Resetting Missile Defenses

From FPRI:

RESETTING MISSILE DEFENSES


by James Jay Carafano



April 20, 2011



Dr. James Jay Carafano is the Deputy Director of The Kathryn

and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies

and is Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for

Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.



Available on the web and in pdf format at:

http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201104.carafano.missiledefense.html



RESETTING MISSILE DEFENSES



by James Jay Carafano



What's changed in the last few years? Pretty much both

political parties now agree that missile defenses are

integral to America's national security. They serve to

protect and defend the homeland from the threat of ballistic

missile attack. Defenses cover US deployed forces and

assets overseas. They also safeguard friendly and allied

nations.



There is consensus as well that there are threats worth

defending against. Currently, at least 30 countries in the

world have ballistic missile technologies. True, some of

these nations are our friends. The mere fact, however, that

ballistic programs have become so ubiquitous demonstrates

that robust defenses should now also be axiomatic.



Sadly, they are not.



Today the trend in Washington is to accept "just enough"

missile defense. That is a trend that needs to change or

America will end the Obama years more at risk to missile

threats than at any time since the end of the Cold War.



HOW WE GOT HERE FROM THERE

Reagan's rush to grab the ultimate high ground-a space-based

global missile defense shield, faltered under the first Bush

and fell into neutral under Clinton. President Clinton cut

all the space-based missile defense programs. The Clinton

Administration also tried to eliminate theater missile

defense systems (which protect U.S. soldiers from short-

range missiles) by negotiating missile defense limitation

agreements with the Russians. However, due to opposition

within the U.S. Senate, the Clinton Administration was not

able to follow through with these plans.



In turn, Congress pressed for The National Missile Defense

Act of 1999 to highlight the imperative of providing

defenses against ballistic missile attack. The Act states

that "It is the policy of the United States to deploy as

soon as is technologically possible an effective National

Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of

the United States against limited ballistic missile attack

(whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with

funding subject to the annual authorization of

appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for

National Missile Defense." When G.W. Bush became president

he came to office with every intention of following through

on that commitment.



In 2001, the Bush Administration abandoned the 1972 Anti-

Ballistic Missile Treaty because as the president declared

"the ABM treaty hinders our government's ability to develop

ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue

state missile attacks." The Bush Administration increased

funding for the U.S. ballistic defense program and announced

a decision to field an initial capability to protect the

U.S. homeland from a long-range threat by 2004.



Even Bush, however, could not restore all the momentum lost

under Clinton. The Bush Administration's attempts to revive

the U.S. space-based missile defense program failed due to

Congressional opposition. For example, in 2006, the Missile

Defense Agency requested $673 million between FY2008-2011

for designing, developing, and testing a space test bed.

This space-based test bed would have been the initial step

towards achieving the full coverage and protection of the

United States from ballistic missile threats. However, this

request was never appropriated.



Since taking office President Obama has chosen a more modest

course. Despite the persistent growing danger and clear

evidence that some states with ballistic capabilities are an

increasingly serious concern for the United States, since

taking office the Obama Administration has slow walked and

curtailed the development and deployment of a more

comprehensive, integrated, and layered missile defense

system. The administration has cut funding for research and

development overall. It has canned promising programs and

mothballed others.



The Obama Administration's course won't keep up with

evolving threats. For example, by some estimates of the US

intelligence community Iran will have a long-range missile

by 2015. By the administration's own time line, emplacing a

system in Europe to counter that threat won't happen till

2018. Some analysts believe defenses in Europe might not be

ready till 2020 or after.



Furthermore, just keeping up with threats is not enough. The

right missile defenses would significantly leapfrog emerging

threats-discouraging potential proliferators from fielding

expensive threats that could easily be countered by robust

defenses.



WHAT WENT WRONG?

In his first year in office, President Obama immediately

laid down his marker on missile defense by requesting $1.5

billion less for the Missile Defense Agency (the U.S.

missile defense program coordinator) than the last budget

request of G. W. Bush. By some accounts, the administration

came into office envisioning much deeper cuts-as much as 50

percent.



