From FPRI:
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201105.helfont.binladen.html
BIN LADEN'S DEMISE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Report on an FPRI Briefing
by Tally Helfont
Edward Turzanski, an FPRI scholar with extensive experience
in the intelligence community, noted that two main
perspectives are coming out of the Obama administration on
the heels of Bin Laden's death: the first by CIA director,
Leon Panetta, who said that we can indeed expect some sort
of retaliation against us in the future; and the second by
the president's advisor for homeland security, John Brennan,
who said that we can expect al Qaeda to begin engaging in
intense infighting because of the lack of popularity of the
organization's number two, Ayman al Zawahiri. Turzanski
explained that al Qaeda "has suffered tremendously as a
brand name" as a result of the Sahwa (awakening) Movement in
western Anbar Province and of General David Petraeus's
successful surge. Bin Laden had, it was widely believed,
receded into the background in recent years, becoming more a
titular head, who, though certainly an important symbolic
figure, was less and less involved in operational planning.
He conceded that while a retaliatory attack may come at some
point in the future, al Qaeda lacks the organizational
cohesion and expertise to strike back at us on the scale of
9/11, at least in the short run. Turzanski concluded by
saying that the demise of Bin Laden is "a pretty good thing
for us. It does bring some measure of closure for those who
lost loved ones on 9/11_ and it demonstrates a resolve and
an expertise that, quite frankly, people forgot that the
United States possesses."
Barak Mendelsohn, author of Combating Jihadism (University
of Chicago Press, 2009), argued that the most important
thing that we can take away, especially in light of the
"Arab Spring," is how marginal the support al Qaeda and its
radical agenda have throughout the Middle East. The fact
that "people are going to the streets and demanding freedom
and democracy," he said, amounts to infidelity in Bin
Laden's view; for al Qaeda, "democracy is heresy."
Mendelsohn explained that al Qaeda's support was at its peak
in 2003, and at that point, it was still able to convince
people around the Muslim world of its narrative that an
"American crusader attack on Islam" was truly taking place.
However, as al Qaeda started killing many Muslims
themselves, "the narrative didn't hold anymore." As such,
Iraq and the attacks in Jordan, Pakistan and Indonesia began
to devastate al Qaeda's reputation and reduced the appeal of
its agenda. The death of Bin Laden not only shattered the
myth that he was invincible but also marks the decline of al
Qaeda central.
Sumit Ganguly, the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian
Cultures and Civilizations and Professor of Political
Science at Indiana University - Bloomington, noted that
India's reaction to Bin Laden's death was one of
incredulity. The Indians had long maintained that there was
complicity on the part of Pakistani regimes in protecting
Bin Laden, rejecting the notion that he was living in the
western borderland of Pakistan in a cave. Ganguly noted
that, though it rarely made it to the American press, the
Indians maintained that Bin Laden had been on kidney
dialysis for some time, necessitating a certain amount of
medical infrastructure to survive on a daily basis. In fact,
considering India was very adamant about the fact that Bin
Laden was in the shelter of various Pakistani elements,
there was a certain amount of gloating going on in India,
according to Ganguly, over the fact that their assertion had
been confirmed. He added that there is "also a kind of
sneaking admiration for the manner in which American Special
Forces carried out this operation, with such extraordinary
skill and dexterity." Ganguly asserted that as far as
Pakistanis are concerned, it is utterly implausible that
they were unaware of Bin Laden's whereabouts, especially
since his compound was located barely a few meters from
Pakistan's Military Academy. If this were true, it would
suggest that the ISI "is either remarkably maladroit and
remarkably inept, or they were downright complicit."
Pakistani spin doctoring of this revelation as an
intelligence failure, he said, "borders between the
laughable and the bizarre."
