From FPRI:
SAUDI ARABIA'S INTERVENTION IN BAHRAIN:
A NECESSARY EVIL OR A STRATEGIC BLUNDER?
by Rachel Bronson
March 18, 2011
Rachel Bronson is the Vice President, Programs and Studies
at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Dr. Bronson's
book Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with
Saudi Arabia (Oxford University Press, 2006), has been
translated into Japanese and published in paperback in June
2008. She has testified before the Congressional Anti-
Terrorist Finance Task Force, Congress' Joint Economic
Committee and the 9/11 Commission.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201103.bronson.saudiarabia.html
SAUDI ARABIA'S INTERVENTION IN BAHRAIN:
A NECESSARY EVIL OR A STRATEGIC BLUNDER?
by Rachel Bronson
On March 14, the government in Manama imposed martial law
over the tiny island state of Bahrain. Shortly thereafter,
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates moved security
forces into Bahrain under the auspices of a Peninsula Shield
Force (PSF). This show of force constituted a significant
step-change in regional politics. It was the first time that
Arab forces had crossed an international border to respond
to the political turmoil that has rocked the region since
December. It was also a surprisingly public show of force
from Saudi Arabia, a country that tends to prefer acting in
the shadows. The Kingdom is clearly rattled by events in the
region, and has lost faith in U.S. efforts to promote
dialogue in the absence of brute force. Time will tell
whether Saudi Arabia's decision to deploy more than one
thousand troops is a necessary evil or a strategic blunder.
Saudi Arabia's deployment is not without reason. Sitting
twenty miles off Saudi Arabia's eastern coast, Bahrain is
strategically important to Riyadh for economic, sectarian
and geopolitical reasons. Bahrain edges on Saudi Arabia's
Eastern Province, an oil-producing region that accounts for
one quarter of the world's proven oil resources. Any unrest
there has the potential to spill over into the Kingdom and
upend global oil markets. The Eastern Province is also home
to most of Saudi Arabia's Shi'a population, a population
that equals about 15 percent of Saudi Arabia's total
population and 30 percent of the population of the Eastern
Province. A radicalized and fraught Bahrain, with a Shi'a
population hovering around 70 percent could stoke the fires
of dissent in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, and provide
sanctuary to disgruntled Saudis. Overlaying the economic
and sectarian concerns are geopolitical realities that also
feed Saudi anxieties. An unstable Bahrain could easily
attract Iranian mischief. Iran has long-standing territorial
claims on Bahrain, and the Bahraini Shi'a were inspired by
the 1979 Iranian revolution. A more visible Iranian presence
in Bahrain would bring Tehran directly on to Saudi Arabia's
border. Riyadh clearly calculated that the ruling al-
Khalifa's of Bahrain were losing their grip, that the softer
line of dialogue peddled by Bahrain's Crown Prince and
supported by Washington was proving ineffective, and that
protests would continue on indefinitely to Saudi Arabia's
detriment and Iran's gain. Following Qaddafi's lead, Saudi
Arabia flexed its muscles hoping to put an end to local
instability.
Events may prove Riyadh right. But there are at least four
reasons to believe that even if a short-term boon, the Saudi
force deployment is a medium to longer term strategic
blunder. First, it greatly increases the chance of an
Iranian-Saudi confrontation. Second, it will likely roil oil
markets, something the Saudis try hard to avoid. Third, it
will deepen the region's Shi'a-Sunni divide in a way that
benefits Iran. Fourth, it will further strain U.S.-Saudi
relations.
INCREASING THE CHANCE OF IRANIAN-SAUDI ARABIAN CONFRONTATION
Saudi leaders have been deeply worried about Iran's regional
ascendancy since 1979, although its concern has become
heightened over the last decade. One very senior Saudi
explained it this way: "Iran is a country that feels
frustrated because it believes it has been hemmed in. It
feels it has been kept away from the leadership role that it
deserves. These feelings in such an important country are
dangerous." This view is pervasive among members of Saudi
Arabia's ruling elite.
