it was operated by civilians, and could be employed covertly, or at least without the number of personnel and amount of fanfare normally attending an Air Force operation.



(S) The fact the SR-71's were ordered eased the path of OXCART develop- ment, since it meant that the financial burden was shared with the Air Force, and the cost per aircraft was somewhat reduced by producing greater numbers. In the longer run, however, the existence of SR-71 spelled the doom of OXCART, for reasons which appear to have been chiefly financial and in a manner now to be related.



(S) Ending



(S) During November 1965, the very month when OXCART was finally declared operational, the moves toward its demise commenced. Within the Bureau of the Budget a memorandum was circulated expressing concern at the costs of the A-12 and SR-71 programs, both past and projected. It questioned the requirement for the total number of aircraft represented in the combined fleets, and doubted the necessity for a separate CIA (OXCART) fleet. Several alternatives were proposed to achieve a substantial reduction in the forecasted spending, but the recommended course was to phase out the A-12 program by September 1966 and stop any further procurement of SR-71 aircraft. Copies of this memorandum were sent to the Department of Defense and the CIA with the suggestion that those agencies explore the alternatives set out in the paper. But the Secretary of Defense declined to consider the proposal, presumably because the SR-71 would not be operational by September 1966.



(S) Things remained in this state until in July 1966 the Bureau of the Budget proposed that a study group be established to look into the possibility of reducing expenses on the OXCART and SR-71 programs. The group was requested to consider the following alternatives:



1. Retention of separate A-12 and SR-71 fleets, i.e., status quo.



2. Collocation of the two fleets.



3. Transfer of the OXCART mission and aircraft to SAC.



4. Transfer of the OXCART mission to SAC and storage of A-12 aircraft.



5. Transfer of the OXCART mission to SAC and disposal of A-12 aircraft.



(S)The study group included C. W. Fischer, Bureau of the Budget; Herbert Bennington, Department of Defense; and John Paragosky, Central Intelligence Agency.



(S) This group conducted its study through the fall of 1966, and identified three principal alternatives of its own. They were:



1. To maintain the status quo and continue both fleets at current approval levels.



2. To mothball all A-12 aircraft, but maintain the OXCART capability by sharing SR-71 aircraft between SAC and CIA.



3. To terminate the OXCART fleet in January 1968 (assuming an operational readiness date of September 1967 for the SR-71) and assign all missions to the SR-71 fleet.



(S) On 12 December 1966 there was a meeting at the Bureau of the Budget attended by Mr. Helms, Mr. Shultze, Mr. Vance, and Dr. Hornig, Scientific Advisor to the President. Those present voted on the alternatives proposed in the Fischer-Bennington-Paragosky report. Messrs. Vance, Schultze, and Hornig chose to terminate the OXCART fleet, and Mr. Helms stood out for eventual sharing of the SR-71 fleet between CIA and SAC. The Bureau of the Budget immediately prepared a letter to the President setting forth the course of action recommended by the majority. Mr. Helms, having dissented from the majority, requested his Deputy Director for Science and Technology to prepare a letter to the President stating CIA's reasons for remaining in the reconnaissance business.



(S) On 16 December Mr. Schultze handed Mr. Helms a draft memorandum to the President which requested a decision either to share the SR-71 fleet between CIA and SAC, or to terminate the CIA capability entirely. This time Mr. Helms replied that new information of considerable significance had been brought to his attention concerning SR-71 performance. He requested another meeting after 1 January to review pertinent facts, and also asked that the memorandum to the President be withheld pending that meeting's outcome. Specifically, he cited indications that the SR-71 program was having serious technical problems and that there was real doubt that it would achieve an operational capability by the time suggested for termination of the A-12 program. Mr. Helms therefore changed his position from sharing the SR-71 aircraft with SAC to a firm recommendation to retain the OXCART A-12 fleet under civilian sponsorship. The Budget Bureau's memorandum was neverthe- less transmitted to the President, who on 28 December 1966 accepted the recommendations of Messrs. Vance, Hornig, and Schultze, and directed the termination of the OXCART Program by 1 January 1968.



(S) This decision meant that a schedule had to be developed for orderly phase-out. After consultation with project Headquarters, the Deputy Secretary of Defense was advised on 10 January 1967 that four A-12's would be placed in storage in July 1967, two more by December, and the last four by the end of January 1968. In May Mr. Vance directed that the SR-71 assume contingency responsibility to conduct Cuban overflights as of 1 July 1967 and take over the dual capability over Southeast Asia and Cuba by 1 December 1967. This provided for some overlap between OXCART withdrawal and SR-71 assump- tion of responsibility.



(S) Meanwhile until 1 July 1967 the OXCART Detachment was to maintain its capability to conduct operational missions both from a prepared location overseas and from the US. This included a 15 day quick reaction capability for deployment to the Far East and a seven-day quick reaction for deployment over Cuba. Between 1 July and 31 December 1967 the fleet would remain able to conduct operational missions either from a prepared overseas base or from home base, but not from both simultaneously. A quick reaction capability for either Cuban overflights or deployment to the Far East would also be maintained.