The Pentagon talked the White House out of draconian cuts.

Nevertheless, Obama cut the number of ground-based

interceptors in Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air

Force Base, California, intended to protect the U.S.

homeland from strategic attack, from 44 to 30. This system

is the only operationally deployed missile defense system

currently protecting the U.S. homeland from ballistic

missile attack from Iran, North Korea, or any other source

of attack.



The administration then decided to cancel the European-based

"third site" ballistic missile defense basing plan developed

the Bush Administration, which planned for 10 two-stage

ground-based interceptors in Poland and a high-powered X-

Band radar in the Czech Republic. Obama's decision was not

only wrongheaded, it was executed in an extremely careless

manner embarrassing two staunch U.S. allies who had invested

tremendous political capital to see this project through.

The decision was also universally perceived as a concession

to the Russians in anticipation of negotiations on the New

START arms control agreement.



Citing "new findings" that Iran would not be able to

threaten the U.S. with long-range missiles until 2020, and

that the Iranian short-range missile threat (especially the

Shahab-3 missile) was more immediate, Obama cancelled the

third site deployment. The decision reflected the belief

that the defense of U.S. allies in Europe against regional

missile threats would be sufficient for both the short and

medium term.



The stark contrast between the "new" intelligence assessment

and a recently released Air Force assessment that Iran could

have an ICBM by 2015 could not be more alarming.



The administration's newfound optimism about Iran's lack of

progress is questionable, especially considering the

Intelligence Community's bad track record of predicting such

developments in the past. It is presumptuous to think that

the U.S. could predict the exact date (e.g., 2020) when Iran

will achieve an ICBM capability to threaten the U.S.

homeland. It could be earlier. Prudence dictates that it is

best to be prepared in advance. President Obama also

ignored, to a large degree, the positive role that missile

defenses play in extended deterrence and reassurance to U.S.

allies.



Furthermore, the Obama Administration replaced the Bush

missile defense strategy for Europe with a new plan called

the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA). The President's

initiative relies heavily on the Aegis sea-based component

of the layered missile defense architecture. Unlike the Bush

scheme that would have been built with proven radars and

interceptors (the interceptor was a two-stage variant of the

current three-stage ground-based interceptors), the Obama

plan requires new missile technologies that have yet to be

developed and expects them to be fielded on a very ambitious

time line. Some analysts have argued that the deployment

plan for the Phased Adaptive Approach is driven more by the

agenda demanded by the White House than by a realistic

assessment of what can actually be delivered.



In addition to "killing" the third site, the Obama

Administration also chose to terminate the Multiple Kill

Vehicle program (MKV). This planned missile defense program

was slated to assist in the fielding of a new generation of

Standard Missile-3 interceptors, an essential part of the

layered Aegis ballistic missile defense program. The goal of

the MKV program was to design, develop, and deploy multiple,

small kinetic energy-based kill vehicles that could

intercept and destroy multiple ballistic missiles, including

decoy targets (penetration aids) and countermeasures that

adversaries are developing.



The Administration's commitment to protect its allies and

forward-deployed troops has also now been called into even

greater question with the cancellation the Medium Extended

Air Defense System (MEADS), a ground-based terminal

ballistic missile defense system developed jointly by the

United States, Italy, and Germany. Designed to replace

Patriot systems in the United States and Germany, MEADS

offers more firepower and is designed to protect maneuvering

forces and fixed locations against tactical ballistic

missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and

aircraft. This program is also cost-efficient: in fact, it

is one of the few in which allies actually share the costs

of research and development of the ballistic missile defense

system.



By cancelling the third site and the earlier defense

coverage it would have afforded the U.S. homeland, the

administration is downplaying the growing threat from the

proliferation of ballistic missile technology and

particularly advances in Iran's ballistic missile program.

Iran is achieving increasing range and payload capabilities.