Michael Noonan, the Managing Director of FPRI's Program on
National Security Studies, noted that according to open
source reporting, the Navy Seals team that killed Bin Laden
confiscated five computers, ten hard drives, and over one
hundred thumb drives, CDs, and numerous documents, adding
that it will be interesting to see how the exploitation of
this material contributes to U.S. efforts to take down other
key players in al Qaeda. Likewise, preliminary assessments
of some of these materials seem to suggest that Bin Laden's
role might have in fact been more operational than had been
previously thought, contrary to the conventional wisdom
within the intelligence community. As far as Afghanistan is
concerned, Noonan said, a key thing to watch for is the
Pakistani reaction, specifically because there had already
been a steady cooling of relations between Pakistan and the
United States. Any further deterioration of this
relationship could jeopardize our campaign in Afghanistan,
considering that the U.S. has been moving a tremendous
percentage of its supplies by land across Pakistan. However,
Noonan suggested that it may in fact be time for the U.S. to
leave Afghanistan, responding not only to Hamid Karzai's own
statements along these lines but also to the stalemate that
currently exists in negotiation with the Taliban. The 2001
Status of Forces Agreement was very clear about those
responsible for the attacks on 9/11, "If we are able to take
care of al Qaeda and divorce that from larger issues in
Afghanistan_ we might as well." Noonan concluded by saying,
"refereeing a civil war in Afghanistan is not in our
national interest." Taking into account the recent
reshuffling that occurred within the Administration
involving General Petraeus, Director Panetta, and Secretary
Gates along with recent events, "this could very well be the
first step in disengaging from Afghanistan."
Theodore Friend, author of Indonesian Destinies (Harvard
University Press, 2003) and of the forthcoming book Woman,
Man, and God in Modern Islam, responded to a question on the
reaction of the Muslim world to the news of Bin Laden's
death by noting that there is no single, unified response.
Friend suggested that the Arab uprisings that have occurred
throughout Middle East, and more specifically the efforts to
throw off the yoke of authoritarian rulers, were fifty years
overdue. He expressed his hope that these efforts would
continue and flourish, citing the Egyptian example with its
strong military establishment in particular. Two aspects
that Friend believed are being neglected in analyses of the
impact of these events on the region include economics and
the role of women. Economically, Turkey's green capitalism
(Islamic not ecological) and the economic prosperity it has
generated is a development that is underreported but
deserves attention, in Friend's view. In regards to women,
there remains a lack of progress in Muslim countries, and
what Friend referred to as "intentional oppression and
theologized diminution of the standing of women and their
opportunities." He was saddened to say that, according to
his assessment, there is little promise to be seen on this
front in the so-called Arab Spring.
Eric Trager, who spent much of the past few months in Egypt
working on his doctoral dissertation, suggested that, as
indicated by his interviews of senior leaders of the Muslim
Brotherhood's Guidance Office as well as its youth movement,
there remains a deep hostility towards the United States.
Trager said this sentiment was particularly evident in their
perceptions of who perpetrated the September 11th attacks,
which at best doubted the involvement of Muslims and at
worst, believed the entire event to be a fabrication of the
United States as an excuse to attack the Muslims. Trager
recounted that when asked what the Muslim Brotherhood is
for, they responded that the Brotherhood is "for moderate
Islam." When asked to elaborate, they qualified, "Well, we
are not al Qaeda." Trager explained that while al Qaeda is
in fact unpopular in Egypt, the United States is more
unpopular in the eyes of the Muslim Brotherhood and the
like. This reality is apparent not only in the Brotherhood's
statements in response to Bin Laden's killing, but also in
many Egyptian dailies like al Masri al Yom, which equate the
United States with al Qaeda, saying that the U.S. has in
fact killed more people in more countries than the latter.
Trager commented that these moral equivalencies "crystallize
the challenge that America faces in the moving ahead in what
may well be the new Middle East." He cautioned that while
the uprisings have brought forth a new, liberal, anti-
authoritarian set of youth activists; these activists still
hold deeply anti-American views.
Christopher Swift, author of the forthcoming book, The
Fighting Vanguard: Local Insurgencies in the Global Jihad
suggested that Bin Laden's death would transform the war on
terror without ending it. With the decline of al Qaeda
central and its operational capability over the last few
years, the emerging threat to U.S. interests comes from two
primary sources: the first is from Salafi jihadi syndicates
like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which appears to be adopting
more global ambitions; and the second is from global
jihadist subsidiaries like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP). Both groups are de-territorialized politically, de-
localized ideologically, and historically have demonstrated
a high level of operational integration with al Qaeda
central. It is Swift's sense that the strategic center of
what remains of al Qaeda central's global insurgency has
already been shifting away from the Afghanistan - Pakistan
theater to Saudi Arabia and more importantly, Yemen.