For Saudi leaders, Iran is understood to be a revolutionary
and revanchist state whose opportunities are improving with
time. Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal has argued that the
2003 American invasion of Iraq was a gift to Iran, one that
we handed Tehran on a "silver platter." 2006 proved another
big win for Iran, when the U.S. supported democratic
elections in Palestine that brought Hamas to power. Not
surprising to the Saudis, Iran has capitalized on Hamas'
international isolation and used it to increase its
influence in the Palestinian territories. Lebanon is a third
front where Iranian influence is flourishing. There is thus
good reason for the Saudis to be concerned with Iranian
activities, and is the reason why Saudi Arabia's King
Abdullah called on the U.S. to "cut off the head of the
[Iranian] snake."
Over the past decade the Saudis and Iranians have verbally
sparred, and they have confronted each other albeit through
proxies. The most violent of confrontations occurred in
Yemen in 2009, when Saudi Arabia backed the Yemeni
government in its suppression of the al-Houthi rebellion,
claiming that the rebels were backed by Iran. The rebels
responded by taking the fight on to Saudi territory.
Although attacks on Saudi territory were significant, the
conflict was largely fought from behind the scenes, and in
the shadows, where the Saudis have tended to be more
comfortable. Hence the surprise to see Saudi forces rolling
across Bahrain's causeway so publicly.
With their presence in Bahrain now so-well advertised, Saudi
Arabia is vulnerable to charges of intervention and Iranian
sabotage. Although Iran is unlikely to deploy forces to meet
Arab activity, it will seek local allies and more
aggressively strengthen them. Even low level and potentially
unintentional events could now lead to a major dust-up.
Already, on March 15, Bahrain's largest Shiite Muslim
opposition group, Al Wefaq, condemned the government's
decision to impose martial law and called for international
intervention. Will the Iranians offer aid or military
support? Would al-Wefaq accept it? Iran has petitioned the
United Nations to examine the intervention. And rumors
abound of Saudi soldiers being the target of local attacks.
An on-going battle between Saudi Arabia and Iranian-
supported Bahraini fighters would easily turn into a nasty,
violent and destabilizing conflict, even if Iran does not
send overt military assistance.
RATTLING A JITTERY OIL MARKET
Second, the Saudi deployment has the potential to rattle oil
markets to a greater degree than the fighting in Libya. The
Saudis prefer calm markets with oil at reasonable prices.
Although dramatic swings upward add to Saudi Arabia's
coffers, it also causes buyers to search for alternative
sources of energy. With so much of the world's reserves
under its control, Saudi Arabia seeks oil prices below the
threshold that will prompt further diversification.
Today, oil markets are jittery because of first and foremost
the nuclear meltdown in Japan and then the stalemate in
Libya. Libya exports 1.2 million barrels a day and its
sweet crude is easier to refine than much of the heavier oil
shipping from elsewhere. Still, Saudi Arabia's ability to
replace Libyan exports (at least in volume) has calmed the
market. But the events in Libya pale in comparison to
instability in Bahrain, in ways that could reverberate into
the Eastern Province, and to a possible Saudi-Iranian
confrontation. If protests continue there, and if Bahrain's
oil facilities experience walk-outs or sabotage, we should
expect prices to rise, as traders bet against stability,
worry about the security of Persian Gulf sea lanes, and
anticipate Iranian subversion of Saudi oil fields only miles
away. It could be argued that ongoing instability in Bahrain
would have agitated market anyway. Until recently, however,
it seemed that oil markets were not responding to events in
Bahrain with panic. As one oil analyst described it, Bahrain
was "a page two or page three" story, until recently.
DEEPENING THE SUNNI-SHI'A DIVIDE
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, and al-Qa'eda
attacks on targets in the Kingdom in 2003/4, King Abdullah
undertook a set of high profile set of "National Dialogues"
with Shi'a leaders. The aim was to shift the internal
dialogue away from anti-Shi'a extremism. Sunni-Shi'a
relations have had a poor track record inside the Kingdom.