The White House has also failed to acknowledge that short-

range and long-range missile programs are rarely pursued

independently of each of other. Research programs are

undertaken concurrently and the lessons learned from one are

applied to the other. Case in point, Iran has already

fielded a number of different short-range missiles and

successfully launched a satellite in 2009.The technology for

sending a satellite into an orbit is essentially the same as

delivering a light warhead to any destination on the planet.



Moreover, states with short-range missiles can pursue

alternative deployment options to give them the ability to

attack the U.S. homeland. For example, short-range missile

launchers can be placed on cargo vessels off the U.S. coast

to launch a missile at the homeland (the so called scud-in-

the-bucket scenario). Similarly, any single nuclear weapon

detonated at high-altitude above the U.S. would create an

electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effect, permanently disabling

the electrical systems that run nearly all civilian and

military infrastructures, tearing the very fabric of society

and changing life as we know it.



An EMP attack is one of the greatest threats imaginable to

the United States and the world. If a nuclear device were

to explode high in the atmosphere above the United States

with even a small nuclear weapon it would cause a

catastrophe similar to a large urban blackout, the Haitian

earthquake, or Hurricane Katrina. A ground-based midcourse

missile defense is one of the few means of countering

adversarial EMP-weapon programs.



Yet, the Obama Administration canceled the Airborne Laser

(ABL)-one of a few programs that could be utilized to

counter the scud-in-the-bucket threat in February of 2010.

The ABL uses directed energy to destroy incoming ballistic

missiles of all ranges in their boost, or initial, phase of

flight when the missile is the slowest and therefore the

most vulnerable. From an operational program, the Obama

Administration returned the ABL program to a test-bed

program. In FY2012, the Administration plans to invest $98

million-not enough for fully developing this system.



Finally, the Obama Administration negotiated The New START

Treaty, a bilateral arms control treaty with Russia. The

treaty, which entered into force in February 2011, is

detrimental to U.S. national security. It directly and

indirectly limits U.S. missile defense systems. The preamble

of the treaty establishes a link between offensive and

defensive arms, giving Russia a reason to object to the

Administration's Phased Adaptive Approach execution. The

treaty prohibits the conversion of offensive missile

launchers into missile defense interceptor launchers and

vice versa. In addition, the treaty requires both parties to

share telemetric information (information transmitted by

ballistic missiles and interceptors to the battle-space

management center on the ground), which could make U.S.

missile defenses less effective. Finally, New START creates

the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), the treaty's

implementing body, with a very broad mandate that could be

manipulated to further limit the capability of U.S. missile

defenses.



WHERE WE NEED TO GO

While Obama has put the brakes on missile defense, slowing

the program at exactly the wrong time, it is not too late to

hit the gas pedal again.



The essential first step that needs to be taken, to mitigate

the threat of a ballistic missile attack, is restoration of

funding for the Missile Defense Agency to the FY2010 level

of $10.9 billion. This level of funding could be easily

achieved if overall defense budgets were adequate. Funding

the core defense program at prudent levels would cost an

average of approximately $720 billion per year for the five-

year period from FY 2012 to FY 2016. A budget sustained at

this level through FY 2016 would allow the Department of

Defense to adequately fund research and development for

missile defense, as well as conventional forces, space,

command and control, cyberspace, and sensor technologies.

An average core defense funding level of $720 billion per

year is reasonable. It represents spending only around 4

percent of the nation's gross domestic product to meet the

federal government's primary constitutional obligation. More

specifically, it means marginally increasing defense

spending from 3.9 percent of GDP in FY 2010 to 4 percent of

GDP by FY 2015 and maintaining spending at 4 percent of GDP

for the next few years.



Sustaining adequate funding for missile defense as well as

for other defenses in the current constrained fiscal

environment will require: (1) reducing growth in entitlement

spending; (2) slowing the rise in defense manpower costs;

and (3) reducing wasteful, unnecessary, and inefficient

expenditures. These are difficult cost-saving and budgetary

measures that the Congress and the Administration must

undertake to ensure adequate funding, not just for missile

defense, but also for achieving sufficient defense spending

overall.