Finally, Swift noted that AQAP's "growing prominence within
the constellation of contemporary Islamic militant groups
may signal an important evolution within the al Qaeda
movement itself." Rather than colonizing and co-opting
conflicts in distant lands, which, thus far, has been the
modus operandi of al Qaeda central, AQAP is operating in its
own society. Rather than challenging and usurping the
indigenous social and political structures, Swift says, this
group has grafted itself onto them. This model is more
adaptive, resilient, and produces a more tenacious
adversary, something the U.S. should be weary of in the
future as it tries to prioritize and distinguish between its
various threats and enemies.
Stephen Gale, the Chairman of FPRI's Center on Terrorism and
Counter-Terrorism, argued that the impact of Bin Laden's
death is not to be measured by the response of leaders of
Muslim countries or even of the ummah, but rather by the
legacy of terrorism, which doesn't require a broad base. The
real question, from his point of view, is will this motivate
those relatively small groups not just to exact revenge but
also to use Bin Laden's death as a rationale for extending
the campaign of jihad? Gale noted that from al Qaeda's point
of view, September 11th was a failure. He suggested that it
is only a matter of time until they plan an event that
achieves their goals and that the death of Bin Laden is not
going to bring about any transformation in the Middle East,
releasing people from the obligation to carry out jihad.
David Danelo, a Marine Corps veteran who served in the Iraq
War, stated that in his view, "Bin Laden's death marks the
single most significant moral victory that we have achieved
thus far in the war on terror." Referencing various other
memorable achievements accomplished by the United States,
Danelo argued that none compared to victory embodied in this
achievement, as illustrated in the triumphant responses of
millions of Americans across the country at hearing the news
from President Obama. Danelo noted, "There is an open-ended
question of how we sustain this narrative of moral victory
in the United States." He also suggested that the Obama
administration derived a policy dividend from this
successful mission, and how it uses this policy dividend
will be the question that defines the 2012 upcoming
election.
Lawrence Husick, a specialist in technology and terrorism,
noted the need for our country, and for the West in general,
to reevaluate our grand strategy for security. Husick argued
that Bin Laden invented and built al Qaeda by using the
expertise he gained in construction and his understanding of
supply chains and logistics prior to his radicalization. Bin
Laden essentially used his organization "to exert leverage
where he could not exert force directly." Husick explained
that this, in its essence, is the textbook definition of
terrorism. He went on to assert that "Bin Laden was one of
the few figures in history, who in fact changed the world
and he did so by inventing al Qaeda" and its methods. Today,
al Qaeda has metastasized; it has become a brand with
franchises but without a central agency. These franchises
have taken up the banner and the ideology to the extent that
it suits their purposes and are working, according to their
own schedule, to strike at us. This is why it is critical
that we rework our security strategy, not simply in terms of
offense-defense, but also in terms of sustainability and
survivability.
Jack Tomarchio, a former deputy undersecretary of
intelligence in the Department of Homeland Security, noted
that, though al Qaeda's franchises are much more active than
al Qaeda central, which has been systematically taken down
using drone strikes and other techniques, al Qaeda's number
two, Ayman al Zawahiri is still at large, describing his
role as being primarily operational and much like that of a
chief operating officer. Tomarchio referred to the toppling
of the Arab regimes as being a primary goal of al Qaeda, and
though this has occurred over the course of only a few
weeks, it was for very different reasons and using very
different means than envisaged by al Qaeda. The Arab Street
was successful where al Qaeda was not. This is telling about
al Qaeda's narrative and its lack of compatibility with the
demands that motivated the Arab uprisings. However,
Tomarchio cautioned that we must remain vigilant and act in
a prudent manner moving forward, taking into account that
future attacks are likely to be carried out by radicalized
individuals both domestically and abroad.
