From Wired.com:
East Afghan Plan: Choke the ‘Rat Lines,’ Secure the Roads
By Spencer Ackerman
August 23, 2010
7:27 am
Categories: Af/Pak
Follow @attackerman
BAGRAM AIR FIELD, Afghanistan — Make the main roads safe. Stop commuting to the fight. Choke the insurgent “rat lines” that supply attacks on Kabul. Shut down bases where they’re not needed. And get ready to hand off more places to Afghan control.
That’s the gist of the campaign plan for securing eastern Afghanistan, designed by Major General John Campbell (pictured, left). His 101st Airborne Division is largely responsible for keeping the region secure. Which means Campbell and his troops carry a lot on their shoulders. The so-called “rat lines” carrying insurgent fighters, weapons and cash from the tribal areas of Pakistan up to Kabul remain open. And the U.S.’ overall strategy for Afghanistan focuses on southern provinces like Helmand and Kandahar; Campbell and his men have to make due without as much help from HQ.
To some degree, that focus — a shift in course from the first eight years of the war, when the east was the central front — resulted from the Obama administration and the military embracing counterinsurgency as the war’s organizational template. Counterinsurgency theory urges commanders to swarm troops into dense population centers in order to win crucial local support. But rural, mountainous eastern Afghanistan doesn’t have so many population-dense areas. How to wage a counterinsurgency there?
Campbell thinks he has an answer. He’s got six brigades under his command, consisting of between 3000 and 5000 U.S., Polish and French troops each. (A seventh, the 4th Brigade of the 101st, is arriving soon.) His instructions are to focus on the district centers, the relatively dense areas where governance and commerce are supposed to occur. The goal is to make the district centers “secure enough so the folks doing the governance can get to work,” Campbell explains to Danger Room from his Bagram office. He calls it “District Center Reinforcement.”
District Center Reinforcement borrows a key concept from the Iraq surge of 2007: don’t try to “commute to the fight” from big base; set up right in the heart of the action. “We’re going to move into where the people are going to be,” Campbell says. That means setting up smaller bases in the district centers for U.S. and Afghan forces. “It’s like a JSS,” the general says, referring to the Joint Security Stations that General David Petraeus established in Baghdad’s most chaotic neighborhoods. Does that mean he’ll continue shutting down bases in more remote and depopulated areas, as his predecessor, Major General Peter Scaparotti did? “I think we have to,” he says, though he doesn’t exactly specify where.
But here’s a clue. Campbell’s area of responsibility, known as Regional Command East, has 40 of the 83 “key terrain districts” – Pentagon parlance for areas critical to the Afghanistan war. And several of those districts cluster around two critical roads: Highway Seven, running east from Kabul to the Torkham Gate, an entranceway to Pakistan and a critical route for both Afghan commerce and NATO’s supply chain; and Highway One, running south in RC-East to Kandahar. “I’m going to focus around the roads,” Campbell says.
The idea is to control and hold the roads, one district center at a time. Then expand security (and local government and development) outwards, something known as an “ink spot” approach. But it’s not just to protect the people. It’s to disrupt the insurgent “rat lines.” The insurgents, after all, use the roads, too, in order to get to their objective: Kabul. (You can see that for yourself in this visual representation of insurgent activity based on the WikiLeaks disclosures.)
“If they want to show the government is not capable of protecting the people, they’ll attack Kabul,” Campbell assesses. They use Highways 1 and 7, as well as a route through Khost, Paktia and Paktika provinces up through Logar, in order to prepare for attacks that so far haven’t materialized. For its part, security in Kabul is largely under the control of Afghans. A series of police checkpoints have sprouted in the city, known as the “Ring of Steel.” But except for the city’s frustratingly snarled traffic, there is freedom of movement through the capitol.
While Petraeus was relatively upbeat about security in Kabul during an interview with Danger Room last week, Campbell is more cautious. The insurgents — led in the east by the Haqqani network, “some Taliban, [and] a small piece of al-Qaeda” – “want to attack it,” he says.