Anti-Shi'a policies and attacks go back as far as the
founding of Kingdom, and even earlier. For Saudi Shi'a,
their systematic marginalization, and the deep prejudice
with which their demands have been met are reason for
considerable skepticism that the situation will get much
better. Still their somewhat regular protests and their 1979
mobilization during Iran's revolution, makes trust building
a difficult enterprise. For this reason, King Abdullah's
initiative was a welcomed one, as was some increased public
spending in Shi'a areas. The King's efforts have not been
followed up with much of substance.
Still the King's efforts, and statements he has made at the
U.N. and elsewhere, are evidence that he does not view a
hardened Shi'a Sunni rift in the Kingdom's interest. And
yet, such a divide is exactly what Saudi Arabia's military
efforts will further solidify. The GCC has clearly come out
in favor of the Sunni-led status quo, and on March 16,
Jordan too threw its lot in with the GCC. Iran will of
course do everything in its power to cast recent activities
as a Sunni onslaught. Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon and Shi'a
leaders in Iraq have issued statements against the
deployment. Saudi Arabia's mobilization will fuel simmering
sectarian fires of the Middle East, and has offered the
Iranians a terrific diplomatic victory.
STRAINING U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS
The Saudi deployment, undertaken one day after U.S.
Secretary of Defense Gates traveled to the region and urged
reform, marks a new low point in U.S.-Saudi relations. As
David Ignatius of the Washington Post describes it, today's
unwelcomed situation is "the most important U.S.-Saudi
disagreement in decades," and it leaves the U.S. with few
good options. Washington and Riyadh are now publically
squared off on issues of political representation, violence
and stability. A U.S./Saudi diplomatic clash would further
challenge shaken oil markets. It would also leave Saudi
Arabia exposed internationally, as its primary international
partner distances itself. China and Russia remain as
possible future partners, in addition of course to local
Arab states, but Saudi Arabia has benefited from America's
partnership. For the U.S., the risks of a Saudi-U.S. split
are also profound. There is no more likely way to create a
true clash of civilizations than having the U.S. and Saudi
Arabia on opposite sides of a political divide. An
antagonized U.S.-Saudi relationship could empower the
radicals inside the Kingdom rather than bolster more
moderate forces. The Saudis have put at risk some of the
considerable gains they have made both internationally and
domestically by ensuring a U.S.-Saudi spat.
WHAT TO DO?
The U.S. finds itself in an extremely difficult position in
the Gulf. Statements from Secretary Clinton that Bahrain and
its Gulf Cooperation Council partners are "on the wrong
track," are feeble, but sadly about all the U.S. can offer.
Washington's dithering in Libya makes it even harder to
influence the Saudis to bring their soldiers home. Over the
past weeks, not to mention years, the U.S. has routinely
taken action that are at odds with the advice offered by
their regional allies, including turning a blind eye to
Libya's rebels when key partners in Europe and the Middle
East have argued to support them. Since military force is
emerging as the only predictable response that both keeps
leaders in power, and appears to be sanctioned by the United
States, there is little reason for Riyadh to pull back. U.S.
efforts to contain Iran have also been limited, further
bolstering Saudi calculations that it is time to look out
for itself. The problem of course is that if things go awry,
which they are likely to do, it risks a broader regional
conflict in the heart of oil territory and on the doorsteps
of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. The U.S., with Saudi help, has
boxed itself into a very dangerous corner and now faces a
very daunting choice between three bad options: (1) tacitly
backing Riyadh, and hoping that it can quickly shut down
dissent in Bahrain, the likelihood of which seems tenuous at
best; (2) using all leverage at its disposal to reverse
Saudi action, though its leverage is limited and such
pressure is likely to be rebuffed; (3) waffling somewhere in
the middle, appearing weak, antagonizing Saudi Arabia and
energizing Iran while offering little help to the Bahrainis
on either side of the conflict. These are unenviable
choices. What seems clear, however, is that whichever way
events take the region, the U.S. administration should be
quickly developing a new plan for how to manage a proxy war
between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Bahrain that will threaten
on a daily basis to escalate into major conflict.