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201105.helfont.binladen.html
BIN LADEN'S DEMISE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Report on an FPRI Briefing
by Tally Helfont
Edward Turzanski, an FPRI scholar with extensive experience
in the intelligence community, noted that two main
perspectives are coming out of the Obama administration on
the heels of Bin Laden's death: the first by CIA director,
Leon Panetta, who said that we can indeed expect some sort
of retaliation against us in the future; and the second by
the president's advisor for homeland security, John Brennan,
who said that we can expect al Qaeda to begin engaging in
intense infighting because of the lack of popularity of the
organization's number two, Ayman al Zawahiri. Turzanski
explained that al Qaeda "has suffered tremendously as a
brand name" as a result of the Sahwa (awakening) Movement in
western Anbar Province and of General David Petraeus's
successful surge. Bin Laden had, it was widely believed,
receded into the background in recent years, becoming more a
titular head, who, though certainly an important symbolic
figure, was less and less involved in operational planning.
He conceded that while a retaliatory attack may come at some
point in the future, al Qaeda lacks the organizational
cohesion and expertise to strike back at us on the scale of
9/11, at least in the short run. Turzanski concluded by
saying that the demise of Bin Laden is "a pretty good thing
for us. It does bring some measure of closure for those who
lost loved ones on 9/11_ and it demonstrates a resolve and
an expertise that, quite frankly, people forgot that the
United States possesses."
Barak Mendelsohn, author of Combating Jihadism (University
of Chicago Press, 2009), argued that the most important
thing that we can take away, especially in light of the
"Arab Spring," is how marginal the support al Qaeda and its
radical agenda have throughout the Middle East. The fact
that "people are going to the streets and demanding freedom
and democracy," he said, amounts to infidelity in Bin
Laden's view; for al Qaeda, "democracy is heresy."
Mendelsohn explained that al Qaeda's support was at its peak
in 2003, and at that point, it was still able to convince
people around the Muslim world of its narrative that an
"American crusader attack on Islam" was truly taking place.
However, as al Qaeda started killing many Muslims
themselves, "the narrative didn't hold anymore." As such,
Iraq and the attacks in Jordan, Pakistan and Indonesia began
to devastate al Qaeda's reputation and reduced the appeal of
its agenda. The death of Bin Laden not only shattered the
myth that he was invincible but also marks the decline of al
Qaeda central.
Sumit Ganguly, the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian
Cultures and Civilizations and Professor of Political
Science at Indiana University - Bloomington, noted that
India's reaction to Bin Laden's death was one of
incredulity. The Indians had long maintained that there was
complicity on the part of Pakistani regimes in protecting
Bin Laden, rejecting the notion that he was living in the
western borderland of Pakistan in a cave. Ganguly noted
that, though it rarely made it to the American press, the
Indians maintained that Bin Laden had been on kidney
dialysis for some time, necessitating a certain amount of
medical infrastructure to survive on a daily basis. In fact,
considering India was very adamant about the fact that Bin
Laden was in the shelter of various Pakistani elements,
there was a certain amount of gloating going on in India,
according to Ganguly, over the fact that their assertion had
been confirmed. He added that there is "also a kind of
sneaking admiration for the manner in which American Special
Forces carried out this operation, with such extraordinary
skill and dexterity." Ganguly asserted that as far as
Pakistanis are concerned, it is utterly implausible that
they were unaware of Bin Laden's whereabouts, especially
since his compound was located barely a few meters from
Pakistan's Military Academy. If this were true, it would
suggest that the ISI "is either remarkably maladroit and
remarkably inept, or they were downright complicit."
Pakistani spin doctoring of this revelation as an
intelligence failure, he said, "borders between the
laughable and the bizarre."