Cambell’s “rat lines” picture is almost the exact same security assessment I heard in Khost two years ago, despite the endless pledges of progress from the military and the Obama administration since. “I don’t think that’s changed over the years,” Campbell concedes, although “some areas have done better than others.” In order to make additional progress, Campbell has the 4th Brigade of the 101st on the way. It’s going to take responsibility for Paktika away from Task Force Rakkasans, which will retain Khost and Paktia provinces. It’s an intuitive choice: 4-101 was in all three provinces in 2008, so it should know the area.
But neither Campbell nor Petraeus believes that NATO can actually close the insurgent logistical spigot. “We’ll disrupt those ratlines,” Campbell says. “We’re not going to shut them down totally.” Adds Petraeus: “I don’t think we shut down rat lines in Arizona. What you do is you reduce, you disrupt.”
Campbell has almost as many troops under his command than were in all of Afghanistan before 2009. But he doesn’t have a lot of time to show results. So he’s looking to get out of areas where he doesn’t think he can secure and transition to effective Afghan governance. Asked if that means pulling troops out of the violent province of Kunar — as a recent Stars & Stripes piece hinted might be on the table — he replies, “We’re looking at that right now.” The provincial capitol of Asadabad might still need U.S. protection. But small combat outposts in remote Kunar areas like Blessing and Michigan might be the next candidates for U.S. pullback.
Campbell explains that the question he’ll ask is “Can we get to the next step” — meaning prepare an area for a sustainable transition to Afghan security control under a capable and legitimate government. If not, he’ll pull out. By the same token, he’s looking to transition more stable provinces like Bamiyan, Parwan and Panjshir to the Afghans by July 2011.
It’s an ambitious agenda. A pamphlet that Campbell issued to Afghans explaining his strategy begins, “The Afghan people in [the east] believe that supporting their government” will improve their lives. But one of the last brigade commanders in the violent eastern provinces of Nangahar, Nuristan, Kunar and Laghman found that the locals hate the government more than they hate the insurgents. Campbell has ten more months to show results in the district centers and on the roads. It’s not clear that time is on his side.
Photo: CJTF-101
East Afghan Plan: Choke the ‘Rat Lines,’ Secure the Roads
By Spencer Ackerman
August 23, 2010
7:27 am
Categories: Af/Pak
Follow @attackerman
BAGRAM AIR FIELD, Afghanistan — Make the main roads safe. Stop commuting to the fight. Choke the insurgent “rat lines” that supply attacks on Kabul. Shut down bases where they’re not needed. And get ready to hand off more places to Afghan control.
That’s the gist of the campaign plan for securing eastern Afghanistan, designed by Major General John Campbell (pictured, left). His 101st Airborne Division is largely responsible for keeping the region secure. Which means Campbell and his troops carry a lot on their shoulders. The so-called “rat lines” carrying insurgent fighters, weapons and cash from the tribal areas of Pakistan up to Kabul remain open. And the U.S.’ overall strategy for Afghanistan focuses on southern provinces like Helmand and Kandahar; Campbell and his men have to make due without as much help from HQ.
To some degree, that focus — a shift in course from the first eight years of the war, when the east was the central front — resulted from the Obama administration and the military embracing counterinsurgency as the war’s organizational template. Counterinsurgency theory urges commanders to swarm troops into dense population centers in order to win crucial local support. But rural, mountainous eastern Afghanistan doesn’t have so many population-dense areas. How to wage a counterinsurgency there?
Campbell thinks he has an answer. He’s got six brigades under his command, consisting of between 3000 and 5000 U.S., Polish and French troops each. (A seventh, the 4th Brigade of the 101st, is arriving soon.) His instructions are to focus on the district centers, the relatively dense areas where governance and commerce are supposed to occur. The goal is to make the district centers “secure enough so the folks doing the governance can get to work,” Campbell explains to Danger Room from his Bagram office. He calls it “District Center Reinforcement.”