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
SAUDI ARABIA'S INTERVENTION IN BAHRAIN:
A NECESSARY EVIL OR A STRATEGIC BLUNDER?
by Rachel Bronson
March 18, 2011
Rachel Bronson is the Vice President, Programs and Studies
at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Dr. Bronson's
book Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with
Saudi Arabia (Oxford University Press, 2006), has been
translated into Japanese and published in paperback in June
2008. She has testified before the Congressional Anti-
Terrorist Finance Task Force, Congress' Joint Economic
Committee and the 9/11 Commission.
Available on the web and in pdf format at:
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201103.bronson.saudiarabia.html
SAUDI ARABIA'S INTERVENTION IN BAHRAIN:
A NECESSARY EVIL OR A STRATEGIC BLUNDER?
by Rachel Bronson
On March 14, the government in Manama imposed martial law
over the tiny island state of Bahrain. Shortly thereafter,
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates moved security
forces into Bahrain under the auspices of a Peninsula Shield
Force (PSF). This show of force constituted a significant
step-change in regional politics. It was the first time that
Arab forces had crossed an international border to respond
to the political turmoil that has rocked the region since
December. It was also a surprisingly public show of force
from Saudi Arabia, a country that tends to prefer acting in
the shadows. The Kingdom is clearly rattled by events in the
region, and has lost faith in U.S. efforts to promote
dialogue in the absence of brute force. Time will tell
whether Saudi Arabia's decision to deploy more than one
thousand troops is a necessary evil or a strategic blunder.
Saudi Arabia's deployment is not without reason. Sitting
twenty miles off Saudi Arabia's eastern coast, Bahrain is
strategically important to Riyadh for economic, sectarian
and geopolitical reasons. Bahrain edges on Saudi Arabia's
Eastern Province, an oil-producing region that accounts for
one quarter of the world's proven oil resources. Any unrest
there has the potential to spill over into the Kingdom and
upend global oil markets. The Eastern Province is also home
to most of Saudi Arabia's Shi'a population, a population
that equals about 15 percent of Saudi Arabia's total
population and 30 percent of the population of the Eastern
Province. A radicalized and fraught Bahrain, with a Shi'a
population hovering around 70 percent could stoke the fires
of dissent in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, and provide
sanctuary to disgruntled Saudis. Overlaying the economic
and sectarian concerns are geopolitical realities that also
feed Saudi anxieties. An unstable Bahrain could easily
attract Iranian mischief. Iran has long-standing territorial
claims on Bahrain, and the Bahraini Shi'a were inspired by
the 1979 Iranian revolution. A more visible Iranian presence
in Bahrain would bring Tehran directly on to Saudi Arabia's
border. Riyadh clearly calculated that the ruling al-
Khalifa's of Bahrain were losing their grip, that the softer
line of dialogue peddled by Bahrain's Crown Prince and
supported by Washington was proving ineffective, and that
protests would continue on indefinitely to Saudi Arabia's
detriment and Iran's gain. Following Qaddafi's lead, Saudi
Arabia flexed its muscles hoping to put an end to local
instability.
Events may prove Riyadh right. But there are at least four
reasons to believe that even if a short-term boon, the Saudi
force deployment is a medium to longer term strategic
blunder. First, it greatly increases the chance of an
Iranian-Saudi confrontation. Second, it will likely roil oil
markets, something the Saudis try hard to avoid. Third, it
will deepen the region's Shi'a-Sunni divide in a way that
benefits Iran. Fourth, it will further strain U.S.-Saudi
relations.
INCREASING THE CHANCE OF IRANIAN-SAUDI ARABIAN CONFRONTATION
Saudi leaders have been deeply worried about Iran's regional
ascendancy since 1979, although its concern has become
heightened over the last decade. One very senior Saudi
explained it this way: "Iran is a country that feels
frustrated because it believes it has been hemmed in. It
feels it has been kept away from the leadership role that it
deserves. These feelings in such an important country are
dangerous." This view is pervasive among members of Saudi
Arabia's ruling elite.
