From Homeland Security NewsWire:
Libya updateCampaign in Libya likely to be a drawn out affair
Published 21 April 2011
NATO campaign has so far failed to yield the desired results, for four reasons: new tactics by Gaddafi's forces and militias have negated NATO’s air superiority; NATO members are divided among themselves as to the ultimate goals of the campaign and its immediate tactics; the rebel forces are utterly ineffective as a military force; and the rebel leadership is divided in incoherent; unless all these factors change -- that is, NATO finds a military response to Gaddafi's ever-changing tactics; NATO members become more unified in their approach; the rebels develop into an effective military force; and the rebel leadership become more unified -- it is not likely the campaign will end any time soon; this does not mean it will not succeed, though, as Gaddafi and his regime are under a tight economic and arms embargo, and he is likely to get weaker over time, even if it is a long time
Passion tries to overcome professionalism // Source: semanarioesquinanorte.com
The United Kingdom announced the other day that it was sending forty trainers to assist the anti-Gaddafi rebel better coordinate their military efforts to withstand the Libyan’s army. The sending of the trainers is an admission that NATO strategy of relying only on air attacks to force Gaddafi’s hand has failed.
The New York Times reports that there are at least four reasons for the campaign’s disappointing result, at least so far:
•Adaptation. New tactics used by Colonel Qaddafi’s forces — mixing with civilian populations, camouflaging weapons, and driving pickup trucks instead of military vehicles have severely limited the effectiveness of the coalition’s air attacks.
•Fractured coalition. NATO is not united either in words or in deeds. Italy and Spain, for example, have not contributed to the military campaign so far. Turkey and Germany have expressed unease with continuing attacks on Gaddafi’s forces.
•Rebels ineffectiveness. The coalition forces have destroyed Gaddafi’s air force and much of his heavy armor. Yet, the rebels have been unable to take advantage of the situation. Lacking in training and equipment, the rebels barley hang on under the attacks by the Libyan military and foreign militias – especially since Gaddafi’s change of tactics made much of the coalition air dominance irrelevant on the ground.
•Rebels disunity. A detailed report by the New York Times’s Rod Nordland offers a depressing picture of division and disunity among the rebels. Writing about the forty British trainers sent to Libya to aid the rebels army, Nordland says that,
The first question the British will face is “Whose army?”
For they will find themselves advising a ragtag rebel force that cannot even agree on who its top officer is, amid squabbling between two generals who both come with unsavory baggage.
To bring about a quick and successful resolution of the campaign, NATO needs major changes in all these areas, that is:<
•A military solution to the ability of Gaddafi’s military and militias to change and adapt so as to negate NATO’s air superiority
•A greater unity among NATO members, essential to convince Gaddafi that he cannot just hang on until the division will bring about an end to the campaign
•Greater military effectiveness on the part of the rebels: better equipment, better training, the ability to fight in larger formations
•Greater unity and cohesion among the political and military leadership of the rebels
None of these changes is likely to happen anytime soon. Does this mean that the Libyan campaign is doomed? Not necessarily. It may yet succeed, but in the long, rather than the short, run. As a senior NATO commander, pleading for patience, told the New York Times:
In the end the balance will shift; it has to,…. Qaddafi gets no more arms, no more tanks, no more ammo, and he gets weaker and over time the others get stronger. And at some point someone around Qaddafi decides to have a political way out.
Libya updateCampaign in Libya likely to be a drawn out affair
Published 21 April 2011
NATO campaign has so far failed to yield the desired results, for four reasons: new tactics by Gaddafi's forces and militias have negated NATO’s air superiority; NATO members are divided among themselves as to the ultimate goals of the campaign and its immediate tactics; the rebel forces are utterly ineffective as a military force; and the rebel leadership is divided in incoherent; unless all these factors change -- that is, NATO finds a military response to Gaddafi's ever-changing tactics; NATO members become more unified in their approach; the rebels develop into an effective military force; and the rebel leadership become more unified -- it is not likely the campaign will end any time soon; this does not mean it will not succeed, though, as Gaddafi and his regime are under a tight economic and arms embargo, and he is likely to get weaker over time, even if it is a long time
Passion tries to overcome professionalism // Source: semanarioesquinanorte.com
The United Kingdom announced the other day that it was sending forty trainers to assist the anti-Gaddafi rebel better coordinate their military efforts to withstand the Libyan’s army. The sending of the trainers is an admission that NATO strategy of relying only on air attacks to force Gaddafi’s hand has failed.
The New York Times reports that there are at least four reasons for the campaign’s disappointing result, at least so far:
•Adaptation. New tactics used by Colonel Qaddafi’s forces — mixing with civilian populations, camouflaging weapons, and driving pickup trucks instead of military vehicles have severely limited the effectiveness of the coalition’s air attacks.
•Fractured coalition. NATO is not united either in words or in deeds. Italy and Spain, for example, have not contributed to the military campaign so far. Turkey and Germany have expressed unease with continuing attacks on Gaddafi’s forces.
•Rebels ineffectiveness. The coalition forces have destroyed Gaddafi’s air force and much of his heavy armor. Yet, the rebels have been unable to take advantage of the situation. Lacking in training and equipment, the rebels barley hang on under the attacks by the Libyan military and foreign militias – especially since Gaddafi’s change of tactics made much of the coalition air dominance irrelevant on the ground.
•Rebels disunity. A detailed report by the New York Times’s Rod Nordland offers a depressing picture of division and disunity among the rebels. Writing about the forty British trainers sent to Libya to aid the rebels army, Nordland says that,
The first question the British will face is “Whose army?”
For they will find themselves advising a ragtag rebel force that cannot even agree on who its top officer is, amid squabbling between two generals who both come with unsavory baggage.
To bring about a quick and successful resolution of the campaign, NATO needs major changes in all these areas, that is:<
•A military solution to the ability of Gaddafi’s military and militias to change and adapt so as to negate NATO’s air superiority
•A greater unity among NATO members, essential to convince Gaddafi that he cannot just hang on until the division will bring about an end to the campaign
•Greater military effectiveness on the part of the rebels: better equipment, better training, the ability to fight in larger formations
•Greater unity and cohesion among the political and military leadership of the rebels
None of these changes is likely to happen anytime soon. Does this mean that the Libyan campaign is doomed? Not necessarily. It may yet succeed, but in the long, rather than the short, run. As a senior NATO commander, pleading for patience, told the New York Times:
In the end the balance will shift; it has to,…. Qaddafi gets no more arms, no more tanks, no more ammo, and he gets weaker and over time the others get stronger. And at some point someone around Qaddafi decides to have a political way out.
No comments:
Post a Comment