Michael Noonan, the Managing Director of FPRI's Program on
National Security Studies, noted that according to open
source reporting, the Navy Seals team that killed Bin Laden
confiscated five computers, ten hard drives, and over one
hundred thumb drives, CDs, and numerous documents, adding
that it will be interesting to see how the exploitation of
this material contributes to U.S. efforts to take down other
key players in al Qaeda. Likewise, preliminary assessments
of some of these materials seem to suggest that Bin Laden's
role might have in fact been more operational than had been
previously thought, contrary to the conventional wisdom
within the intelligence community. As far as Afghanistan is
concerned, Noonan said, a key thing to watch for is the
Pakistani reaction, specifically because there had already
been a steady cooling of relations between Pakistan and the
United States. Any further deterioration of this
relationship could jeopardize our campaign in Afghanistan,
considering that the U.S. has been moving a tremendous
percentage of its supplies by land across Pakistan. However,
Noonan suggested that it may in fact be time for the U.S. to
leave Afghanistan, responding not only to Hamid Karzai's own
statements along these lines but also to the stalemate that
currently exists in negotiation with the Taliban. The 2001
Status of Forces Agreement was very clear about those
responsible for the attacks on 9/11, "If we are able to take
care of al Qaeda and divorce that from larger issues in
Afghanistan_ we might as well." Noonan concluded by saying,
"refereeing a civil war in Afghanistan is not in our
national interest." Taking into account the recent
reshuffling that occurred within the Administration
involving General Petraeus, Director Panetta, and Secretary
Gates along with recent events, "this could very well be the
first step in disengaging from Afghanistan."
Theodore Friend, author of Indonesian Destinies (Harvard
University Press, 2003) and of the forthcoming book Woman,
Man, and God in Modern Islam, responded to a question on the
reaction of the Muslim world to the news of Bin Laden's
death by noting that there is no single, unified response.
Friend suggested that the Arab uprisings that have occurred
throughout Middle East, and more specifically the efforts to
throw off the yoke of authoritarian rulers, were fifty years
overdue. He expressed his hope that these efforts would
continue and flourish, citing the Egyptian example with its
strong military establishment in particular. Two aspects
that Friend believed are being neglected in analyses of the
impact of these events on the region include economics and
the role of women. Economically, Turkey's green capitalism
(Islamic not ecological) and the economic prosperity it has
generated is a development that is underreported but
deserves attention, in Friend's view. In regards to women,
there remains a lack of progress in Muslim countries, and
what Friend referred to as "intentional oppression and
theologized diminution of the standing of women and their
opportunities." He was saddened to say that, according to
his assessment, there is little promise to be seen on this
front in the so-called Arab Spring.
Eric Trager, who spent much of the past few months in Egypt
working on his doctoral dissertation, suggested that, as
indicated by his interviews of senior leaders of the Muslim
Brotherhood's Guidance Office as well as its youth movement,
there remains a deep hostility towards the United States.
Trager said this sentiment was particularly evident in their
perceptions of who perpetrated the September 11th attacks,
which at best doubted the involvement of Muslims and at
worst, believed the entire event to be a fabrication of the
United States as an excuse to attack the Muslims. Trager
recounted that when asked what the Muslim Brotherhood is
for, they responded that the Brotherhood is "for moderate
Islam." When asked to elaborate, they qualified, "Well, we
are not al Qaeda." Trager explained that while al Qaeda is
in fact unpopular in Egypt, the United States is more
unpopular in the eyes of the Muslim Brotherhood and the
like. This reality is apparent not only in the Brotherhood's
statements in response to Bin Laden's killing, but also in
many Egyptian dailies like al Masri al Yom, which equate the
United States with al Qaeda, saying that the U.S. has in
fact killed more people in more countries than the latter.
Trager commented that these moral equivalencies "crystallize
the challenge that America faces in the moving ahead in what
may well be the new Middle East." He cautioned that while
the uprisings have brought forth a new, liberal, anti-
authoritarian set of youth activists; these activists still
hold deeply anti-American views.
Christopher Swift, author of the forthcoming book, The
Fighting Vanguard: Local Insurgencies in the Global Jihad
suggested that Bin Laden's death would transform the war on
terror without ending it. With the decline of al Qaeda
central and its operational capability over the last few
years, the emerging threat to U.S. interests comes from two
primary sources: the first is from Salafi jihadi syndicates
like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which appears to be adopting
more global ambitions; and the second is from global
jihadist subsidiaries like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP). Both groups are de-territorialized politically, de-
localized ideologically, and historically have demonstrated
a high level of operational integration with al Qaeda
central. It is Swift's sense that the strategic center of
what remains of al Qaeda central's global insurgency has
already been shifting away from the Afghanistan - Pakistan
theater to Saudi Arabia and more importantly, Yemen.