For Saudi leaders, Iran is understood to be a revolutionary
and revanchist state whose opportunities are improving with
time. Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal has argued that the
2003 American invasion of Iraq was a gift to Iran, one that
we handed Tehran on a "silver platter." 2006 proved another
big win for Iran, when the U.S. supported democratic
elections in Palestine that brought Hamas to power. Not
surprising to the Saudis, Iran has capitalized on Hamas'
international isolation and used it to increase its
influence in the Palestinian territories. Lebanon is a third
front where Iranian influence is flourishing. There is thus
good reason for the Saudis to be concerned with Iranian
activities, and is the reason why Saudi Arabia's King
Abdullah called on the U.S. to "cut off the head of the
[Iranian] snake."
Over the past decade the Saudis and Iranians have verbally
sparred, and they have confronted each other albeit through
proxies. The most violent of confrontations occurred in
Yemen in 2009, when Saudi Arabia backed the Yemeni
government in its suppression of the al-Houthi rebellion,
claiming that the rebels were backed by Iran. The rebels
responded by taking the fight on to Saudi territory.
Although attacks on Saudi territory were significant, the
conflict was largely fought from behind the scenes, and in
the shadows, where the Saudis have tended to be more
comfortable. Hence the surprise to see Saudi forces rolling
across Bahrain's causeway so publicly.
With their presence in Bahrain now so-well advertised, Saudi
Arabia is vulnerable to charges of intervention and Iranian
sabotage. Although Iran is unlikely to deploy forces to meet
Arab activity, it will seek local allies and more
aggressively strengthen them. Even low level and potentially
unintentional events could now lead to a major dust-up.
Already, on March 15, Bahrain's largest Shiite Muslim
opposition group, Al Wefaq, condemned the government's
decision to impose martial law and called for international
intervention. Will the Iranians offer aid or military
support? Would al-Wefaq accept it? Iran has petitioned the
United Nations to examine the intervention. And rumors
abound of Saudi soldiers being the target of local attacks.
An on-going battle between Saudi Arabia and Iranian-
supported Bahraini fighters would easily turn into a nasty,
violent and destabilizing conflict, even if Iran does not
send overt military assistance.
RATTLING A JITTERY OIL MARKET
Second, the Saudi deployment has the potential to rattle oil
markets to a greater degree than the fighting in Libya. The
Saudis prefer calm markets with oil at reasonable prices.
Although dramatic swings upward add to Saudi Arabia's
coffers, it also causes buyers to search for alternative
sources of energy. With so much of the world's reserves
under its control, Saudi Arabia seeks oil prices below the
threshold that will prompt further diversification.
Today, oil markets are jittery because of first and foremost
the nuclear meltdown in Japan and then the stalemate in
Libya. Libya exports 1.2 million barrels a day and its
sweet crude is easier to refine than much of the heavier oil
shipping from elsewhere. Still, Saudi Arabia's ability to
replace Libyan exports (at least in volume) has calmed the
market. But the events in Libya pale in comparison to
instability in Bahrain, in ways that could reverberate into
the Eastern Province, and to a possible Saudi-Iranian
confrontation. If protests continue there, and if Bahrain's
oil facilities experience walk-outs or sabotage, we should
expect prices to rise, as traders bet against stability,
worry about the security of Persian Gulf sea lanes, and
anticipate Iranian subversion of Saudi oil fields only miles
away. It could be argued that ongoing instability in Bahrain
would have agitated market anyway. Until recently, however,
it seemed that oil markets were not responding to events in
Bahrain with panic. As one oil analyst described it, Bahrain
was "a page two or page three" story, until recently.
DEEPENING THE SUNNI-SHI'A DIVIDE
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, and al-Qa'eda
attacks on targets in the Kingdom in 2003/4, King Abdullah
undertook a set of high profile set of "National Dialogues"
with Shi'a leaders. The aim was to shift the internal
dialogue away from anti-Shi'a extremism. Sunni-Shi'a
relations have had a poor track record inside the Kingdom.
