From STRATFOR:
2013, the Taliban and the U.S. Commitment to Afghanistan
February 2, 2012 | 0554 GMT
NATO meetings in Brussels this week had been expected to center on France's recent attempts to shorten its commitment to NATO's mission in Afghanistan (with the important repercussion of the potential for other European allies to follow the French lead). But U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, while en route to Brussels on Wednesday, announced that combat operations in Afghanistan would transition to a "training, advise and assist" role before the end of 2013 -- rather than the long-held 2014 deadline. The shortened time frame Panetta proffered would be consistent with what French President Nicolas Sarkozy now desires. But the mission in Afghanistan does not depend on the presence of the French contingent -- or even on the cumulative contributions of European countries that might follow the French in reducing their commitments. Concern about the durability of the French commitment to the war effort is insufficient to understand Panetta’s announcement.
When in 2001 the Northern Alliance -- supported by American airpower and special operations forces -- seized Kabul, Stratfor argued that the Taliban had not been defeated, but had declined combat on American terms and conceded the capital. Washington’s attention quickly shifted to Iraq. As the war in Iraq intensified and then settled, the war in Afghanistan underwent a significant shift. The old al Qaeda core that orchestrated the 9/11 attacks moved to Pakistan and was increasingly degraded, culminating in the 2011 death of Osama bin Laden. Pursuing that al Qaeda core is what originally motivated the United States to invade Afghanistan. But today, the principal military adversary of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force is a diffuse and decentralized group -- the Taliban. And even the peak of NATO's combined forces -- almost 150,000 between the United States and allied personnel -- would not be sufficient to pacify the country within the remaining time.
Washington consequently has an incentive to seek a political accommodation in Afghanistan. The United States wants to negotiate a settlement that allows it to gracefully withdraw from the country while ensuring Washington's long term goal: that Afghanistan not serve as a sanctuary for transnational jihadists.
Thus, looking beyond the alliance's shaky commitment to the war in Afghanistan, the underlying inability of committed troops to defeat the Taliban has led to the current reality, within which the circumstances of American defeat in Afghanistan are being negotiated.
This is not as radical as it sounds. The nature of American global military power is expeditionary. Any power in this position -- British, American or otherwise -- will be involved in spoiling attacks and limited interventions that are intended to protect its national interests at minimal cost. As such, the United States is now seeking a framework in which it can withdraw from Afghanistan. And as Stratfor has argued, there have been more visible signs of progress in facilitating such negotiations in 2012 than in the rest of the history of the war in Afghanistan combined. Panetta’s statement must be viewed in this context.
Stratfor has long argued that this is not a simple, two-way talk between the United States and Mullah Muhammad Omar, the senior leader of the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan, the regime of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and even India, Iran and Russia, all have serious interests in the outcome of any such negotiated settlement. Still, the importance of Panetta's statement is in its relation to Taliban demands.
Each side in a negotiation will open with far more hardline conditions than they are ultimately willing to settle with. The Taliban has long insisted on complete withdrawal as a precondition for talks. But Stratfor sources indicate that talks have long been ongoing, even though they have not necessarily involved negotiations on specific points of contention. In announcing that 2013 is now the deadline for the completion of combat operations, the United States has taken a very visible step toward political accommodation.
This step should be viewed in the appropriate context. Since Panetta made his announcement in January 2012, "next year" actually leaves a two-year time frame, which seasonally entails two full campaign seasons in non-winter months. And the United States demonstrated quite well in 2010-2011 that it can push its advantage in the seasonal winter lull. What’s more, Panetta’s deadline can always be extended. "Conditions dependent" has been the caveat of American strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, meaning the United States ultimately did not really concede that much.
But it remains true that Panetta conceded ground on a key parameter of an American withdrawal consistent with Taliban demands. Whatever the status of negotiations, it is clear that the United States is talking to the Taliban. And in this context, Panetta put something substantial on the table. Long-term American national interests are not as far apart as they once were from those of the Afghan Taliban. And there has been too much movement between Washington and the Afghan Taliban in the last month to ignore. A negotiated settlement is not inevitable, but both sides seek such an understanding for their own reasons. Panetta’s statement Wednesday is perhaps the strongest indication yet that substantive negotiations may take place in the years ahead.
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