Getting the federal budget and defense priorities in order

is only the start. There are follow-on actions that could be

made to shore up defenses for both the short and the long

term.



For starters we need a broader bottom-up consensus on the

need for a comprehensive ballistic missile defense and

educate the public on the importance of missile defenses and

its stabilizing role in conflict situations. To do this

Congress should hold a series of public hearings to educate

the public. Hearings would emphasize the importance of

missile defense in national security issues and prepare

Congress to take legislative action to counter the threat of

ballistic missiles. These actions would allow Congress to

build and endorse a bipartisan national consensus for robust

layered missile defenses.



Meanwhile, for the short-term, the Aegis sea-based missile

defense with Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) interceptors provides

the U.S. with the most promising opportunities to remain

protected in the face of the evolving threat. The Obama

Administration should increase a number of SM-3

interceptors, including their newest version-SM-3 Block IB.

Last year, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that

Iran could potentially attack Europe with hundreds of

missiles. Increasing defensive capabilities in the European

theater is essential for the protection of U.S. allies,

interests, and forward-deployed troops. If these missiles

are properly networked with the existing radars and adequate

command and control arrangements in place (these steps are

also known under the "engage on remote" header), the

inherent long-range capability of SM-3 interceptors can be

further improved.



Furthermore, a smaller, lighter kill vehicle in SM-3

missiles would make the interceptor faster and more capable.

Technologies for smaller kill vehicles were developed during

the Reagan-era Strategic Defense Initiative. These can be

revived, adjusted and used for contemporary uses.



Missile defense also presents a great opportunity for

cooperation between the U.S. and its allies. Significant

steps have already been taken, for example when the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided in its 2010

Strategic Concept to "develop the capability to defend our

populations and territories against ballistic missile attack

as a core element of our collective defense, which

contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance."

Europe is already part of the Obama Administration's PAA.

That is not enough. Cooperation should extend to other

activities, such as the joint development of missile defense

systems, establishing command and control systems, and

preparing operational plans. NATO should field a variety of

land, air, sea, and ultimately space-based systems. More

robust and multinational missile defenses would be capable

of intercepting ballistic missiles in all three stages of

flight: the boost phase, the midcourse phase, and the

terminal phase. A division of labor, within allied

cooperation, would help to insure maximum interoperability,

flexibility, adaptability, and affordability. To that end,

the Administration can begin to take a step in the right

direction by restoring and committing to the fielding of the

MEADS program.



For the long-term, we need to reopen the debate over putting

defenses in space. Space-based missile defenses offer

significant advantages to protecting the United States and

its allies from a ballistic missile attack. First, space

missile defense is the most cost efficient option for

protecting the United States and its allies. A global

constellation of 1,000 space-based hit-to-kill interceptors,

along with replacements, would cost less than $20 billion to

build, launch, operate, and maintain over a 20-year period.

Second, space interceptors allow us to disable an incoming

missile at an earlier stage of flight, when the missile is

slowest and therefore the most vulnerable to an attack.

Third, interceptors in space are the least vulnerable to an

attack by adversaries. The current U.S. missile defense

infrastructure (silos and radars essential for cueing

interceptors) is mostly ground-based, and, therefore, more

vulnerable to an attack. Some countries (e.g., China and

Russia) have a rudimentary capability to shoot down space-

based interceptors, but they are not capable of disabling

all interceptors in space.



RESET-MISSILE DEFENSE, MR. PRESIDENT

The Obama Administration has complicated the ability of the

United States to protect against an incoming missile attack

despite evidence of aggressive ballistic missile programs in

Iran and North Korea and heavy investments by Russia and

China in their nuclear and missile programs. To get back

ahead of the threat, the fundamental choices made by the

administration must be revisited and some wholly reversed.



The time to push for maximum missile defenses is now.



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