Anti-Shi'a policies and attacks go back as far as the
founding of Kingdom, and even earlier. For Saudi Shi'a,
their systematic marginalization, and the deep prejudice
with which their demands have been met are reason for
considerable skepticism that the situation will get much
better. Still their somewhat regular protests and their 1979
mobilization during Iran's revolution, makes trust building
a difficult enterprise. For this reason, King Abdullah's
initiative was a welcomed one, as was some increased public
spending in Shi'a areas. The King's efforts have not been
followed up with much of substance.
Still the King's efforts, and statements he has made at the
U.N. and elsewhere, are evidence that he does not view a
hardened Shi'a Sunni rift in the Kingdom's interest. And
yet, such a divide is exactly what Saudi Arabia's military
efforts will further solidify. The GCC has clearly come out
in favor of the Sunni-led status quo, and on March 16,
Jordan too threw its lot in with the GCC. Iran will of
course do everything in its power to cast recent activities
as a Sunni onslaught. Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon and Shi'a
leaders in Iraq have issued statements against the
deployment. Saudi Arabia's mobilization will fuel simmering
sectarian fires of the Middle East, and has offered the
Iranians a terrific diplomatic victory.
STRAINING U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS
The Saudi deployment, undertaken one day after U.S.
Secretary of Defense Gates traveled to the region and urged
reform, marks a new low point in U.S.-Saudi relations. As
David Ignatius of the Washington Post describes it, today's
unwelcomed situation is "the most important U.S.-Saudi
disagreement in decades," and it leaves the U.S. with few
good options. Washington and Riyadh are now publically
squared off on issues of political representation, violence
and stability. A U.S./Saudi diplomatic clash would further
challenge shaken oil markets. It would also leave Saudi
Arabia exposed internationally, as its primary international
partner distances itself. China and Russia remain as
possible future partners, in addition of course to local
Arab states, but Saudi Arabia has benefited from America's
partnership. For the U.S., the risks of a Saudi-U.S. split
are also profound. There is no more likely way to create a
true clash of civilizations than having the U.S. and Saudi
Arabia on opposite sides of a political divide. An
antagonized U.S.-Saudi relationship could empower the
radicals inside the Kingdom rather than bolster more
moderate forces. The Saudis have put at risk some of the
considerable gains they have made both internationally and
domestically by ensuring a U.S.-Saudi spat.
WHAT TO DO?
The U.S. finds itself in an extremely difficult position in
the Gulf. Statements from Secretary Clinton that Bahrain and
its Gulf Cooperation Council partners are "on the wrong
track," are feeble, but sadly about all the U.S. can offer.
Washington's dithering in Libya makes it even harder to
influence the Saudis to bring their soldiers home. Over the
past weeks, not to mention years, the U.S. has routinely
taken action that are at odds with the advice offered by
their regional allies, including turning a blind eye to
Libya's rebels when key partners in Europe and the Middle
East have argued to support them. Since military force is
emerging as the only predictable response that both keeps
leaders in power, and appears to be sanctioned by the United
States, there is little reason for Riyadh to pull back. U.S.
efforts to contain Iran have also been limited, further
bolstering Saudi calculations that it is time to look out
for itself. The problem of course is that if things go awry,
which they are likely to do, it risks a broader regional
conflict in the heart of oil territory and on the doorsteps
of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. The U.S., with Saudi help, has
boxed itself into a very dangerous corner and now faces a
very daunting choice between three bad options: (1) tacitly
backing Riyadh, and hoping that it can quickly shut down
dissent in Bahrain, the likelihood of which seems tenuous at
best; (2) using all leverage at its disposal to reverse
Saudi action, though its leverage is limited and such
pressure is likely to be rebuffed; (3) waffling somewhere in
the middle, appearing weak, antagonizing Saudi Arabia and
energizing Iran while offering little help to the Bahrainis
on either side of the conflict. These are unenviable
choices. What seems clear, however, is that whichever way
events take the region, the U.S. administration should be
quickly developing a new plan for how to manage a proxy war
between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Bahrain that will threaten
on a daily basis to escalate into major conflict.
----------------------------------------------------------
Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/).
No comments:
Post a Comment