Finally, Swift noted that AQAP's "growing prominence within
the constellation of contemporary Islamic militant groups
may signal an important evolution within the al Qaeda
movement itself." Rather than colonizing and co-opting
conflicts in distant lands, which, thus far, has been the
modus operandi of al Qaeda central, AQAP is operating in its
own society. Rather than challenging and usurping the
indigenous social and political structures, Swift says, this
group has grafted itself onto them. This model is more
adaptive, resilient, and produces a more tenacious
adversary, something the U.S. should be weary of in the
future as it tries to prioritize and distinguish between its
various threats and enemies.
Stephen Gale, the Chairman of FPRI's Center on Terrorism and
Counter-Terrorism, argued that the impact of Bin Laden's
death is not to be measured by the response of leaders of
Muslim countries or even of the ummah, but rather by the
legacy of terrorism, which doesn't require a broad base. The
real question, from his point of view, is will this motivate
those relatively small groups not just to exact revenge but
also to use Bin Laden's death as a rationale for extending
the campaign of jihad? Gale noted that from al Qaeda's point
of view, September 11th was a failure. He suggested that it
is only a matter of time until they plan an event that
achieves their goals and that the death of Bin Laden is not
going to bring about any transformation in the Middle East,
releasing people from the obligation to carry out jihad.
David Danelo, a Marine Corps veteran who served in the Iraq
War, stated that in his view, "Bin Laden's death marks the
single most significant moral victory that we have achieved
thus far in the war on terror." Referencing various other
memorable achievements accomplished by the United States,
Danelo argued that none compared to victory embodied in this
achievement, as illustrated in the triumphant responses of
millions of Americans across the country at hearing the news
from President Obama. Danelo noted, "There is an open-ended
question of how we sustain this narrative of moral victory
in the United States." He also suggested that the Obama
administration derived a policy dividend from this
successful mission, and how it uses this policy dividend
will be the question that defines the 2012 upcoming
election.
Lawrence Husick, a specialist in technology and terrorism,
noted the need for our country, and for the West in general,
to reevaluate our grand strategy for security. Husick argued
that Bin Laden invented and built al Qaeda by using the
expertise he gained in construction and his understanding of
supply chains and logistics prior to his radicalization. Bin
Laden essentially used his organization "to exert leverage
where he could not exert force directly." Husick explained
that this, in its essence, is the textbook definition of
terrorism. He went on to assert that "Bin Laden was one of
the few figures in history, who in fact changed the world
and he did so by inventing al Qaeda" and its methods. Today,
al Qaeda has metastasized; it has become a brand with
franchises but without a central agency. These franchises
have taken up the banner and the ideology to the extent that
it suits their purposes and are working, according to their
own schedule, to strike at us. This is why it is critical
that we rework our security strategy, not simply in terms of
offense-defense, but also in terms of sustainability and
survivability.
Jack Tomarchio, a former deputy undersecretary of
intelligence in the Department of Homeland Security, noted
that, though al Qaeda's franchises are much more active than
al Qaeda central, which has been systematically taken down
using drone strikes and other techniques, al Qaeda's number
two, Ayman al Zawahiri is still at large, describing his
role as being primarily operational and much like that of a
chief operating officer. Tomarchio referred to the toppling
of the Arab regimes as being a primary goal of al Qaeda, and
though this has occurred over the course of only a few
weeks, it was for very different reasons and using very
different means than envisaged by al Qaeda. The Arab Street
was successful where al Qaeda was not. This is telling about
al Qaeda's narrative and its lack of compatibility with the
demands that motivated the Arab uprisings. However,
Tomarchio cautioned that we must remain vigilant and act in
a prudent manner moving forward, taking into account that
future attacks are likely to be carried out by radicalized
individuals both domestically and abroad.
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/
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