(S) All these transactions and arrangements occurred before the OXCART had conducted a single operational mission or even deployed to Kadena for such a mission. As recounted above, the aircraft first performed its appointed role over North Vietnam on the last day of May 1967. In succeeding months it demonstrated both its exceptional technical capabilities and the competence with which its operations were managed. As word began to get around that OXCART was to be phased out, high officials commenced to feel some disquiet. Concern was shown by Walt Rostow, the President's Special Assistant; by key Congressional figures, members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the President's Scientific Advisory Commit- tee. The phase-out lagged, and the question was reopened.



(S) A new study of the feasibility and cost of continuing the OXCART program was completed in the spring of 1968 and four new alternatives were proposed.



1. Transfer all OXCART aircraft to SAC by 31 October 1968; substitute Air Force for contractor support where possible; turn the test A-12 aircraft over to the SR-71 test facility.



2. Transfer OXCART as in alternative 1, above, and store eight SR-71's.



3. Close the OXCART home base and collocate the fleet with SR-71's at Beale Air Force Base in California, but with CIA retaining control and management.



4. Continue OXCART operations at its own base under CIA control and management.



(S) Mr. Helms expressed his reactions to these alternatives in a memorandum to Messrs. Nitze, Hornig, and Flax, dated 18 April 1968. In it he questioned why, if eight SR-71's could be stored in one option, they could not be stored in all the options, with the resultant savings applied in each case. He questioned the lower cost figures of combining the OXCART with the SR-71's and disagreed, for security reasons, with collocating the two fleets. Above all, however, he felt that the key point was the desirability of retaining a covert re- connaissance capability under civilian management. It was his judgement that such a requirement existed, and he recommended that OXCART continue at its own base under CIA management.



(S) In spite of all these belated efforts, the Secretary of Defense on 16 May 1968 reaffirmed the original decision to terminate the OXCART Program and store the aircraft. At his weekly luncheon with his principal advisors on 21 May 1968, the President confirmed Secretary Clifford's decision.



(S) Early in March 1968, USAF SR-71 aircraft began to arrive at Kadena to take over the BLACK SHIELD commitment, and by gradual stages the A-12 was placed on standby to back up the SR-71. The last operational mission flown by OXCART was on 8 May 1968 over North Korea, following which the Kadena Detachment was advised to prepare to go home. Project Headquarters selected 8 June 1968 as the earliest possible date to begin redeployment, and in the meantime flights of A-12 aircraft were to be limited to those essential for maintaining flying safety and pilot proficiency. After BLACK SHIELD aircraft arrived in the US they would proceed to storage. Those already at base were placed in storage by 7 June.



(S) During its final days overseas the OXCART enterprise suffered yet another blow, as inexplicable as it was tragic. On 4 June Aircraft No. 129, piloted by Jack Weeks, set out from Kadena on a check flight necessitated by a change of engine. Weeks was heard from when 520 miles east of Manila. Then he disappeared. Search and rescue operations found nothing. No cause for the accident was ever ascertained, and it remains a mystery to this day. Once again the official news release identified the lost aircraft as an SR-71 and security was maintained.



(S) A few days afterwards the two remaining planes on Okinawa flew to the US and were stored with the remainder of the OXCART family.



(S) Postscript



(S) In summary; the OXCART Program lasted just over ten years, from its in- ception in 1957 through first flights in 1962 to termination in 1968. Lockheed produced 15 OXCARTS, three YF-12A's and 31 SR-71's. The 49 supersonic aircraft had completed more than 7,300 flights, with 17,000 hours in the air. Over 2,400 hours had been above Mach 3. Five OXCART's were lost in accidents; two pilots were killed, and two had narrow escapes. In addition, two F-101 chase planes were lost with their Air Force pilots during OXCART's testing phase.



(U) The main objective of the program-to create a reconnaissance aircraft of unprecedented speed, range, and altitude capability-was triumphantly achieved. It may well be, however, that the most important aspects of the effort lay in its by-products--the notable advances in aerodynamic design, engine performance, cameras, electronic countermeasures, pilot life support systems, antiair devices, and above all in milling, machining, and shaping titanium. Altogether it was a pioneering accomplishment.



(S) In a ceremony at the Nevada base on 26 June 1968, Vice Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, presented the CIA Intelligence Star for valor to pilots Kenneth S. Collins, Ronald L. Layton, Francis J. Murray, Dennis B. Sullivan, and Mele Vojvodich for participation in the BLACK SHIELD operation. The posthumous award to pilot Jack W. Weeks was accepted by his widow. The United States Air Force Legion of Merit was presented to Colonel Slater and his Deputy, Colonel Maynard N. Amundson. The Air Force Outstanding Unit Award was presented to the members of the OXCART Detachment (1129th Special Activities Squadron, Detachment 1) and the USAF supporting units.



(U) Wives of the pilots were present and learned for the first time of the activities in which their husbands had been involved. Kelly Johnson was a guest speaker at the ceremony, and lamented in moving words the end of an enterprise which had marked his most outstanding achievement in aircraft design. His own awards had already been received: The Presidents Medal of Freedom in 1964, and on 10 February 1966, the National Medal of Science, from President Johnson, for his contributions to aerospace science and to the national security.





The End