District Center Reinforcement borrows a key concept from the Iraq surge of 2007: don’t try to “commute to the fight” from big base; set up right in the heart of the action. “We’re going to move into where the people are going to be,” Campbell says. That means setting up smaller bases in the district centers for U.S. and Afghan forces. “It’s like a JSS,” the general says, referring to the Joint Security Stations that General David Petraeus established in Baghdad’s most chaotic neighborhoods. Does that mean he’ll continue shutting down bases in more remote and depopulated areas, as his predecessor, Major General Peter Scaparotti did? “I think we have to,” he says, though he doesn’t exactly specify where.
But here’s a clue. Campbell’s area of responsibility, known as Regional Command East, has 40 of the 83 “key terrain districts” – Pentagon parlance for areas critical to the Afghanistan war. And several of those districts cluster around two critical roads: Highway Seven, running east from Kabul to the Torkham Gate, an entranceway to Pakistan and a critical route for both Afghan commerce and NATO’s supply chain; and Highway One, running south in RC-East to Kandahar. “I’m going to focus around the roads,” Campbell says.
The idea is to control and hold the roads, one district center at a time. Then expand security (and local government and development) outwards, something known as an “ink spot” approach. But it’s not just to protect the people. It’s to disrupt the insurgent “rat lines.” The insurgents, after all, use the roads, too, in order to get to their objective: Kabul. (You can see that for yourself in this visual representation of insurgent activity based on the WikiLeaks disclosures.)
“If they want to show the government is not capable of protecting the people, they’ll attack Kabul,” Campbell assesses. They use Highways 1 and 7, as well as a route through Khost, Paktia and Paktika provinces up through Logar, in order to prepare for attacks that so far haven’t materialized. For its part, security in Kabul is largely under the control of Afghans. A series of police checkpoints have sprouted in the city, known as the “Ring of Steel.” But except for the city’s frustratingly snarled traffic, there is freedom of movement through the capitol.
While Petraeus was relatively upbeat about security in Kabul during an interview with Danger Room last week, Campbell is more cautious. The insurgents — led in the east by the Haqqani network, “some Taliban, [and] a small piece of al-Qaeda” – “want to attack it,” he says.
Cambell’s “rat lines” picture is almost the exact same security assessment I heard in Khost two years ago, despite the endless pledges of progress from the military and the Obama administration since. “I don’t think that’s changed over the years,” Campbell concedes, although “some areas have done better than others.” In order to make additional progress, Campbell has the 4th Brigade of the 101st on the way. It’s going to take responsibility for Paktika away from Task Force Rakkasans, which will retain Khost and Paktia provinces. It’s an intuitive choice: 4-101 was in all three provinces in 2008, so it should know the area.
But neither Campbell nor Petraeus believes that NATO can actually close the insurgent logistical spigot. “We’ll disrupt those ratlines,” Campbell says. “We’re not going to shut them down totally.” Adds Petraeus: “I don’t think we shut down rat lines in Arizona. What you do is you reduce, you disrupt.”
Campbell has almost as many troops under his command than were in all of Afghanistan before 2009. But he doesn’t have a lot of time to show results. So he’s looking to get out of areas where he doesn’t think he can secure and transition to effective Afghan governance. Asked if that means pulling troops out of the violent province of Kunar — as a recent Stars & Stripes piece hinted might be on the table — he replies, “We’re looking at that right now.” The provincial capitol of Asadabad might still need U.S. protection. But small combat outposts in remote Kunar areas like Blessing and Michigan might be the next candidates for U.S. pullback.
Campbell explains that the question he’ll ask is “Can we get to the next step” — meaning prepare an area for a sustainable transition to Afghan security control under a capable and legitimate government. If not, he’ll pull out. By the same token, he’s looking to transition more stable provinces like Bamiyan, Parwan and Panjshir to the Afghans by July 2011.
It’s an ambitious agenda. A pamphlet that Campbell issued to Afghans explaining his strategy begins, “The Afghan people in [the east] believe that supporting their government” will improve their lives. But one of the last brigade commanders in the violent eastern provinces of Nangahar, Nuristan, Kunar and Laghman found that the locals hate the government more than they hate the insurgents. Campbell has ten more months to show results in the district centers and on the roads. It’s not clear that time is on his side.
Photo: CJTF-101
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